1
00:00:19,429 --> 00:00:18,150
[Music]

2
00:00:22,429 --> 00:00:19,439
bespoke radio

3
00:00:23,990 --> 00:00:22,439
for the masses headline edition july 8

4
00:00:25,910 --> 00:00:24,000
1947

5
00:00:27,670 --> 00:00:25,920
the army air forces has announced that a

6
00:00:30,070 --> 00:00:27,680
flying disc has been found

7
00:00:31,429 --> 00:00:30,080
and is now in the possession of the army

8
00:00:34,790 --> 00:00:31,439
if the game is rigged

9
00:00:37,910 --> 00:00:34,800
change the game game changer

10
00:00:39,910 --> 00:00:37,920
i occasionally think how quickly our

11
00:00:42,950 --> 00:00:39,920
differences worldwide

12
00:00:43,750 --> 00:00:42,960
would vanish if we were facing an alien

13
00:00:45,590 --> 00:00:43,760
threat

14
00:00:47,360 --> 00:00:45,600
from outside this world

15
00:00:50,150 --> 00:00:47,370
[Music]

16
00:00:52,950 --> 00:00:50,160
[Applause]

17
00:00:54,069 --> 00:00:52,960
this is fade to black with your host

18
00:00:56,630 --> 00:00:54,079
jimmy church

19
00:00:57,670 --> 00:00:56,640
on the game changer radio network and

20
00:01:02,549 --> 00:00:57,680
kgra

21
00:01:07,770 --> 00:01:05,550
i need your help to get to the year

22
00:01:11,590 --> 00:01:07,780
1985.

23
00:01:13,590 --> 00:01:11,600
[Music]

24
00:01:28,469 --> 00:01:13,600
you're listening to fate to flag with

25
00:01:33,190 --> 00:01:29,370
good evening

26
00:01:33,200 --> 00:01:36,630
fade to black

27
00:01:50,720 --> 00:01:38,690
bespoke radio

28
00:01:52,710 --> 00:01:50,730
[Music]

29
00:01:57,110 --> 00:01:52,720
[Applause]

30
00:01:58,830 --> 00:01:57,120
today is tuesday may 19 2020.

31
00:02:01,630 --> 00:01:58,840
[Music]

32
00:02:03,190 --> 00:02:01,640
140 days into the new year

33
00:02:08,990 --> 00:02:03,200
[Applause]

34
00:02:12,390 --> 00:02:09,000
only 228 days left is that right that's

35
00:02:20,790 --> 00:02:12,400
368 days my math is off

36
00:02:23,910 --> 00:02:22,309
we are live from a bunker somewhere in

37
00:02:24,790 --> 00:02:23,920
the middle of beautiful downtown burbank

38
00:02:25,990 --> 00:02:24,800
california and i

39
00:02:29,430 --> 00:02:26,000
would like to welcome everybody

40
00:02:35,589 --> 00:02:33,430
all across the united states

41
00:02:37,430 --> 00:02:35,599
hither and tether to and fro back and

42
00:02:39,990 --> 00:02:37,440
forth up and down east and west north

43
00:02:40,000 --> 00:02:44,390
far and near

44
00:02:50,790 --> 00:02:46,630
this is fade to block for kjcr the game

45
00:02:52,550 --> 00:02:50,800
changer network and kg r a the planets

46
00:02:56,869 --> 00:02:52,560
all right i'm your host jimmy church

47
00:03:02,830 --> 00:02:56,879
what is cracking everybody how you doing

48
00:03:08,229 --> 00:03:04,630
wow

49
00:03:11,110 --> 00:03:08,239
grace jones man oh man all right

50
00:03:12,630 --> 00:03:11,120
yeah just checking out twitter that's

51
00:03:13,350 --> 00:03:12,640
what i was doing right there follow me

52
00:03:16,309 --> 00:03:13,360
on twitter

53
00:03:17,509 --> 00:03:16,319
churchradio hashtag f2b is the sandbox

54
00:03:18,710 --> 00:03:17,519
you can come and check out everything

55
00:03:22,470 --> 00:03:18,720
that i am looking at

56
00:03:26,470 --> 00:03:22,480
in real time from tampa rick from

57
00:03:29,750 --> 00:03:26,480
tara cassandra donny

58
00:03:32,550 --> 00:03:29,760
john yeah yeah

59
00:03:33,270 --> 00:03:32,560
kevin brad you guys are good you guys

60
00:03:36,550 --> 00:03:33,280
are funny

61
00:03:39,990 --> 00:03:36,560
you're funny with these yeah funny

62
00:03:42,550 --> 00:03:40,000
mark corey that's a good one

63
00:03:44,710 --> 00:03:42,560
that's a good one ah a little frank

64
00:03:46,390 --> 00:03:44,720
zappa just came in

65
00:03:48,949 --> 00:03:46,400
yeah this is pretty good stuff at

66
00:03:49,670 --> 00:03:48,959
jchurchradio hashtag f2b right there on

67
00:03:52,869 --> 00:03:49,680
twitter

68
00:03:56,390 --> 00:03:52,879
tonight back with this is greg

69
00:04:00,149 --> 00:03:56,400
housh there is you know

70
00:04:02,470 --> 00:04:00,159
greg is our hacker anonymous

71
00:04:03,270 --> 00:04:02,480
in residence that's that's that's greg

72
00:04:05,670 --> 00:04:03,280
that's greg

73
00:04:06,550 --> 00:04:05,680
uh when it comes to fade to black and we

74
00:04:09,030 --> 00:04:06,560
get

75
00:04:10,390 --> 00:04:09,040
you know breaking news on the internet

76
00:04:12,550 --> 00:04:10,400
and hacking and all that

77
00:04:15,030 --> 00:04:12,560
you know that's you know i i got the

78
00:04:15,509 --> 00:04:15,040
hotline to the guy right i can pick up

79
00:04:17,430 --> 00:04:15,519
the phone

80
00:04:18,949 --> 00:04:17,440
and call greg go man have you heard

81
00:04:21,990 --> 00:04:18,959
about this

82
00:04:22,629 --> 00:04:22,000
and uh he knows about everything too by

83
00:04:25,830 --> 00:04:22,639
the way he

84
00:04:29,749 --> 00:04:25,840
absolutely knows about everything so uh

85
00:04:33,830 --> 00:04:29,759
there is a huge story right now

86
00:04:37,110 --> 00:04:33,840
and that is a law firm

87
00:04:40,710 --> 00:04:37,120
in new york city and said by many

88
00:04:43,270 --> 00:04:40,720
to be the top the tippity top

89
00:04:44,150 --> 00:04:43,280
entertainment law firm in the world has

90
00:04:47,990 --> 00:04:44,160
been hacked

91
00:04:50,950 --> 00:04:48,000
by a group called our evil and

92
00:04:52,070 --> 00:04:50,960
uh it is huge news it's huge news for a

93
00:04:55,189 --> 00:04:52,080
lot of different reasons

94
00:04:56,390 --> 00:04:55,199
um but uh we're gonna go through all of

95
00:05:00,870 --> 00:04:56,400
that tonight

96
00:05:03,909 --> 00:05:00,880
with greg and over the weekend

97
00:05:07,270 --> 00:05:03,919
they upped their ransom demand from 21

98
00:05:10,790 --> 00:05:07,280
million dollars to 42 million

99
00:05:13,990 --> 00:05:10,800
and they said the reason for that is

100
00:05:17,110 --> 00:05:14,000
with the 750 gigabytes of

101
00:05:17,510 --> 00:05:17,120
secret data that we stole from you in

102
00:05:20,629 --> 00:05:17,520
that

103
00:05:21,029 --> 00:05:20,639
there is dirt on president trump and you

104
00:05:24,310 --> 00:05:21,039
have

105
00:05:25,110 --> 00:05:24,320
seven days to pay up okay or we're gonna

106
00:05:26,790 --> 00:05:25,120
release it

107
00:05:28,310 --> 00:05:26,800
so that's where we're at right now we're

108
00:05:30,070 --> 00:05:28,320
in a game of

109
00:05:32,310 --> 00:05:30,080
you know it's a poker match right it's

110
00:05:34,790 --> 00:05:32,320
poker going on here

111
00:05:35,749 --> 00:05:34,800
and that's what we're gonna cover

112
00:05:38,790 --> 00:05:35,759
tonight and why

113
00:05:41,350 --> 00:05:38,800
do this why why do this

114
00:05:43,510 --> 00:05:41,360
right why and we're gonna find out

115
00:05:45,350 --> 00:05:43,520
tonight it is very interesting and the

116
00:05:47,189 --> 00:05:45,360
other part about this and

117
00:05:49,270 --> 00:05:47,199
of course greg will be here in a few

118
00:05:52,310 --> 00:05:49,280
minutes to talk about it

119
00:05:54,710 --> 00:05:52,320
is that president trump

120
00:05:56,710 --> 00:05:54,720
you know like him or not and we're just

121
00:05:59,990 --> 00:05:56,720
talking about the facts here

122
00:06:03,510 --> 00:06:00,000
president trump was not appears to not

123
00:06:06,070 --> 00:06:03,520
have been a client of this law firm

124
00:06:07,830 --> 00:06:06,080
so what is it in these files if there is

125
00:06:11,350 --> 00:06:07,840
anything in these files

126
00:06:14,390 --> 00:06:11,360
right we don't know these answers

127
00:06:15,990 --> 00:06:14,400
it's very very very interesting okay

128
00:06:17,909 --> 00:06:16,000
so we'll be talking about all of that

129
00:06:20,629 --> 00:06:17,919
tonight

130
00:06:23,749 --> 00:06:20,639
yeah man greg spent much of his teens

131
00:06:27,430 --> 00:06:23,759
and early 20s evading the fbi

132
00:06:27,830 --> 00:06:27,440
every time hey craig craig every time i

133
00:06:31,909 --> 00:06:27,840
read

134
00:06:34,950 --> 00:06:31,919
man early 20s

135
00:06:36,710 --> 00:06:34,960
evading the fbi but that's it's it's

136
00:06:38,469 --> 00:06:36,720
real it's a real part of your life and

137
00:06:40,550 --> 00:06:38,479
it's absolutely crazy

138
00:06:43,749 --> 00:06:40,560
you were involved it's sort of what

139
00:06:46,870 --> 00:06:43,759
happened yeah well it's sort of right

140
00:06:48,629 --> 00:06:46,880
oh man it was life man you know

141
00:06:50,150 --> 00:06:48,639
you do what's next what's in front of

142
00:06:53,189 --> 00:06:50,160
you you react and

143
00:06:54,870 --> 00:06:53,199
that's where all of those uh accidents

144
00:06:58,550 --> 00:06:54,880
and mistakes took me

145
00:07:01,270 --> 00:06:58,560
you know uh recently uh because

146
00:07:03,270 --> 00:07:01,280
of uh one of the craziest days in

147
00:07:04,870 --> 00:07:03,280
internet history and the history of the

148
00:07:07,909 --> 00:07:04,880
world was

149
00:07:09,270 --> 00:07:07,919
the day that anonymous uh global protest

150
00:07:11,749 --> 00:07:09,280
campaign against the church of

151
00:07:13,990 --> 00:07:11,759
scientology was made public and

152
00:07:15,350 --> 00:07:14,000
and you guys woke up that morning going

153
00:07:16,950 --> 00:07:15,360
well i wonder if anything's going to

154
00:07:19,589 --> 00:07:16,960
happen right

155
00:07:20,230 --> 00:07:19,599
yeah pretty much and the next thing you

156
00:07:22,390 --> 00:07:20,240
know

157
00:07:24,390 --> 00:07:22,400
you've got thousands of people uh at

158
00:07:26,870 --> 00:07:24,400
different locations around the world

159
00:07:27,430 --> 00:07:26,880
all gathering uh wearing the guy foust

160
00:07:30,469 --> 00:07:27,440
mask

161
00:07:31,510 --> 00:07:30,479
and and the doo doo hit the fan that day

162
00:07:35,589 --> 00:07:31,520
but check this out

163
00:07:38,309 --> 00:07:35,599
recently i was looking up some terms

164
00:07:39,350 --> 00:07:38,319
uh some legal definitions in some

165
00:07:42,550 --> 00:07:39,360
research

166
00:07:45,830 --> 00:07:42,560
and in that i saw that

167
00:07:48,150 --> 00:07:45,840
the church of scientology is no longer

168
00:07:49,189 --> 00:07:48,160
allowed to bring or to use the court

169
00:07:51,270 --> 00:07:49,199
system

170
00:07:52,790 --> 00:07:51,280
right they can't do it they can't they

171
00:07:55,909 --> 00:07:52,800
because they attacked and

172
00:07:57,670 --> 00:07:55,919
used the court system to uh bring down

173
00:07:58,869 --> 00:07:57,680
event debt on people that they didn't

174
00:08:01,990 --> 00:07:58,879
like

175
00:08:02,469 --> 00:08:02,000
that now of any lawsuit or anything that

176
00:08:05,350 --> 00:08:02,479
they do

177
00:08:07,270 --> 00:08:05,360
has to be approved by the courts before

178
00:08:09,909 --> 00:08:07,280
they can take a step forward

179
00:08:11,430 --> 00:08:09,919
and not many lawyers want to represent

180
00:08:13,110 --> 00:08:11,440
them anymore because of

181
00:08:14,790 --> 00:08:13,120
this classification that they've been

182
00:08:17,909 --> 00:08:14,800
labeled on and

183
00:08:20,790 --> 00:08:17,919
i would say that all of that is

184
00:08:22,790 --> 00:08:20,800
largely in part uh to what went down

185
00:08:25,110 --> 00:08:22,800
back in 2008 man

186
00:08:26,309 --> 00:08:25,120
and you're responsible you're not you're

187
00:08:28,869 --> 00:08:26,319
responsible

188
00:08:30,950 --> 00:08:28,879
but you played a part in that and that's

189
00:08:33,029 --> 00:08:30,960
got to make you feel pretty good

190
00:08:35,110 --> 00:08:33,039
you know what i mean it does it does

191
00:08:35,509 --> 00:08:35,120
it's always weird looking back at that

192
00:08:37,750 --> 00:08:35,519
stuff

193
00:08:38,790 --> 00:08:37,760
and seeing the part i played because i

194
00:08:41,909 --> 00:08:38,800
know

195
00:08:43,589 --> 00:08:41,919
just how nothing we thought it was going

196
00:08:45,509 --> 00:08:43,599
to be how big of a joke we thought we

197
00:08:47,590 --> 00:08:45,519
were playing for that week right

198
00:08:49,910 --> 00:08:47,600
right and then and then i know the

199
00:08:51,750 --> 00:08:49,920
ramifications i know what happened

200
00:08:53,430 --> 00:08:51,760
and i know how we felt afterward and

201
00:08:53,990 --> 00:08:53,440
then what actions we took that led to

202
00:08:56,470 --> 00:08:54,000
all of this

203
00:08:57,590 --> 00:08:56,480
and like so i i you know from the inside

204
00:08:59,110 --> 00:08:57,600
it's way different than

205
00:09:01,590 --> 00:08:59,120
from the outside you could almost look

206
00:09:04,470 --> 00:09:01,600
at that as an unbelievably well planned

207
00:09:07,350 --> 00:09:04,480
attack that took down this behemoth of a

208
00:09:09,750 --> 00:09:07,360
no it like we made some just a lot of

209
00:09:10,310 --> 00:09:09,760
mistakes and miscalculations that led us

210
00:09:11,990 --> 00:09:10,320
into

211
00:09:14,150 --> 00:09:12,000
a much bigger thing than we had ever

212
00:09:15,910 --> 00:09:14,160
planned and being in and

213
00:09:17,430 --> 00:09:15,920
got very lucky that our decisions that

214
00:09:19,509 --> 00:09:17,440
we made along the way

215
00:09:20,630 --> 00:09:19,519
as all those accidents fell on our head

216
00:09:22,870 --> 00:09:20,640
happen to be

217
00:09:24,070 --> 00:09:22,880
the right ones to uh you know get us

218
00:09:26,710 --> 00:09:24,080
where we are now

219
00:09:28,389 --> 00:09:26,720
all because of it if you think about it

220
00:09:30,470 --> 00:09:28,399
lulls

221
00:09:32,550 --> 00:09:30,480
it was hilarious we wrote the radio

222
00:09:34,550 --> 00:09:32,560
right to make uh we only we wanted

223
00:09:37,150 --> 00:09:34,560
scientology to believe that the internet

224
00:09:39,030 --> 00:09:37,160
itself like some ominous uh

225
00:09:41,720 --> 00:09:39,040
anthropomorphic kind of uh

226
00:09:44,230 --> 00:09:41,730
character the internet was after them

227
00:09:46,710 --> 00:09:44,240
[Laughter]

228
00:09:47,350 --> 00:09:46,720
they only knew right if they only yeah

229
00:09:50,949 --> 00:09:47,360
and

230
00:09:54,150 --> 00:09:50,959
okay it has enough time passed uh

231
00:09:56,710 --> 00:09:54,160
with all of this that the statute of

232
00:09:59,990 --> 00:09:56,720
limitations on pizza deliveries has

233
00:10:01,590 --> 00:10:00,000
expired i mean on on a fair amount of

234
00:10:02,870 --> 00:10:01,600
what happened back then yeah the the

235
00:10:04,870 --> 00:10:02,880
statute is up

236
00:10:06,630 --> 00:10:04,880
so you can admit then that maybe you

237
00:10:08,630 --> 00:10:06,640
delivered a couple hundred pizzas to

238
00:10:11,670 --> 00:10:08,640
scientology

239
00:10:14,550 --> 00:10:11,680
i didn't deliver any pizza cookies

240
00:10:15,190 --> 00:10:14,560
uh some other people might have done

241
00:10:16,949 --> 00:10:15,200
that one

242
00:10:18,230 --> 00:10:16,959
i i did my fair share of fun stuff

243
00:10:20,710 --> 00:10:18,240
though yeah absolutely

244
00:10:21,509 --> 00:10:20,720
man absolutely and uh we're we're in

245
00:10:23,750 --> 00:10:21,519
such a debt

246
00:10:24,870 --> 00:10:23,760
uh to you and all of your friends man

247
00:10:27,030 --> 00:10:24,880
you have no idea

248
00:10:27,990 --> 00:10:27,040
love talking about it and i don't know

249
00:10:31,190 --> 00:10:28,000
if you listen to

250
00:10:33,670 --> 00:10:31,200
uh my rant today but um

251
00:10:35,190 --> 00:10:33,680
going back to our conversation that we

252
00:10:38,550 --> 00:10:35,200
had a few weeks ago

253
00:10:41,910 --> 00:10:38,560
uh here on fade to black you uh

254
00:10:44,790 --> 00:10:41,920
took the opportunity to just absolutely

255
00:10:45,990 --> 00:10:44,800
my brain when we started to talk about

256
00:10:48,790 --> 00:10:46,000
fake twitter accounts

257
00:10:49,990 --> 00:10:48,800
and and the ability to do that via

258
00:10:52,389 --> 00:10:50,000
software and

259
00:10:54,470 --> 00:10:52,399
and where that conversation yeah yeah

260
00:10:55,350 --> 00:10:54,480
yeah and where that conversation took us

261
00:10:58,630 --> 00:10:55,360
that night

262
00:11:00,389 --> 00:10:58,640
but then after that really

263
00:11:02,389 --> 00:11:00,399
it's weird how everything in the

264
00:11:05,430 --> 00:11:02,399
universe is duality man it's

265
00:11:06,550 --> 00:11:05,440
everything happens in pairs and you just

266
00:11:09,269 --> 00:11:06,560
have to be

267
00:11:10,470 --> 00:11:09,279
uh wide awake uh to notice it when it

268
00:11:11,750 --> 00:11:10,480
happens because right after that

269
00:11:15,269 --> 00:11:11,760
conversation

270
00:11:18,949 --> 00:11:15,279
this flurry of activities

271
00:11:21,750 --> 00:11:18,959
surfaced on facebook and i

272
00:11:24,550 --> 00:11:21,760
ignored it i saw it all but it was

273
00:11:27,350 --> 00:11:24,560
talking about these fact checking bots

274
00:11:29,269 --> 00:11:27,360
and and everybody retweeting go and and

275
00:11:31,030 --> 00:11:29,279
get into your security go to blocking

276
00:11:33,030 --> 00:11:31,040
search these keywords

277
00:11:34,710 --> 00:11:33,040
and and look at these bots that are

278
00:11:36,710 --> 00:11:34,720
there and start blocking them and

279
00:11:39,269 --> 00:11:36,720
deleting them right so

280
00:11:40,389 --> 00:11:39,279
and i see it it's all over the place i

281
00:11:43,750 --> 00:11:40,399
ignored it

282
00:11:46,630 --> 00:11:43,760
and today i was like okay

283
00:11:48,389 --> 00:11:46,640
all right you know i get another message

284
00:11:50,550 --> 00:11:48,399
from you know a personal friend

285
00:11:51,590 --> 00:11:50,560
going you know a personal message going

286
00:11:53,269 --> 00:11:51,600
to me this is

287
00:11:54,710 --> 00:11:53,279
this is actually pretty real you need to

288
00:11:59,269 --> 00:11:54,720
go and check this out

289
00:12:02,310 --> 00:11:59,279
so i did today and and i jumped in

290
00:12:05,829 --> 00:12:02,320
and i was shocked greg i was shocked

291
00:12:06,949 --> 00:12:05,839
to see how many and they don't even hide

292
00:12:10,389 --> 00:12:06,959
their names

293
00:12:14,069 --> 00:12:10,399
right these bots facebook

294
00:12:17,110 --> 00:12:14,079
fact checking bot it's what it's called

295
00:12:18,629 --> 00:12:17,120
or variations of that and and i had

296
00:12:20,870 --> 00:12:18,639
about a half a dozen of those

297
00:12:22,870 --> 00:12:20,880
and and i blocked them and then i got a

298
00:12:25,269 --> 00:12:22,880
couple of new ones as soon as those were

299
00:12:26,069 --> 00:12:25,279
blocked and then i started searching

300
00:12:29,110 --> 00:12:26,079
other names

301
00:12:29,829 --> 00:12:29,120
you know uh facebook checker facebook

302
00:12:36,310 --> 00:12:29,839
check

303
00:12:37,990 --> 00:12:36,320
and i it turns out as you can imagine i

304
00:12:40,389 --> 00:12:38,000
know i'm not surprising you but i'm

305
00:12:42,550 --> 00:12:40,399
literally followed by a thousand people

306
00:12:45,750 --> 00:12:42,560
named checker

307
00:12:48,629 --> 00:12:45,760
right it's like oh wait where did this

308
00:12:50,710 --> 00:12:48,639
you know and and the other bizarre part

309
00:12:52,069 --> 00:12:50,720
about this and again i'm not telling you

310
00:12:53,910 --> 00:12:52,079
anything that you don't already

311
00:12:55,829 --> 00:12:53,920
know but when you get facebook

312
00:12:58,790 --> 00:12:55,839
notifications about a follower

313
00:13:00,389 --> 00:12:58,800
it pops up right jane doe is now

314
00:13:03,430 --> 00:13:00,399
following you on facebook

315
00:13:04,629 --> 00:13:03,440
right steve jones is now following you

316
00:13:06,470 --> 00:13:04,639
on facebook

317
00:13:07,750 --> 00:13:06,480
and and you get those but i never got a

318
00:13:10,629 --> 00:13:07,760
notification about

319
00:13:11,509 --> 00:13:10,639
facebook fact checker is now following

320
00:13:14,550 --> 00:13:11,519
you on facebook

321
00:13:14,870 --> 00:13:14,560
you don't get that notification and i

322
00:13:20,629 --> 00:13:14,880
was

323
00:13:23,190 --> 00:13:20,639
you can assume it's going on to some

324
00:13:26,629 --> 00:13:23,200
degree right of course

325
00:13:29,590 --> 00:13:26,639
but is it necessary to have a thousand

326
00:13:31,269 --> 00:13:29,600
face checking bots and people following

327
00:13:34,550 --> 00:13:31,279
somebody like me that's never even been

328
00:13:36,949 --> 00:13:34,560
in facebook jail why did they do it

329
00:13:38,470 --> 00:13:36,959
uh i mean data's money though the more

330
00:13:39,350 --> 00:13:38,480
people they follow the more stuff they

331
00:13:42,310 --> 00:13:39,360
can learn

332
00:13:43,750 --> 00:13:42,320
the more they can aggregate into uh data

333
00:13:46,870 --> 00:13:43,760
sets that do fun things

334
00:13:48,230 --> 00:13:46,880
train machine learning right uh sell the

335
00:13:49,990 --> 00:13:48,240
data to other people

336
00:13:51,590 --> 00:13:50,000
i mean it's just it's it's it's all

337
00:13:55,350 --> 00:13:51,600
about data at that point

338
00:13:57,829 --> 00:13:55,360
it is the is the process

339
00:13:58,870 --> 00:13:57,839
in doing this because facebook is

340
00:14:00,710 --> 00:13:58,880
private

341
00:14:01,990 --> 00:14:00,720
uh you know to some degree i mean it's a

342
00:14:03,910 --> 00:14:02,000
publicly traded company

343
00:14:05,670 --> 00:14:03,920
but it's not a officially a

344
00:14:09,189 --> 00:14:05,680
government-run organization

345
00:14:13,750 --> 00:14:09,199
yet but uh is this is this

346
00:14:17,590 --> 00:14:13,760
kind of monitoring legal

347
00:14:19,110 --> 00:14:17,600
uh you know it's the one of those really

348
00:14:21,750 --> 00:14:19,120
gray areas where

349
00:14:23,910 --> 00:14:21,760
you've agreed to a terms of service that

350
00:14:25,990 --> 00:14:23,920
facebook will do x y and z

351
00:14:27,590 --> 00:14:26,000
and then they've agreed to a terms of

352
00:14:29,030 --> 00:14:27,600
service you know the other say user

353
00:14:31,350 --> 00:14:29,040
who's now following you

354
00:14:33,030 --> 00:14:31,360
that says facebook will do x y and z you

355
00:14:35,189 --> 00:14:33,040
both have agreed to what you

356
00:14:36,949 --> 00:14:35,199
will do and what you're allowed to do

357
00:14:38,790 --> 00:14:36,959
and um

358
00:14:41,509 --> 00:14:38,800
some of their actions fall well within

359
00:14:43,990 --> 00:14:41,519
the terms of service and some do not

360
00:14:46,150 --> 00:14:44,000
illegal that's the big question because

361
00:14:47,189 --> 00:14:46,160
is violating a terms of service that you

362
00:14:49,509 --> 00:14:47,199
might not have read

363
00:14:51,110 --> 00:14:49,519
illegal that has been tried in court a

364
00:14:53,670 --> 00:14:51,120
few different times and

365
00:14:55,269 --> 00:14:53,680
the problem we've run into is the cases

366
00:14:57,430 --> 00:14:55,279
have always ended up being settled on a

367
00:14:59,750 --> 00:14:57,440
completely different point than that

368
00:15:01,990 --> 00:14:59,760
and so we've never gotten a definitive

369
00:15:02,949 --> 00:15:02,000
uh answer to you know just just how

370
00:15:06,310 --> 00:15:02,959
strong uh that

371
00:15:09,509 --> 00:15:06,320
that tos is yeah the terms of service

372
00:15:10,069 --> 00:15:09,519
i would say any argument laid out in

373
00:15:14,150 --> 00:15:10,079
court

374
00:15:16,069 --> 00:15:14,160
by any uh it could be the plaintiff or

375
00:15:17,430 --> 00:15:16,079
a defense attorney it's going to say the

376
00:15:18,710 --> 00:15:17,440
exact same thing and everybody

377
00:15:21,990 --> 00:15:18,720
understands it

378
00:15:23,430 --> 00:15:22,000
that nobody reads a tos they can there's

379
00:15:26,230 --> 00:15:23,440
a whole south park joke about it

380
00:15:27,189 --> 00:15:26,240
yeah in the entire episode yeah and yes

381
00:15:31,189 --> 00:15:27,199
that's right

382
00:15:32,550 --> 00:15:31,199
and the reason is uh everybody knows

383
00:15:35,350 --> 00:15:32,560
that they have

384
00:15:36,710 --> 00:15:35,360
uh made the type so small the legalese

385
00:15:39,990 --> 00:15:36,720
and boilerplate

386
00:15:42,310 --> 00:15:40,000
stuff so long that nobody

387
00:15:43,269 --> 00:15:42,320
is ever going to read it therefore they

388
00:15:45,110 --> 00:15:43,279
can bury

389
00:15:46,389 --> 00:15:45,120
anything in that terms of service that

390
00:15:48,069 --> 00:15:46,399
they want to

391
00:15:50,710 --> 00:15:48,079
you're going to sign it you're going to

392
00:15:51,910 --> 00:15:50,720
click because you want whatever it is

393
00:15:54,310 --> 00:15:51,920
that they have

394
00:15:55,670 --> 00:15:54,320
whether it's software it's a platform

395
00:15:57,829 --> 00:15:55,680
whatever that tos

396
00:15:59,509 --> 00:15:57,839
is you need it you're gonna click and

397
00:16:02,310 --> 00:15:59,519
you're just assuming that

398
00:16:03,829 --> 00:16:02,320
you're in the clear if anything rises in

399
00:16:06,629 --> 00:16:03,839
the legal sense later they

400
00:16:08,550 --> 00:16:06,639
they will always say well you you agreed

401
00:16:11,110 --> 00:16:08,560
to the terms of service

402
00:16:11,590 --> 00:16:11,120
but everybody knows that nobody reads a

403
00:16:14,870 --> 00:16:11,600
term

404
00:16:18,230 --> 00:16:14,880
of service right and it's like this

405
00:16:19,910 --> 00:16:18,240
conundrum that we find ourselves in

406
00:16:21,509 --> 00:16:19,920
i mean every time i see any kind of a

407
00:16:23,829 --> 00:16:21,519
terms of service window or

408
00:16:25,350 --> 00:16:23,839
do you agree to this on software window

409
00:16:27,110 --> 00:16:25,360
i literally just

410
00:16:28,870 --> 00:16:27,120
glance at it so i can find the button

411
00:16:29,670 --> 00:16:28,880
i've gotta click and jokingly say yep

412
00:16:32,949 --> 00:16:29,680
you can have it

413
00:16:35,430 --> 00:16:32,959
that's it whatever it is they want click

414
00:16:36,710 --> 00:16:35,440
because i'm not reading that's three

415
00:16:38,069 --> 00:16:36,720
days worth of reading to figure out

416
00:16:38,949 --> 00:16:38,079
whether i'm installing the software or

417
00:16:41,110 --> 00:16:38,959
not no thank you

418
00:16:45,110 --> 00:16:41,120
yeah that's right it could say something

419
00:16:48,710 --> 00:16:45,120
like and if you don't pay your 5.99

420
00:16:51,189 --> 00:16:48,720
on time we will take your house

421
00:16:52,150 --> 00:16:51,199
you know it could yeah and nobody would

422
00:16:54,550 --> 00:16:52,160
ever know

423
00:16:56,150 --> 00:16:54,560
right yeah and then we just don't know

424
00:16:58,069 --> 00:16:56,160
how strongly they actually hold up in

425
00:16:59,910 --> 00:16:58,079
court there's been a few cases where

426
00:17:01,350 --> 00:16:59,920
certain information in them has worked

427
00:17:04,069 --> 00:17:01,360
out in in the favor of the

428
00:17:06,069 --> 00:17:04,079
the company but overall we don't have a

429
00:17:07,750 --> 00:17:06,079
strong precedent set yet you know all

430
00:17:09,590 --> 00:17:07,760
the way up to the supreme court on

431
00:17:12,069 --> 00:17:09,600
just how enforceable in terms of

432
00:17:13,270 --> 00:17:12,079
services especially based on how it's

433
00:17:15,189 --> 00:17:13,280
presented like

434
00:17:16,630 --> 00:17:15,199
if your website just in a little pop-up

435
00:17:18,470 --> 00:17:16,640
says we have one

436
00:17:20,390 --> 00:17:18,480
and you should read it and then you know

437
00:17:21,429 --> 00:17:20,400
lets you in does that count as you

438
00:17:23,909 --> 00:17:21,439
agreeing to it

439
00:17:25,669 --> 00:17:23,919
or did you have to scroll all the way to

440
00:17:26,309 --> 00:17:25,679
the bottom before the button appeared

441
00:17:28,390 --> 00:17:26,319
you know

442
00:17:29,430 --> 00:17:28,400
we don't have a strong precedent as to

443
00:17:32,070 --> 00:17:29,440
what that means

444
00:17:33,270 --> 00:17:32,080
you know there's nothing like say gdpr

445
00:17:35,270 --> 00:17:33,280
is over in europe where

446
00:17:36,789 --> 00:17:35,280
they're controlling how cookies work

447
00:17:38,710 --> 00:17:36,799
right where you have to

448
00:17:40,310 --> 00:17:38,720
ask people in a certain way before we

449
00:17:42,390 --> 00:17:40,320
believe you got their permission

450
00:17:44,549 --> 00:17:42,400
in terms of services don't work that way

451
00:17:45,350 --> 00:17:44,559
and so it'll be really interesting when

452
00:17:47,590 --> 00:17:45,360
a when a

453
00:17:49,430 --> 00:17:47,600
real supreme court case actually happens

454
00:17:51,350 --> 00:17:49,440
that actually talks about

455
00:17:53,110 --> 00:17:51,360
how they have to show it to you how they

456
00:17:55,029 --> 00:17:53,120
have to prove that you saw it

457
00:17:56,789 --> 00:17:55,039
or it's on your head because you didn't

458
00:17:59,029 --> 00:17:56,799
read it and go find it yourself

459
00:18:00,150 --> 00:17:59,039
and there was a very exciting thing that

460
00:18:03,750 --> 00:18:00,160
happened uh

461
00:18:06,870 --> 00:18:03,760
with the eu last year with the way that

462
00:18:08,310 --> 00:18:06,880
websites represented themselves for

463
00:18:10,630 --> 00:18:08,320
a lot of different reasons we don't need

464
00:18:14,230 --> 00:18:10,640
to go into those details but

465
00:18:17,350 --> 00:18:14,240
uh the eu stressed and this involved

466
00:18:20,390 --> 00:18:17,360
everybody from facebook on down every

467
00:18:21,190 --> 00:18:20,400
if you had a website on the web you had

468
00:18:24,310 --> 00:18:21,200
to

469
00:18:27,430 --> 00:18:24,320
comply with this new eu ruling

470
00:18:29,029 --> 00:18:27,440
and if you're a website like say fade to

471
00:18:30,950 --> 00:18:29,039
black that is

472
00:18:32,710 --> 00:18:30,960
seen around the world and it's not

473
00:18:34,549 --> 00:18:32,720
limited and everything is seen around

474
00:18:37,270 --> 00:18:34,559
the world and if somebody in europe is

475
00:18:41,430 --> 00:18:37,280
clicking on your website you are now

476
00:18:43,510 --> 00:18:41,440
uh forced into um uh complying

477
00:18:44,630 --> 00:18:43,520
well that was exciting at the time that

478
00:18:46,630 --> 00:18:44,640
you know the eu was

479
00:18:48,230 --> 00:18:46,640
taking this initiative but what it

480
00:18:51,830 --> 00:18:48,240
forced everybody to do

481
00:18:55,510 --> 00:18:51,840
is to rewrite their terms of service so

482
00:18:58,710 --> 00:18:55,520
everybody right and so all of these new

483
00:19:01,510 --> 00:18:58,720
versions of terms of service went out

484
00:19:02,870 --> 00:19:01,520
to comply with this regulation and

485
00:19:08,230 --> 00:19:02,880
nobody read it

486
00:19:10,470 --> 00:19:08,240
billions of clicks on tos

487
00:19:12,310 --> 00:19:10,480
that wasn't reviewed by one single user

488
00:19:14,630 --> 00:19:12,320
and i can guarantee that

489
00:19:16,710 --> 00:19:14,640
but a bunch of people did see more of

490
00:19:17,430 --> 00:19:16,720
those uh do you accept our cookies

491
00:19:19,190 --> 00:19:17,440
notices

492
00:19:20,950 --> 00:19:19,200
yep yep but they just click on the

493
00:19:24,150 --> 00:19:20,960
button without even reading

494
00:19:24,630 --> 00:19:24,160
i i deny cookies every time i do not

495
00:19:26,150 --> 00:19:24,640
know

496
00:19:27,909 --> 00:19:26,160
you're in a very small percentage of

497
00:19:30,310 --> 00:19:27,919
people i deny them every time

498
00:19:31,029 --> 00:19:30,320
it never stops the website from running

499
00:19:33,110 --> 00:19:31,039
so oh

500
00:19:34,630 --> 00:19:33,120
no and it usually in the end i mean half

501
00:19:35,190 --> 00:19:34,640
of those tools don't even work and you

502
00:19:36,630 --> 00:19:35,200
know

503
00:19:38,390 --> 00:19:36,640
the cookies come right through and you

504
00:19:40,150 --> 00:19:38,400
could run other tools like heck you

505
00:19:41,669 --> 00:19:40,160
could run brave browser which is so

506
00:19:43,110 --> 00:19:41,679
awesome that it blocks

507
00:19:44,870 --> 00:19:43,120
all of the tracking and ads and

508
00:19:46,549 --> 00:19:44,880
everything on every website only of

509
00:19:47,750 --> 00:19:46,559
course to inject all of its own tracking

510
00:19:51,029 --> 00:19:47,760
and ads

511
00:19:54,630 --> 00:19:51,039
um like sure that great oh

512
00:19:55,029 --> 00:19:54,640
man and yeah totally totally totally and

513
00:20:01,990 --> 00:19:55,039
now

514
00:20:03,990 --> 00:20:02,000
easyjet uh which which popped up

515
00:20:05,510 --> 00:20:04,000
and going back to what we're going to be

516
00:20:07,750 --> 00:20:05,520
talking about tonight

517
00:20:09,190 --> 00:20:07,760
which is uh this entertainment law firm

518
00:20:10,789 --> 00:20:09,200
out of new york we'll get to all of that

519
00:20:14,149 --> 00:20:10,799
at the top of the hour

520
00:20:17,430 --> 00:20:14,159
but isn't isn't it

521
00:20:20,789 --> 00:20:17,440
the accepted internet 101

522
00:20:24,310 --> 00:20:20,799
rule number one today that everybody

523
00:20:27,510 --> 00:20:24,320
should be understanding which is never

524
00:20:31,190 --> 00:20:27,520
click on a link right never click

525
00:20:33,350 --> 00:20:31,200
nev when is it when is it a good

526
00:20:35,909 --> 00:20:33,360
acceptable time to click on a link that

527
00:20:37,909 --> 00:20:35,919
somebody has sent you greg

528
00:20:39,830 --> 00:20:37,919
uh when you know you've got the right

529
00:20:41,750 --> 00:20:39,840
security software running you know the

530
00:20:45,190 --> 00:20:41,760
domain that it's going to

531
00:20:46,950 --> 00:20:45,200
uh and you have copied the link not just

532
00:20:49,190 --> 00:20:46,960
clicked on it but copied it out and

533
00:20:51,190 --> 00:20:49,200
pasted it in and not pasted it and just

534
00:20:52,549 --> 00:20:51,200
instantly hit enter but paste it in to

535
00:20:54,149 --> 00:20:52,559
make sure that it's not some crazy

536
00:20:55,029 --> 00:20:54,159
formatted one that's going to send you

537
00:20:56,710 --> 00:20:55,039
off because

538
00:20:58,390 --> 00:20:56,720
you know one of my favorite hacks i ever

539
00:20:59,830 --> 00:20:58,400
saw in terms of like getting people to

540
00:21:02,950 --> 00:20:59,840
follow links was

541
00:21:04,230 --> 00:21:02,960
there was a url on microsoft.com where

542
00:21:08,470 --> 00:21:04,240
if you form this url

543
00:21:11,510 --> 00:21:08,480
by typing in microsoft.com slash re-dir

544
00:21:12,390 --> 00:21:11,520
dot jsp slash and then some other domain

545
00:21:13,990 --> 00:21:12,400
name

546
00:21:15,510 --> 00:21:14,000
you would visit it and it looks like

547
00:21:16,310 --> 00:21:15,520
you're going to microsoft.com because

548
00:21:18,710 --> 00:21:16,320
you are

549
00:21:19,510 --> 00:21:18,720
but microsoft would instantly redirect

550
00:21:21,430 --> 00:21:19,520
you

551
00:21:23,510 --> 00:21:21,440
to that other website so people would

552
00:21:24,870 --> 00:21:23,520
send you these microsoft.com links

553
00:21:26,870 --> 00:21:24,880
and you'd think oh it's microsoft i can

554
00:21:29,510 --> 00:21:26,880
click on that it's safe no it's not

555
00:21:30,070 --> 00:21:29,520
read the whole link that's right now how

556
00:21:33,190 --> 00:21:30,080
many people

557
00:21:35,669 --> 00:21:33,200
do what you just said i mean most

558
00:21:36,310 --> 00:21:35,679
don't no nobody always attacks work

559
00:21:39,750 --> 00:21:36,320
right and

560
00:21:41,669 --> 00:21:39,760
and so the rule of thumb is you know you

561
00:21:44,549 --> 00:21:41,679
get an email with a link in it

562
00:21:45,669 --> 00:21:44,559
no matter who it is what it is what the

563
00:21:48,630 --> 00:21:45,679
company is

564
00:21:50,470 --> 00:21:48,640
never click on it right just just unless

565
00:21:52,950 --> 00:21:50,480
you asked for it like if you asked for a

566
00:21:55,029 --> 00:21:52,960
password reset and then it shows up

567
00:21:56,230 --> 00:21:55,039
copy it paste it in make sure that looks

568
00:21:58,070 --> 00:21:56,240
legit and then

569
00:21:59,270 --> 00:21:58,080
click you know the hit the enter button

570
00:22:00,710 --> 00:21:59,280
whatever but like

571
00:22:02,230 --> 00:22:00,720
you know if you didn't ask for it and

572
00:22:03,590 --> 00:22:02,240
you get a password reset button don't

573
00:22:04,789 --> 00:22:03,600
think oh i need to visit that website

574
00:22:07,190 --> 00:22:04,799
i'm going to click the link

575
00:22:08,310 --> 00:22:07,200
no no go type it in and go reset your

576
00:22:11,750 --> 00:22:08,320
password just to be safe

577
00:22:15,990 --> 00:22:11,760
yeah i uh recently uh i took

578
00:22:19,830 --> 00:22:16,000
the initiative right i i get uh a paypal

579
00:22:20,470 --> 00:22:19,840
email um asking for a couple of specific

580
00:22:23,510 --> 00:22:20,480
things

581
00:22:27,110 --> 00:22:23,520
and uh to i don't want to get into the

582
00:22:27,510 --> 00:22:27,120
the details of it but uh to to click on

583
00:22:29,750 --> 00:22:27,520
this

584
00:22:30,870 --> 00:22:29,760
well i i was in the middle of something

585
00:22:33,270 --> 00:22:30,880
with paypal

586
00:22:34,230 --> 00:22:33,280
like the week before and i thought it

587
00:22:37,510 --> 00:22:34,240
was related

588
00:22:40,270 --> 00:22:37,520
right and i just looked at it really

589
00:22:41,510 --> 00:22:40,280
really closely and it was like to

590
00:22:44,789 --> 00:22:41,520
paypal.com

591
00:22:48,149 --> 00:22:44,799
and and and i looked at and then it just

592
00:22:50,710 --> 00:22:48,159
didn't seem quite right and

593
00:22:52,310 --> 00:22:50,720
it turns out i went to paypal.com and i

594
00:22:56,070 --> 00:22:52,320
looked at a couple of things

595
00:22:58,230 --> 00:22:56,080
and realized it was a phishing email

596
00:23:00,070 --> 00:22:58,240
i turned around and contacted paypal

597
00:23:00,630 --> 00:23:00,080
they wrote me back and said could you

598
00:23:02,470 --> 00:23:00,640
please

599
00:23:04,549 --> 00:23:02,480
just send us the link and we want to

600
00:23:06,789 --> 00:23:04,559
stay on top of this and i did

601
00:23:08,549 --> 00:23:06,799
and and i sent them the links and i sent

602
00:23:11,110 --> 00:23:08,559
them the actual email

603
00:23:11,990 --> 00:23:11,120
itself they wrote me back and said thank

604
00:23:14,870 --> 00:23:12,000
you

605
00:23:15,190 --> 00:23:14,880
um that people do this all the time or

606
00:23:19,909 --> 00:23:15,200
they

607
00:23:23,270 --> 00:23:19,919
paypal.com

608
00:23:24,310 --> 00:23:23,280
uh address but there's always another

609
00:23:26,950 --> 00:23:24,320
tag on it

610
00:23:27,510 --> 00:23:26,960
that doesn't make it paypal.com very

611
00:23:30,630 --> 00:23:27,520
very

612
00:23:34,390 --> 00:23:30,640
well done ingenious how

613
00:23:35,590 --> 00:23:34,400
how uh now in anybody else that would

614
00:23:37,830 --> 00:23:35,600
have seen this

615
00:23:39,590 --> 00:23:37,840
definitely would have clicked i i mean i

616
00:23:39,990 --> 00:23:39,600
just i can guarantee it because i almost

617
00:23:43,350 --> 00:23:40,000
did

618
00:23:45,110 --> 00:23:43,360
yeah and the stuff is uh

619
00:23:46,710 --> 00:23:45,120
so easy and cheap for them to do at this

620
00:23:48,549 --> 00:23:46,720
point uh that i mean

621
00:23:50,149 --> 00:23:48,559
that's actually one of the funnier

622
00:23:53,590 --> 00:23:50,159
things about what's happening

623
00:23:56,630 --> 00:23:53,600
right now with the uh the our evil uh

624
00:23:58,149 --> 00:23:56,640
attack uh it's uh how simple of an

625
00:24:00,390 --> 00:23:58,159
attack it actually is

626
00:24:01,909 --> 00:24:00,400
now uh we're gonna talk about this when

627
00:24:05,190 --> 00:24:01,919
we come back from the break

628
00:24:09,190 --> 00:24:05,200
and uh was

629
00:24:13,590 --> 00:24:09,200
this initiated because

630
00:24:16,149 --> 00:24:13,600
they they also they also hit a

631
00:24:17,590 --> 00:24:16,159
london-based uh foreign currency dealer

632
00:24:19,430 --> 00:24:17,600
called travel x

633
00:24:21,269 --> 00:24:19,440
and they asked for six million dollars

634
00:24:23,350 --> 00:24:21,279
and this was last year

635
00:24:26,070 --> 00:24:23,360
and they threatened to delete customer

636
00:24:28,630 --> 00:24:26,080
data and you know the normal stuff and

637
00:24:31,510 --> 00:24:28,640
they wanted six million travelex uh paid

638
00:24:34,710 --> 00:24:31,520
2.3 million of the ransom

639
00:24:35,669 --> 00:24:34,720
and uh and they ended up keeping their

640
00:24:37,909 --> 00:24:35,679
services

641
00:24:39,269 --> 00:24:37,919
uh offline for several weeks and then

642
00:24:42,950 --> 00:24:39,279
travelex caved in

643
00:24:46,230 --> 00:24:42,960
right but was was this stuff

644
00:24:49,830 --> 00:24:46,240
uh the result of a hack

645
00:24:52,310 --> 00:24:49,840
or was it uh you know a phishing email

646
00:24:54,950 --> 00:24:52,320
that came in and somebody clicked on

647
00:24:56,390 --> 00:24:54,960
on a link inside of the email uh it

648
00:25:00,149 --> 00:24:56,400
could absolutely be

649
00:25:00,710 --> 00:25:00,159
both and uh i will explain that well

650
00:25:02,630 --> 00:25:00,720
okay

651
00:25:04,310 --> 00:25:02,640
it because this one could be both and

652
00:25:06,390 --> 00:25:04,320
i'll explain why i'm saying it that way

653
00:25:07,909 --> 00:25:06,400
okay and we'll do that after the break

654
00:25:09,990 --> 00:25:07,919
and then there was uh

655
00:25:11,830 --> 00:25:10,000
another situation i want to stay on top

656
00:25:14,149 --> 00:25:11,840
of this because

657
00:25:16,149 --> 00:25:14,159
this this isn't the only two that this

658
00:25:19,510 --> 00:25:16,159
malware and this team have actually

659
00:25:21,830 --> 00:25:19,520
done this many times uh and this is a

660
00:25:24,070 --> 00:25:21,840
rebrand of another piece of malware

661
00:25:26,310 --> 00:25:24,080
that puts the actual length of lifetime

662
00:25:27,430 --> 00:25:26,320
of just this malware and and the people

663
00:25:29,990 --> 00:25:27,440
using it for

664
00:25:32,310 --> 00:25:30,000
this specific uh course of action all

665
00:25:34,549 --> 00:25:32,320
the way back to early 2018

666
00:25:35,350 --> 00:25:34,559
and the first group uh that did it

667
00:25:37,350 --> 00:25:35,360
retired

668
00:25:38,549 --> 00:25:37,360
uh after they had hit about two billion

669
00:25:42,230 --> 00:25:38,559
dollars made

670
00:25:45,510 --> 00:25:42,240
now do you remember the series

671
00:25:48,789 --> 00:25:45,520
of towns and civic centers

672
00:25:51,909 --> 00:25:48,799
uh in in the southeast

673
00:25:52,950 --> 00:25:51,919
and and hospitals uh schools school

674
00:25:55,669 --> 00:25:52,960
systems

675
00:25:57,750 --> 00:25:55,679
uh that were hit and all of it was

676
00:25:59,669 --> 00:25:57,760
initiated through malware wasn't it it

677
00:26:02,870 --> 00:25:59,679
was emails that were sent

678
00:26:06,149 --> 00:26:02,880
uh to the the local governments

679
00:26:08,390 --> 00:26:06,159
uh yeah almost all of that was uh

680
00:26:11,269 --> 00:26:08,400
phishing and all of that was the exact

681
00:26:13,909 --> 00:26:11,279
uh same software just older versions

682
00:26:14,789 --> 00:26:13,919
of uh of the same tool same source code

683
00:26:17,990 --> 00:26:14,799
based on everything

684
00:26:21,350 --> 00:26:18,000
now uh these tools

685
00:26:22,549 --> 00:26:21,360
they're for sale aren't they uh

686
00:26:24,630 --> 00:26:22,559
you know it's interesting they're not

687
00:26:27,990 --> 00:26:24,640
really for sale in terms of

688
00:26:30,310 --> 00:26:28,000
uh you can buy uh our evil or the

689
00:26:32,870 --> 00:26:30,320
earlier version uh sea and crab

690
00:26:34,310 --> 00:26:32,880
or canned crab or gand grab many

691
00:26:36,230 --> 00:26:34,320
variations of how you say it

692
00:26:38,070 --> 00:26:36,240
right um but what they are is they're

693
00:26:40,310 --> 00:26:38,080
actually run as a service

694
00:26:41,190 --> 00:26:40,320
so this is called ransomware as a

695
00:26:43,590 --> 00:26:41,200
service

696
00:26:44,710 --> 00:26:43,600
uh you literally sign up as they call

697
00:26:46,230 --> 00:26:44,720
them affiliates

698
00:26:48,070 --> 00:26:46,240
but you sign up and you get access to

699
00:26:49,750 --> 00:26:48,080
this dashboard as if you've signed up to

700
00:26:51,350 --> 00:26:49,760
some other service online like

701
00:26:52,710 --> 00:26:51,360
i don't know trello or some other

702
00:26:53,269 --> 00:26:52,720
service where you're playing around in a

703
00:26:55,990 --> 00:26:53,279
really

704
00:26:57,029 --> 00:26:56,000
pretty dashboard and um it gives you all

705
00:26:59,029 --> 00:26:57,039
the tools you need

706
00:27:01,110 --> 00:26:59,039
to play with to infect people to target

707
00:27:01,909 --> 00:27:01,120
people you can feed it email lists you

708
00:27:03,830 --> 00:27:01,919
can feed it

709
00:27:05,510 --> 00:27:03,840
uh ip addresses of networks you want to

710
00:27:06,390 --> 00:27:05,520
try you can you can do all kinds of

711
00:27:09,590 --> 00:27:06,400
stuff

712
00:27:11,269 --> 00:27:09,600
and uh on on this one uh the affiliates

713
00:27:12,470 --> 00:27:11,279
have some choices on how the money is

714
00:27:14,149 --> 00:27:12,480
processed they can

715
00:27:15,909 --> 00:27:14,159
put in their own processing details and

716
00:27:17,430 --> 00:27:15,919
have it processed through say their own

717
00:27:19,590 --> 00:27:17,440
hacked merchants accounts

718
00:27:21,830 --> 00:27:19,600
but um the way that most people use this

719
00:27:25,350 --> 00:27:21,840
tool is you sign up as an affiliate

720
00:27:27,669 --> 00:27:25,360
and then the our evil uh team

721
00:27:28,710 --> 00:27:27,679
actually all the money's processed

722
00:27:30,710 --> 00:27:28,720
through them

723
00:27:31,990 --> 00:27:30,720
and their hacking system and their

724
00:27:34,310 --> 00:27:32,000
processing system

725
00:27:35,110 --> 00:27:34,320
and then they take their percentage and

726
00:27:37,510 --> 00:27:35,120
hand you

727
00:27:39,990 --> 00:27:37,520
your take uh so literally you're you're

728
00:27:43,190 --> 00:27:40,000
just using a service a cloud provider

729
00:27:44,230 --> 00:27:43,200
of ransomware that's absolutely insane

730
00:27:45,510 --> 00:27:44,240
to me

731
00:27:47,190 --> 00:27:45,520
anyone can do it you don't have to be a

732
00:27:48,470 --> 00:27:47,200
programmer to do it either you when you

733
00:27:49,350 --> 00:27:48,480
log into the back end of this thing

734
00:27:51,350 --> 00:27:49,360
you're literally just

735
00:27:53,269 --> 00:27:51,360
uploading lists and playing with a

736
00:27:55,430 --> 00:27:53,279
really simple to use system i mean it's

737
00:27:59,029 --> 00:27:55,440
it's as easy to use as notepad

738
00:28:02,549 --> 00:27:59,039
the no it ain't don't tell me this

739
00:28:04,710 --> 00:28:02,559
notepad the basic of the basic basics

740
00:28:06,710 --> 00:28:04,720
basics that's why he's new pad by the

741
00:28:08,870 --> 00:28:06,720
way can you copy and paste

742
00:28:10,710 --> 00:28:08,880
a list of emails out of notepad and can

743
00:28:16,470 --> 00:28:10,720
you hit the button that says

744
00:28:19,590 --> 00:28:16,480
send yes okay you win you're done

745
00:28:20,549 --> 00:28:19,600
and what what what do you think no i

746
00:28:23,590 --> 00:28:20,559
know i know

747
00:28:27,110 --> 00:28:23,600
what do you think the age range

748
00:28:29,669 --> 00:28:27,120
the demographic of the users of this is

749
00:28:31,990 --> 00:28:29,679
is it somebody that is uh you know in

750
00:28:33,110 --> 00:28:32,000
their 30s and 40s and 50s that have

751
00:28:35,510 --> 00:28:33,120
hopefully

752
00:28:36,230 --> 00:28:35,520
matured and wouldn't do anything like

753
00:28:39,430 --> 00:28:36,240
this

754
00:28:42,389 --> 00:28:39,440
is it a younger demographic that quite

755
00:28:45,190 --> 00:28:42,399
hasn't learned life life's lessons on

756
00:28:48,630 --> 00:28:45,200
how to be a responsible person

757
00:28:51,750 --> 00:28:48,640
you know there's a direct correlation to

758
00:28:52,389 --> 00:28:51,760
how scared you actually are of the law

759
00:28:55,590 --> 00:28:52,399
force

760
00:28:57,350 --> 00:28:55,600
nearest you uh catching you or doing

761
00:28:59,430 --> 00:28:57,360
anything about it or how corrupt you

762
00:29:01,350 --> 00:28:59,440
think they might be say bribable

763
00:29:03,430 --> 00:29:01,360
to the age the average age of that

764
00:29:05,190 --> 00:29:03,440
person so like in america

765
00:29:06,470 --> 00:29:05,200
usually the average age of people who

766
00:29:08,310 --> 00:29:06,480
would actually try and do this and

767
00:29:11,029 --> 00:29:08,320
somehow still live here

768
00:29:12,230 --> 00:29:11,039
uh you're looking at you know teens

769
00:29:14,230 --> 00:29:12,240
early 20s

770
00:29:15,590 --> 00:29:14,240
at the latest that get involved maybe

771
00:29:17,269 --> 00:29:15,600
they still keep going for a couple years

772
00:29:19,750 --> 00:29:17,279
because they're so profitable but

773
00:29:20,950 --> 00:29:19,760
it's really youth oriented here because

774
00:29:24,230 --> 00:29:20,960
you kind of got to be

775
00:29:24,630 --> 00:29:24,240
uh brazen enough if you will to uh to do

776
00:29:26,789 --> 00:29:24,640
that

777
00:29:28,950 --> 00:29:26,799
right right you know look at a romania

778
00:29:30,470 --> 00:29:28,960
or bulgaria in those countries you're

779
00:29:31,909 --> 00:29:30,480
going to see a lot of

780
00:29:33,830 --> 00:29:31,919
a lot of kids get in but you're going to

781
00:29:35,510 --> 00:29:33,840
see them keep going into their 30s into

782
00:29:37,110 --> 00:29:35,520
their 40s because either

783
00:29:38,630 --> 00:29:37,120
they think they can get away with it

784
00:29:41,669 --> 00:29:38,640
because the law is too busy with

785
00:29:43,190 --> 00:29:41,679
other things or they um

786
00:29:44,870 --> 00:29:43,200
they actually think you know that they

787
00:29:46,070 --> 00:29:44,880
can buy off the law at the point that

788
00:29:47,430 --> 00:29:46,080
they're going to get in trouble because

789
00:29:49,750 --> 00:29:47,440
of the amount of money they're making

790
00:29:51,669 --> 00:29:49,760
yeah and i'm always fascinated with that

791
00:29:52,549 --> 00:29:51,679
where you know so there's a correlation

792
00:29:55,350 --> 00:29:52,559
there with age

793
00:29:55,830 --> 00:29:55,360
yeah i i agree with that and you would

794
00:29:59,269 --> 00:29:55,840
think

795
00:30:02,230 --> 00:29:59,279
that a a town in romania when

796
00:30:02,950 --> 00:30:02,240
uh you know an 18 year old kid living up

797
00:30:06,149 --> 00:30:02,960
the street

798
00:30:08,549 --> 00:30:06,159
is driving a mclaren right

799
00:30:09,269 --> 00:30:08,559
that maybe there's something going on

800
00:30:11,029 --> 00:30:09,279
here

801
00:30:12,789 --> 00:30:11,039
you gotta definitely if you're doing

802
00:30:14,389 --> 00:30:12,799
this in a place like that you've got to

803
00:30:16,070 --> 00:30:14,399
realize that you're storing money for

804
00:30:18,070 --> 00:30:16,080
when you decide to move

805
00:30:19,990 --> 00:30:18,080
and you you're moving it into other

806
00:30:20,310 --> 00:30:20,000
offshore kind of systems and you're not

807
00:30:22,549 --> 00:30:20,320
uh

808
00:30:24,389 --> 00:30:22,559
showing off all your flash and bling

809
00:30:27,350 --> 00:30:24,399
locally in your little small town

810
00:30:29,029 --> 00:30:27,360
you know let's take our break right here

811
00:30:30,549 --> 00:30:29,039
our guest tonight greg house

812
00:30:33,350 --> 00:30:30,559
and when we come back we're gonna get

813
00:30:35,269 --> 00:30:33,360
into it it's an absolutely crazy

814
00:30:35,590 --> 00:30:35,279
breaking story that is happening right

815
00:30:38,470 --> 00:30:35,600
now

816
00:30:38,870 --> 00:30:38,480
in real time out of new york city with

817
00:30:42,310 --> 00:30:38,880
our

818
00:30:45,110 --> 00:30:42,320
evil the ransomware and the hack on

819
00:30:46,470 --> 00:30:45,120
grubman and it's uh it's crazy it's an

820
00:30:49,110 --> 00:30:46,480
insane story we'll

821
00:30:49,510 --> 00:30:49,120
we'll cover all of it in just a short

822
00:31:03,940 --> 00:30:49,520
break

823
00:31:11,029 --> 00:31:03,950
stay with us

824
00:31:13,029 --> 00:31:11,039
[Music]

825
00:31:14,789 --> 00:31:13,039
welcome back bay to black i am your host

826
00:31:15,909 --> 00:31:14,799
jimmy church on the game changer network

827
00:31:19,110 --> 00:31:15,919
and kg r a

828
00:31:19,430 --> 00:31:19,120
the planets hello to everybody listening

829
00:31:21,509 --> 00:31:19,440
all

830
00:31:23,110 --> 00:31:21,519
around the world tonight our guest greg

831
00:31:24,750 --> 00:31:23,120
house

832
00:31:26,549 --> 00:31:24,760
you can follow me on twitter at

833
00:31:29,110 --> 00:31:26,559
jchurchradio

834
00:31:29,669 --> 00:31:29,120
f2b is the sam box you can also follow

835
00:31:34,070 --> 00:31:29,679
greg

836
00:31:35,909 --> 00:31:34,080
two g's and

837
00:31:37,350 --> 00:31:35,919
he's got that really cool blue check

838
00:31:39,830 --> 00:31:37,360
mark that uh

839
00:31:41,509 --> 00:31:39,840
he's totally against in the system but

840
00:31:42,710 --> 00:31:41,519
you like the blue check mark when it

841
00:31:44,710 --> 00:31:42,720
happens greg and

842
00:31:46,310 --> 00:31:44,720
and i get that but you can follow greg

843
00:31:48,230 --> 00:31:46,320
in all of his uh

844
00:31:49,590 --> 00:31:48,240
links are up in our twitter feed right

845
00:31:53,430 --> 00:31:49,600
now so

846
00:31:56,230 --> 00:31:53,440
uh a criminal group uh last week

847
00:31:58,830 --> 00:31:56,240
that uses ransomware and it's called our

848
00:32:01,909 --> 00:31:58,840
evil stole 760

849
00:32:06,190 --> 00:32:01,919
750 gigabytes of data

850
00:32:09,350 --> 00:32:06,200
from the systems of grubman shire

851
00:32:11,509 --> 00:32:09,360
micellars i think and sax

852
00:32:13,269 --> 00:32:11,519
and has threatened to release damaging

853
00:32:13,990 --> 00:32:13,279
documents involving the president of the

854
00:32:17,110 --> 00:32:14,000
united states

855
00:32:19,830 --> 00:32:17,120
that the ransom is not paid and they

856
00:32:22,389 --> 00:32:19,840
doubled the amount from 21 million

857
00:32:25,990 --> 00:32:22,399
dollars to 42 million dollars over

858
00:32:28,389 --> 00:32:26,000
the weekend this is a breaking fluid

859
00:32:29,350 --> 00:32:28,399
story now this criminal group has also

860
00:32:31,909 --> 00:32:29,360
stated

861
00:32:32,710 --> 00:32:31,919
and this was over the weekend that uh

862
00:32:36,149 --> 00:32:32,720
grubman

863
00:32:36,870 --> 00:32:36,159
and shire and associates had seven days

864
00:32:38,950 --> 00:32:36,880
to pay

865
00:32:41,190 --> 00:32:38,960
up or they were going to drop the dirt

866
00:32:44,950 --> 00:32:41,200
on president donald trump

867
00:32:48,070 --> 00:32:44,960
now greg as the story unfolds

868
00:32:50,549 --> 00:32:48,080
let's back up before this

869
00:32:51,909 --> 00:32:50,559
and i'm going to ask the first question

870
00:32:55,269 --> 00:32:51,919
why target an

871
00:32:58,710 --> 00:32:58,389
because you think they have money and

872
00:33:01,750 --> 00:32:58,720
you

873
00:33:03,990 --> 00:33:01,760
also think their clients have money

874
00:33:05,990 --> 00:33:04,000
and you think their clients have secrets

875
00:33:07,990 --> 00:33:06,000
you put all that together and uh

876
00:33:10,070 --> 00:33:08,000
there's a lot of money to be had there

877
00:33:13,110 --> 00:33:10,080
now they represent

878
00:33:16,710 --> 00:33:13,120
uh elton john they represent madonna

879
00:33:20,470 --> 00:33:16,720
uh bruce springsteen and lady gaga

880
00:33:21,669 --> 00:33:20,480
and they took the opportunity of uh

881
00:33:23,669 --> 00:33:21,679
even mentioned the big bands they

882
00:33:24,870 --> 00:33:23,679
mentioned you mentioned those and you

883
00:33:27,590 --> 00:33:24,880
didn't mention the big ones

884
00:33:30,789 --> 00:33:27,600
[Laughter]

885
00:33:33,029 --> 00:33:30,799
i mean elton john and you too yes

886
00:33:34,389 --> 00:33:33,039
bruce springsteen i mean it's it's a

887
00:33:36,710 --> 00:33:34,399
crazy client list

888
00:33:38,630 --> 00:33:36,720
barbara streisand yeah barbra streisand

889
00:33:42,230 --> 00:33:38,640
uh there could be some fun secrets there

890
00:33:44,070 --> 00:33:42,240
yeah and bette midler who knows i mean

891
00:33:45,830 --> 00:33:44,080
they have represented tom cruise in the

892
00:33:46,789 --> 00:33:45,840
past and there's supposedly data on him

893
00:33:50,389 --> 00:33:46,799
in there

894
00:33:54,630 --> 00:33:50,399
now uh going back to scientology right

895
00:33:56,630 --> 00:33:54,640
the uh i understand the money aspect of

896
00:33:59,590 --> 00:33:56,640
this and you have high-end clients

897
00:34:02,149 --> 00:33:59,600
uh you know virtually none bigger than

898
00:34:06,549 --> 00:34:02,159
who is represented by this firm

899
00:34:08,710 --> 00:34:06,559
but president trump himself was never

900
00:34:10,869 --> 00:34:08,720
represented or involved with this law

901
00:34:13,109 --> 00:34:10,879
firm or was he

902
00:34:14,790 --> 00:34:13,119
he well so that's an interesting story i

903
00:34:16,310 --> 00:34:14,800
mean it's a relatively short one but

904
00:34:19,349 --> 00:34:16,320
it's interesting so

905
00:34:20,470 --> 00:34:19,359
they have many hacks going over years at

906
00:34:24,310 --> 00:34:20,480
this point

907
00:34:26,790 --> 00:34:24,320
and uh the trump data is mostly from

908
00:34:27,750 --> 00:34:26,800
earlier hacks over the last uh about

909
00:34:29,669 --> 00:34:27,760
year

910
00:34:31,510 --> 00:34:29,679
uh that involved them actually getting

911
00:34:33,430 --> 00:34:31,520
into some mar-a-lago systems

912
00:34:34,629 --> 00:34:33,440
and some other related trump property

913
00:34:37,349 --> 00:34:34,639
systems

914
00:34:38,629 --> 00:34:37,359
um the data that comes from this hack

915
00:34:42,230 --> 00:34:38,639
specifically

916
00:34:44,069 --> 00:34:42,240
that is about trump is of course exactly

917
00:34:46,149 --> 00:34:44,079
what you would expect from a law firm

918
00:34:48,069 --> 00:34:46,159
that represents all these people so

919
00:34:49,990 --> 00:34:48,079
one of the funniest pieces is uh david

920
00:34:51,909 --> 00:34:50,000
letterman is represented

921
00:34:53,589 --> 00:34:51,919
uh by or was you know i don't know if he

922
00:34:53,909 --> 00:34:53,599
still is by this company but when he had

923
00:34:59,190 --> 00:34:53,919
his

924
00:35:02,310 --> 00:34:59,200
show multiple times

925
00:35:03,349 --> 00:35:02,320
there is a bunch of data in his records

926
00:35:06,150 --> 00:35:03,359
supposedly

927
00:35:07,109 --> 00:35:06,160
that talk about him his team and the

928
00:35:09,990 --> 00:35:07,119
lawyers

929
00:35:11,750 --> 00:35:10,000
making sure trump wouldn't sue them for

930
00:35:13,589 --> 00:35:11,760
anything done on the show

931
00:35:14,950 --> 00:35:13,599
because trump was famous among you know

932
00:35:18,390 --> 00:35:14,960
the entertainment elite for

933
00:35:20,150 --> 00:35:18,400
being very litigious and so the data

934
00:35:23,349 --> 00:35:20,160
that would exist in this data set

935
00:35:26,390 --> 00:35:23,359
is about them preparing against him

936
00:35:27,990 --> 00:35:26,400
just in case he did anytime their actual

937
00:35:30,950 --> 00:35:28,000
uh represented stars

938
00:35:34,150 --> 00:35:30,960
interacted with him any mention yet any

939
00:35:37,670 --> 00:35:34,160
comment from the white house by the way

940
00:35:39,750 --> 00:35:37,680
uh so one they they've uh

941
00:35:41,430 --> 00:35:39,760
through you know some interviews uh like

942
00:35:43,750 --> 00:35:41,440
kellyanne said a couple things

943
00:35:45,589 --> 00:35:43,760
they've said that um that there's

944
00:35:47,190 --> 00:35:45,599
nothing in this it's a big you know to

945
00:35:50,950 --> 00:35:47,200
use his word nothing burger

946
00:35:52,069 --> 00:35:50,960
right um but um and i kind of tend to

947
00:35:53,510 --> 00:35:52,079
agree actually uh

948
00:35:55,349 --> 00:35:53,520
knowing what i know about the earlier

949
00:35:56,390 --> 00:35:55,359
hacks and what what has been shown on

950
00:35:59,190 --> 00:35:56,400
the dark web is

951
00:36:00,950 --> 00:35:59,200
kind of proof it's it doesn't seem that

952
00:36:01,349 --> 00:36:00,960
explosive it looks like it was a money

953
00:36:03,670 --> 00:36:01,359
grab

954
00:36:05,349 --> 00:36:03,680
but you know that that's an initial

955
00:36:06,470 --> 00:36:05,359
assessment now today everything has

956
00:36:09,589 --> 00:36:06,480
changed

957
00:36:11,910 --> 00:36:09,599
um today they actually announced

958
00:36:12,790 --> 00:36:11,920
on their own little dark web blog that

959
00:36:14,950 --> 00:36:12,800
uh

960
00:36:15,990 --> 00:36:14,960
a buyer showed up that wanted the trump

961
00:36:18,069 --> 00:36:16,000
data and

962
00:36:20,710 --> 00:36:18,079
paid them already and has it already and

963
00:36:23,349 --> 00:36:20,720
they've deleted their copy already

964
00:36:24,790 --> 00:36:23,359
uh and so they've decided to change up

965
00:36:26,390 --> 00:36:24,800
their plans since

966
00:36:27,990 --> 00:36:26,400
the law firm has been very clear we're

967
00:36:30,310 --> 00:36:28,000
not going to pay

968
00:36:32,230 --> 00:36:30,320
the timeline that they give is that the

969
00:36:32,750 --> 00:36:32,240
law firm actually initially offered to

970
00:36:36,710 --> 00:36:32,760
pay

971
00:36:38,230 --> 00:36:36,720
365 000 for everything to go away

972
00:36:40,230 --> 00:36:38,240
and then the government stepped in and

973
00:36:42,230 --> 00:36:40,240
told the law firm uh

974
00:36:43,270 --> 00:36:42,240
that it is a federal crime to pay

975
00:36:46,550 --> 00:36:43,280
terrorists right

976
00:36:48,230 --> 00:36:46,560
right and um and you know so who knows

977
00:36:48,950 --> 00:36:48,240
but we know that some cities have paid

978
00:36:49,990 --> 00:36:48,960
this so i

979
00:36:52,790 --> 00:36:50,000
i don't think they would have done

980
00:36:55,190 --> 00:36:52,800
anything to him if they did so

981
00:36:56,390 --> 00:36:55,200
a local offer like that um they decided

982
00:36:57,990 --> 00:36:56,400
to change up their game

983
00:36:59,510 --> 00:36:58,000
so instead they found a buyer for the

984
00:37:01,109 --> 00:36:59,520
trump data sold it off

985
00:37:03,030 --> 00:37:01,119
and now the next data that's on the

986
00:37:05,750 --> 00:37:03,040
block has an opening bid of a million

987
00:37:08,230 --> 00:37:05,760
dollars and it's all of madonna's data

988
00:37:09,349 --> 00:37:08,240
now we don't know who's purchasing the

989
00:37:11,510 --> 00:37:09,359
data

990
00:37:12,550 --> 00:37:11,520
right no they they they give anonymity

991
00:37:15,510 --> 00:37:12,560
to their purchasers

992
00:37:16,390 --> 00:37:15,520
that's right i mean could it be possible

993
00:37:20,230 --> 00:37:16,400
that

994
00:37:21,349 --> 00:37:20,240
somebody uh a friend of president trump

995
00:37:24,069 --> 00:37:21,359
stepped in and

996
00:37:24,470 --> 00:37:24,079
and and bought the data to keep it out

997
00:37:27,430 --> 00:37:24,480
of

998
00:37:28,790 --> 00:37:27,440
the public eye for all we know with what

999
00:37:30,630 --> 00:37:28,800
came out about the

1000
00:37:32,470 --> 00:37:30,640
mar-a-lago data that's in it it's it's

1001
00:37:34,630 --> 00:37:32,480
very you know

1002
00:37:36,710 --> 00:37:34,640
it's not special data it's nothing like

1003
00:37:37,349 --> 00:37:36,720
super important for the mar-a-lago stuff

1004
00:37:39,750 --> 00:37:37,359
it was

1005
00:37:41,430 --> 00:37:39,760
like uh event lists um you know who

1006
00:37:41,990 --> 00:37:41,440
showed up to specific dinner events and

1007
00:37:43,750 --> 00:37:42,000
whatnot

1008
00:37:45,030 --> 00:37:43,760
but it wasn't like you know someone you

1009
00:37:46,390 --> 00:37:45,040
wouldn't expect showed up it was just

1010
00:37:46,950 --> 00:37:46,400
business people and whatnot that you

1011
00:37:48,630 --> 00:37:46,960
would have

1012
00:37:50,470 --> 00:37:48,640
expected to be there but maybe one of

1013
00:37:51,990 --> 00:37:50,480
them didn't want to be in this data dump

1014
00:37:52,630 --> 00:37:52,000
and you know he has a lot of rich

1015
00:37:55,030 --> 00:37:52,640
friends

1016
00:37:58,390 --> 00:37:55,040
sure his thing he collects them do we

1017
00:38:00,790 --> 00:37:58,400
know how much uh the trump data sold for

1018
00:38:02,470 --> 00:38:00,800
we do not but we know that they put an

1019
00:38:04,470 --> 00:38:02,480
opening bid on the next bit of data for

1020
00:38:06,069 --> 00:38:04,480
a million dollars so who knows what it

1021
00:38:06,630 --> 00:38:06,079
sold for but it probably sold pretty

1022
00:38:09,430 --> 00:38:06,640
good

1023
00:38:10,150 --> 00:38:09,440
now would madonna be interested in

1024
00:38:13,589 --> 00:38:10,160
buying her

1025
00:38:15,589 --> 00:38:13,599
own data for a million bucks right

1026
00:38:17,510 --> 00:38:15,599
yeah you know the the question there is

1027
00:38:18,470 --> 00:38:17,520
you run into all sorts of problems right

1028
00:38:20,470 --> 00:38:18,480
because

1029
00:38:22,069 --> 00:38:20,480
you know someone like that sure you

1030
00:38:23,349 --> 00:38:22,079
think they have slightly better security

1031
00:38:24,550 --> 00:38:23,359
but everyone's human man

1032
00:38:26,950 --> 00:38:24,560
and everyone you're dealing with is

1033
00:38:29,430 --> 00:38:26,960
human and there's gonna be ways in so

1034
00:38:30,470 --> 00:38:29,440
if if she herself shows up and publicly

1035
00:38:33,510 --> 00:38:30,480
buys this

1036
00:38:34,150 --> 00:38:33,520
then every every every hacker in the

1037
00:38:35,670 --> 00:38:34,160
world that

1038
00:38:37,829 --> 00:38:35,680
is out there trying to make a buck is

1039
00:38:38,950 --> 00:38:37,839
going to know that coming after madonna

1040
00:38:43,190 --> 00:38:38,960
gets you paid

1041
00:38:46,630 --> 00:38:43,200
who buys madonna's data right who buys

1042
00:38:47,829 --> 00:38:46,640
madonna's data if it was like 92 i'd be

1043
00:38:48,630 --> 00:38:47,839
saying michael jackson would be

1044
00:38:51,750 --> 00:38:48,640
purchasing it

1045
00:38:52,470 --> 00:38:51,760
right at this point i have no idea yeah

1046
00:38:56,390 --> 00:38:52,480
that is so

1047
00:38:59,510 --> 00:38:56,400
let's let's back up let's go

1048
00:39:02,710 --> 00:38:59,520
to uh last week um

1049
00:39:06,310 --> 00:39:02,720
uh how did how do you think the

1050
00:39:07,030 --> 00:39:06,320
hack happened well the tool they're

1051
00:39:10,069 --> 00:39:07,040
using

1052
00:39:13,910 --> 00:39:10,079
um it's it's real name is

1053
00:39:14,470 --> 00:39:13,920
uh sodino kibi um our evil is kind of

1054
00:39:16,950 --> 00:39:14,480
the uh

1055
00:39:17,990 --> 00:39:16,960
flashy we know americans can say it name

1056
00:39:20,950 --> 00:39:18,000
okay um

1057
00:39:22,470 --> 00:39:20,960
you know but so dino b uh sodino kibi is

1058
00:39:25,670 --> 00:39:22,480
the real name

1059
00:39:27,990 --> 00:39:25,680
and uh that tool uh we know of at least

1060
00:39:29,589 --> 00:39:28,000
two attack vectors that it uses that are

1061
00:39:31,589 --> 00:39:29,599
kind of hack related and and

1062
00:39:33,510 --> 00:39:31,599
semi-automated and then we know the

1063
00:39:35,829 --> 00:39:33,520
phishing method obviously

1064
00:39:37,510 --> 00:39:35,839
uh so phishing is of course you know

1065
00:39:40,150 --> 00:39:37,520
sends out an email with a link you hit

1066
00:39:43,990 --> 00:39:40,160
it your browser is somehow exploited and

1067
00:39:48,710 --> 00:39:44,000
you've got problems um the other two

1068
00:39:51,430 --> 00:39:48,720
are rdp and vpn appliances

1069
00:39:52,870 --> 00:39:51,440
so rdp is a protocol used you know for

1070
00:39:55,109 --> 00:39:52,880
remote desktops which

1071
00:39:56,790 --> 00:39:55,119
surprisingly are getting a a lot more

1072
00:39:59,349 --> 00:39:56,800
usage these days

1073
00:39:59,990 --> 00:39:59,359
um so they're enabled at a lot more

1074
00:40:02,790 --> 00:40:00,000
companies

1075
00:40:05,190 --> 00:40:02,800
and it turns out that this group had

1076
00:40:06,710 --> 00:40:05,200
multiple zero days for various rdp

1077
00:40:08,550 --> 00:40:06,720
implementations that would get them

1078
00:40:10,950 --> 00:40:08,560
right past all your security

1079
00:40:11,829 --> 00:40:10,960
if you had rdp exposed to the outside

1080
00:40:13,510 --> 00:40:11,839
world

1081
00:40:15,030 --> 00:40:13,520
um now of course a lot of those have

1082
00:40:16,069 --> 00:40:15,040
been patched since this has been going

1083
00:40:18,069 --> 00:40:16,079
around but

1084
00:40:19,910 --> 00:40:18,079
who keeps all their uh software and

1085
00:40:20,870 --> 00:40:19,920
hardware up to date turns out not many

1086
00:40:24,150 --> 00:40:20,880
people

1087
00:40:25,990 --> 00:40:24,160
um and then the other method is they've

1088
00:40:26,950 --> 00:40:26,000
got an attack that goes up against some

1089
00:40:30,870 --> 00:40:26,960
common

1090
00:40:32,550 --> 00:40:30,880
vpn appliances uh vpn is virtual private

1091
00:40:33,829 --> 00:40:32,560
network and it's it's a way a company

1092
00:40:35,589 --> 00:40:33,839
can allow

1093
00:40:38,390 --> 00:40:35,599
someone at home to connect up to the

1094
00:40:39,750 --> 00:40:38,400
corporate network and have the network

1095
00:40:42,069 --> 00:40:39,760
think that they're on the corporate

1096
00:40:43,910 --> 00:40:42,079
network uh that they're sitting in some

1097
00:40:46,790 --> 00:40:43,920
office cubicle you know

1098
00:40:48,309 --> 00:40:46,800
and uh it's there's complicated ways to

1099
00:40:49,510 --> 00:40:48,319
build it out with you know serious

1100
00:40:51,190 --> 00:40:49,520
infrastructure

1101
00:40:52,950 --> 00:40:51,200
and then there's simple little you know

1102
00:40:54,390 --> 00:40:52,960
boxes you can buy like that little

1103
00:40:55,349 --> 00:40:54,400
router you have for your you know

1104
00:40:56,950 --> 00:40:55,359
internet at home

1105
00:40:59,750 --> 00:40:56,960
that give you a vpn at smaller

1106
00:41:02,710 --> 00:40:59,760
businesses to mid-size businesses

1107
00:41:03,270 --> 00:41:02,720
and uh those uh one one company called

1108
00:41:06,230 --> 00:41:03,280
pulse

1109
00:41:06,710 --> 00:41:06,240
uh had a couple active exploits so the

1110
00:41:09,750 --> 00:41:06,720
uh

1111
00:41:11,510 --> 00:41:09,760
earlier

1112
00:41:13,589 --> 00:41:11,520
that one was actually done uh they

1113
00:41:15,510 --> 00:41:13,599
believe completely through their vpn

1114
00:41:17,190 --> 00:41:15,520
device being uh remotely hacked

1115
00:41:19,510 --> 00:41:17,200
by an automated tool that just went

1116
00:41:22,710 --> 00:41:19,520
right in right through it

1117
00:41:26,710 --> 00:41:22,720
that's incredible right and there

1118
00:41:29,589 --> 00:41:26,720
the the i don't know what is scarier

1119
00:41:31,510 --> 00:41:29,599
to have this done by automation and

1120
00:41:34,390 --> 00:41:31,520
there's nothing that you can do

1121
00:41:35,589 --> 00:41:34,400
uh defense wise that's that is

1122
00:41:38,870 --> 00:41:35,599
terrifying

1123
00:41:40,950 --> 00:41:38,880
and then the other side of it is

1124
00:41:42,550 --> 00:41:40,960
to me equally as terrifying where you

1125
00:41:45,430 --> 00:41:42,560
have an employee

1126
00:41:45,910 --> 00:41:45,440
that's a complete doofus that would

1127
00:41:49,030 --> 00:41:45,920
click

1128
00:41:51,990 --> 00:41:49,040
on the exploit and the and the malware

1129
00:41:53,349 --> 00:41:52,000
inside of an email on a on on a

1130
00:41:55,349 --> 00:41:53,359
corporate server

1131
00:41:56,710 --> 00:41:55,359
right where you're you're yeah you're

1132
00:41:59,510 --> 00:41:56,720
logged in to the

1133
00:42:00,470 --> 00:41:59,520
company's network and and you make that

1134
00:42:03,190 --> 00:42:00,480
click and then

1135
00:42:05,349 --> 00:42:03,200
everything goes foul both are equally as

1136
00:42:08,550 --> 00:42:05,359
terrifying aren't they

1137
00:42:09,990 --> 00:42:08,560
uh yeah i mean you know one is um

1138
00:42:12,470 --> 00:42:10,000
i don't know it's interesting because

1139
00:42:15,430 --> 00:42:12,480
when you talk about the automated tools

1140
00:42:16,150 --> 00:42:15,440
you get this um this thing where it's

1141
00:42:17,430 --> 00:42:16,160
just a bot

1142
00:42:19,750 --> 00:42:17,440
and that software could have been going

1143
00:42:21,829 --> 00:42:19,760
after 10 000 targets when you talk about

1144
00:42:22,950 --> 00:42:21,839
a dedicated fishing campaign that's

1145
00:42:24,309 --> 00:42:22,960
coming for you

1146
00:42:26,390 --> 00:42:24,319
i don't know that one always felt a

1147
00:42:28,630 --> 00:42:26,400
little more sketchy because like

1148
00:42:30,870 --> 00:42:28,640
someone knows my name and is coming

1149
00:42:32,630 --> 00:42:30,880
after my name

1150
00:42:33,990 --> 00:42:32,640
and that one always uh that one always

1151
00:42:37,030 --> 00:42:34,000
always is weird to me

1152
00:42:40,230 --> 00:42:37,040
now when this uh gets

1153
00:42:42,069 --> 00:42:40,240
activated uh you know our evil let's

1154
00:42:43,510 --> 00:42:42,079
specifically talk about what is being

1155
00:42:47,670 --> 00:42:43,520
used in this hack

1156
00:42:48,630 --> 00:42:47,680
uh what happens uh it's really simple um

1157
00:42:50,710 --> 00:42:48,640
it gives them

1158
00:42:53,270 --> 00:42:50,720
access to the data that's available

1159
00:42:54,710 --> 00:42:53,280
there uh so they can uh take it all

1160
00:42:56,790 --> 00:42:54,720
uh you know to download it straight

1161
00:42:58,390 --> 00:42:56,800
through the internet so in this specific

1162
00:43:01,670 --> 00:42:58,400
hack the the grubman hack

1163
00:43:04,950 --> 00:43:01,680
they supposedly downloaded 756

1164
00:43:08,150 --> 00:43:04,960
gigs of data uh that's a lot of data

1165
00:43:09,510 --> 00:43:08,160
yes it is um and then the second it's

1166
00:43:10,470 --> 00:43:09,520
done and they believe they have

1167
00:43:13,670 --> 00:43:10,480
everything

1168
00:43:14,630 --> 00:43:13,680
it then encrypts all the local data in a

1169
00:43:17,030 --> 00:43:14,640
way where

1170
00:43:17,910 --> 00:43:17,040
only putting in the right key one that

1171
00:43:20,870 --> 00:43:17,920
they sell you

1172
00:43:22,309 --> 00:43:20,880
for in this case uh 21 or 42 million

1173
00:43:23,430 --> 00:43:22,319
dollars depending on which day they

1174
00:43:24,870 --> 00:43:23,440
might have acted

1175
00:43:26,630 --> 00:43:24,880
uh putting in that right key will

1176
00:43:27,829 --> 00:43:26,640
decrypt it and you've got your data back

1177
00:43:30,069 --> 00:43:27,839
and you're fine and

1178
00:43:32,950 --> 00:43:30,079
supposedly the software removed itself

1179
00:43:36,550 --> 00:43:32,960
so two things happen then so i i am

1180
00:43:39,589 --> 00:43:36,560
understanding one they lock down

1181
00:43:39,990 --> 00:43:39,599
your current system that's happening so

1182
00:43:42,390 --> 00:43:40,000
you don't

1183
00:43:44,390 --> 00:43:42,400
have access to it and then they've

1184
00:43:47,589 --> 00:43:44,400
managed to get to

1185
00:43:49,670 --> 00:43:47,599
uh certain files and and being able to

1186
00:43:51,190 --> 00:43:49,680
navigate that to get to the data is

1187
00:43:52,390 --> 00:43:51,200
pretty interesting to me let's we'll

1188
00:43:55,510 --> 00:43:52,400
talk about that

1189
00:43:57,910 --> 00:43:55,520
but they've downloaded those files too

1190
00:43:58,630 --> 00:43:57,920
as well so it's not just an encryption

1191
00:44:02,230 --> 00:43:58,640
key to

1192
00:44:05,349 --> 00:44:02,240
unlock your your corporate network

1193
00:44:08,230 --> 00:44:05,359
which is important but they've also

1194
00:44:09,829 --> 00:44:08,240
secured their hijacked right they've

1195
00:44:12,069 --> 00:44:09,839
hijacked something

1196
00:44:14,309 --> 00:44:12,079
and so we have two different things that

1197
00:44:16,710 --> 00:44:14,319
are happening at the same time

1198
00:44:18,390 --> 00:44:16,720
yeah it's completely two almost separate

1199
00:44:21,109 --> 00:44:18,400
things at this point one

1200
00:44:22,710 --> 00:44:21,119
a group of people now have your data to

1201
00:44:23,510 --> 00:44:22,720
your corporate network is currently in

1202
00:44:26,710 --> 00:44:23,520
shambles

1203
00:44:30,230 --> 00:44:26,720
so is uh and in this case

1204
00:44:32,790 --> 00:44:30,240
uh grubman and associates

1205
00:44:34,870 --> 00:44:32,800
uh their system right now is locked up

1206
00:44:36,390 --> 00:44:34,880
am i understanding correctly

1207
00:44:37,510 --> 00:44:36,400
i mean i'm sure that with the security

1208
00:44:38,950 --> 00:44:37,520
firms they've brought in they've got

1209
00:44:40,150 --> 00:44:38,960
other computers up and running at this

1210
00:44:41,349 --> 00:44:40,160
point but um

1211
00:44:43,430 --> 00:44:41,359
you know so they're not completely

1212
00:44:46,550 --> 00:44:43,440
offline but uh the

1213
00:44:49,750 --> 00:44:46,560
the old systems uh haven't been uh

1214
00:44:51,750 --> 00:44:49,760
destroyed or anything uh the fbi uh

1215
00:44:52,470 --> 00:44:51,760
homeland security for the terrorism side

1216
00:44:54,150 --> 00:44:52,480
of things

1217
00:44:55,829 --> 00:44:54,160
and uh and a couple security firms are

1218
00:44:57,270 --> 00:44:55,839
all going over that attempting to find

1219
00:44:59,750 --> 00:44:57,280
ways through

1220
00:45:00,550 --> 00:44:59,760
you know to the other side of it um it

1221
00:45:02,390 --> 00:45:00,560
is uh

1222
00:45:03,750 --> 00:45:02,400
not one that's defeated yet though you

1223
00:45:06,150 --> 00:45:03,760
know a lot of these

1224
00:45:07,510 --> 00:45:06,160
have been defeated uh in a way where

1225
00:45:10,550 --> 00:45:07,520
like we can

1226
00:45:12,230 --> 00:45:10,560
decrypt what they do um so

1227
00:45:13,910 --> 00:45:12,240
you know people have made automated

1228
00:45:17,109 --> 00:45:13,920
tools out there that that'll just

1229
00:45:19,349 --> 00:45:17,119
undo i think at least half of these uh

1230
00:45:20,630 --> 00:45:19,359
these pieces of software but this one

1231
00:45:21,589 --> 00:45:20,640
isn't on the list of ones that we've

1232
00:45:24,309 --> 00:45:21,599
figured out yet

1233
00:45:25,910 --> 00:45:24,319
right right right and so and that's

1234
00:45:28,390 --> 00:45:25,920
interesting too as well

1235
00:45:29,589 --> 00:45:28,400
uh well if you get hit by ransomware uh

1236
00:45:30,470 --> 00:45:29,599
first thing you should check is a

1237
00:45:33,109 --> 00:45:30,480
project named

1238
00:45:33,910 --> 00:45:33,119
no more ransom it's the no more ransom

1239
00:45:37,030 --> 00:45:33,920
project

1240
00:45:38,630 --> 00:45:37,040
and it's at nomoreransome.org and they

1241
00:45:40,150 --> 00:45:38,640
probably have a decrypter that will

1242
00:45:41,990 --> 00:45:40,160
decrypt your stuff without you having to

1243
00:45:44,630 --> 00:45:42,000
pay for it and clean up the mess too

1244
00:45:45,349 --> 00:45:44,640
right um which is this one they do not

1245
00:45:49,430 --> 00:45:45,359
right and

1246
00:45:51,430 --> 00:45:49,440
so it's not just big corporations here

1247
00:45:52,710 --> 00:45:51,440
right it can it can be anybody in any

1248
00:45:55,349 --> 00:45:52,720
fishing campaign

1249
00:45:57,109 --> 00:45:55,359
that is at home it's hit people at home

1250
00:45:58,309 --> 00:45:57,119
it's at two-person businesses it's at

1251
00:46:01,349 --> 00:45:58,319
hospitals it's

1252
00:46:04,550 --> 00:46:01,359
hit travel x now isn't there

1253
00:46:08,230 --> 00:46:04,560
uh isn't there a code

1254
00:46:08,950 --> 00:46:08,240
of honor amongst thieves on on who you

1255
00:46:12,230 --> 00:46:08,960
attack

1256
00:46:15,430 --> 00:46:12,240
why why go after a hospital or

1257
00:46:18,790 --> 00:46:15,440
an elementary school system is

1258
00:46:21,190 --> 00:46:18,800
you know isn't there a code of conduct

1259
00:46:21,990 --> 00:46:21,200
uh you know there there are a bunch of

1260
00:46:25,190 --> 00:46:22,000
hackers who

1261
00:46:27,510 --> 00:46:25,200
even though they're in it for profit uh

1262
00:46:28,630 --> 00:46:27,520
would absolutely have that code and

1263
00:46:31,829 --> 00:46:28,640
there are

1264
00:46:33,510 --> 00:46:31,839
also a bunch who do not and uh that's

1265
00:46:35,829 --> 00:46:33,520
your problem not mine

1266
00:46:37,030 --> 00:46:35,839
give me my money uh they exist and

1267
00:46:39,109 --> 00:46:37,040
there's a lot of them and

1268
00:46:40,950 --> 00:46:39,119
they there weren't a lot of them until

1269
00:46:43,190 --> 00:46:40,960
it became easier

1270
00:46:45,190 --> 00:46:43,200
there was a much stronger kind of uh

1271
00:46:48,230 --> 00:46:45,200
strange ethical code around

1272
00:46:50,390 --> 00:46:48,240
doing highly illegal things than uh

1273
00:46:51,829 --> 00:46:50,400
than there is now simply due to the

1274
00:46:53,430 --> 00:46:51,839
lower barrier to entry

1275
00:46:55,270 --> 00:46:53,440
what was the name of that website again

1276
00:46:56,990 --> 00:46:55,280
no more no

1277
00:46:59,030 --> 00:46:57,000
ransom nomoreransom.org

1278
00:47:02,230 --> 00:46:59,040
nomoreransome.org why

1279
00:47:06,470 --> 00:47:02,240
why isn't that link and that

1280
00:47:09,430 --> 00:47:06,480
news in this article about grubman

1281
00:47:10,390 --> 00:47:09,440
all right i mean i mean some editor

1282
00:47:12,069 --> 00:47:10,400
removed it or

1283
00:47:13,750 --> 00:47:12,079
the author didn't care to tell people

1284
00:47:15,670 --> 00:47:13,760
how to clean up the mess

1285
00:47:17,270 --> 00:47:15,680
yeah that is interesting i mean the goal

1286
00:47:18,790 --> 00:47:17,280
of all these articles remember it's just

1287
00:47:19,349 --> 00:47:18,800
clicks it's just how many ad views can

1288
00:47:22,230 --> 00:47:19,359
we get

1289
00:47:22,710 --> 00:47:22,240
right right right i you know i knock on

1290
00:47:27,270 --> 00:47:22,720
wood

1291
00:47:30,309 --> 00:47:27,280
i i haven't been uh dealing with malware

1292
00:47:33,430 --> 00:47:30,319
or any of course ransomware in

1293
00:47:36,230 --> 00:47:33,440
in probably 15 or 20 years

1294
00:47:37,990 --> 00:47:36,240
we uh we really went through a couple of

1295
00:47:41,670 --> 00:47:38,000
things 15 or 20 years ago

1296
00:47:44,870 --> 00:47:41,680
and and what the time that we had spent

1297
00:47:48,309 --> 00:47:44,880
uh trying to fix our systems it was

1298
00:47:49,430 --> 00:47:48,319
uh it scared me enough that i just don't

1299
00:47:51,750 --> 00:47:49,440
click on links

1300
00:47:52,549 --> 00:47:51,760
no i just don't do it i i just don't do

1301
00:47:56,069 --> 00:47:52,559
it

1302
00:48:02,790 --> 00:47:59,270
the uh second half of this okay so let's

1303
00:48:03,589 --> 00:48:02,800
let's deal uh with uh what is going on

1304
00:48:06,630 --> 00:48:03,599
now

1305
00:48:10,150 --> 00:48:06,640
are we stuck in

1306
00:48:13,430 --> 00:48:10,160
uh a game of of uh

1307
00:48:16,309 --> 00:48:13,440
poker right where

1308
00:48:16,950 --> 00:48:16,319
you know the group behind this hack that

1309
00:48:19,829 --> 00:48:16,960
is using

1310
00:48:20,710 --> 00:48:19,839
our evil they've they put down a

1311
00:48:23,750 --> 00:48:20,720
seven-day

1312
00:48:27,190 --> 00:48:23,760
timeline here uh to

1313
00:48:30,230 --> 00:48:27,200
to pay up what did we do with that

1314
00:48:33,030 --> 00:48:30,240
does grubman stick to their guns and

1315
00:48:35,670 --> 00:48:33,040
uh are we waiting for one side or the

1316
00:48:38,309 --> 00:48:35,680
other to call a bluff

1317
00:48:39,750 --> 00:48:38,319
uh you know in all honesty i i don't

1318
00:48:41,750 --> 00:48:39,760
think this gets paid for

1319
00:48:43,430 --> 00:48:41,760
uh after the back and forth that's

1320
00:48:45,349 --> 00:48:43,440
happened now and

1321
00:48:47,109 --> 00:48:45,359
now that it's been so public that they

1322
00:48:49,109 --> 00:48:47,119
have heard from the government

1323
00:48:50,309 --> 00:48:49,119
telling them not to do it because it's a

1324
00:48:51,829 --> 00:48:50,319
federal crime

1325
00:48:53,910 --> 00:48:51,839
it makes it much harder for them to just

1326
00:48:55,750 --> 00:48:53,920
do it and then apologize later

1327
00:48:57,270 --> 00:48:55,760
so i honestly think they don't pay for

1328
00:48:59,510 --> 00:48:57,280
it and

1329
00:49:01,829 --> 00:48:59,520
this group will sell bits and pieces of

1330
00:49:03,510 --> 00:49:01,839
it until you know no one wants the rest

1331
00:49:05,109 --> 00:49:03,520
uh the prices will go down i don't think

1332
00:49:05,510 --> 00:49:05,119
they get a million for the madonna stuff

1333
00:49:06,790 --> 00:49:05,520
but

1334
00:49:09,670 --> 00:49:06,800
they might get a hundred thousand from

1335
00:49:13,670 --> 00:49:09,680
someone looking to mine for uh for data

1336
00:49:16,390 --> 00:49:13,680
now uh how do we protect ourselves

1337
00:49:16,710 --> 00:49:16,400
i mean from this one specifically you

1338
00:49:19,190 --> 00:49:16,720
know

1339
00:49:21,109 --> 00:49:19,200
it it's attacking mostly corporate

1340
00:49:24,309 --> 00:49:21,119
infrastructure types of tools

1341
00:49:25,430 --> 00:49:24,319
um so you know citrix uh and other kind

1342
00:49:28,790 --> 00:49:25,440
of remote tools

1343
00:49:30,870 --> 00:49:28,800
for rdp type stuff and vpn tools uh

1344
00:49:32,390 --> 00:49:30,880
so for most part people don't have to

1345
00:49:33,829 --> 00:49:32,400
worry about this one hitting their home

1346
00:49:35,829 --> 00:49:33,839
computer but if you're running

1347
00:49:37,589 --> 00:49:35,839
even a small business that has some kind

1348
00:49:39,510 --> 00:49:37,599
of remote capabilities you might have

1349
00:49:42,630 --> 00:49:39,520
one of these tools and for that

1350
00:49:43,750 --> 00:49:42,640
you have to keep them up to date um you

1351
00:49:46,630 --> 00:49:43,760
know the travel x1

1352
00:49:47,270 --> 00:49:46,640
specifically it got in through their vpn

1353
00:49:49,190 --> 00:49:47,280
router

1354
00:49:51,910 --> 00:49:49,200
their their well their vpn device their

1355
00:49:53,510 --> 00:49:51,920
vpn device had already issued an update

1356
00:49:55,990 --> 00:49:53,520
and a patch for this

1357
00:49:57,670 --> 00:49:56,000
before the hack happened and worse than

1358
00:49:59,990 --> 00:49:57,680
that a security company

1359
00:50:00,950 --> 00:50:00,000
that's out there doing kind of the the

1360
00:50:03,430 --> 00:50:00,960
white knighting you know

1361
00:50:05,349 --> 00:50:03,440
the good work the white hat hacking uh

1362
00:50:08,069 --> 00:50:05,359
has an automated tool scanning for these

1363
00:50:10,069 --> 00:50:08,079
broken vpn devices and found theirs

1364
00:50:11,190 --> 00:50:10,079
and they sent an email to them before

1365
00:50:12,950 --> 00:50:11,200
the hack happened

1366
00:50:15,109 --> 00:50:12,960
saying your device is vulnerable this

1367
00:50:16,710 --> 00:50:15,119
could happen to you here's the fix

1368
00:50:18,549 --> 00:50:16,720
and the company never implemented that

1369
00:50:21,109 --> 00:50:18,559
fix the

1370
00:50:22,390 --> 00:50:21,119
uh with your security especially

1371
00:50:25,750 --> 00:50:22,400
when a security firm

1372
00:50:33,030 --> 00:50:30,069
okay so now let's if if your system

1373
00:50:33,990 --> 00:50:33,040
is backed up and i'm talking about in a

1374
00:50:36,950 --> 00:50:34,000
basic sense

1375
00:50:38,230 --> 00:50:36,960
your your photographs and your files and

1376
00:50:38,710 --> 00:50:38,240
you've got time machine or something

1377
00:50:42,069 --> 00:50:38,720
like that

1378
00:50:42,870 --> 00:50:42,079
right right right um and and you have

1379
00:50:45,990 --> 00:50:42,880
that there

1380
00:50:47,589 --> 00:50:46,000
and something like this happens and you

1381
00:50:48,950 --> 00:50:47,599
know that you've got your system backed

1382
00:50:52,390 --> 00:50:48,960
up

1383
00:50:54,549 --> 00:50:52,400
can you does does the malware reside

1384
00:50:57,270 --> 00:50:54,559
somewhere else i mean if you erase your

1385
00:51:00,470 --> 00:50:57,280
drive and reformat your drive

1386
00:51:01,910 --> 00:51:00,480
are you safe at that point it depends on

1387
00:51:03,750 --> 00:51:01,920
the other devices you have connected to

1388
00:51:04,950 --> 00:51:03,760
your network uh if those devices have

1389
00:51:07,109 --> 00:51:04,960
drives you know

1390
00:51:07,990 --> 00:51:07,119
my current system that i'm talking to

1391
00:51:09,750 --> 00:51:08,000
you through on

1392
00:51:11,510 --> 00:51:09,760
right now has three different sets of

1393
00:51:13,190 --> 00:51:11,520
external drives it can access

1394
00:51:15,670 --> 00:51:13,200
it could have been put on there and then

1395
00:51:19,030 --> 00:51:15,680
through you know me accessing something

1396
00:51:22,230 --> 00:51:19,040
um it could bring it back so

1397
00:51:24,790 --> 00:51:22,240
for me um i use

1398
00:51:26,790 --> 00:51:24,800
i use anti-malware tools of course uh on

1399
00:51:28,950 --> 00:51:26,800
windows you really don't have to get

1400
00:51:31,349 --> 00:51:28,960
anything better than what's built in

1401
00:51:33,109 --> 00:51:31,359
no running norton or mcafee please those

1402
00:51:35,910 --> 00:51:33,119
only slow your machine down and

1403
00:51:37,030 --> 00:51:35,920
add attack vectors uh the windows

1404
00:51:40,230 --> 00:51:37,040
defender is fine

1405
00:51:42,309 --> 00:51:40,240
on on mac it's decent itself but

1406
00:51:43,910 --> 00:51:42,319
you need to add to it and on mac i

1407
00:51:46,549 --> 00:51:43,920
recommend uh sofos

1408
00:51:47,349 --> 00:51:46,559
actually um it's a relatively

1409
00:51:50,710 --> 00:51:47,359
inexpensive

1410
00:51:52,950 --> 00:51:50,720
it works good it's up to date uh the

1411
00:51:54,710 --> 00:51:52,960
couple holes that are involved in this

1412
00:51:57,270 --> 00:51:54,720
specific type of ransomware attack

1413
00:51:59,030 --> 00:51:57,280
that could hit your mac system are

1414
00:52:02,069 --> 00:51:59,040
stopped by sophos

1415
00:52:04,150 --> 00:52:02,079
um so you know if you want to go deeper

1416
00:52:05,750 --> 00:52:04,160
and you're a mac user then i would say

1417
00:52:09,030 --> 00:52:05,760
you load up

1418
00:52:11,589 --> 00:52:09,040
a tool called little snitch and uh

1419
00:52:12,390 --> 00:52:11,599
it stops incoming and outgoing network

1420
00:52:14,230 --> 00:52:12,400
traffic

1421
00:52:15,670 --> 00:52:14,240
and it does a pop-up and says do you

1422
00:52:16,790 --> 00:52:15,680
want to allow this traffic

1423
00:52:18,870 --> 00:52:16,800
and if you have no idea what that

1424
00:52:19,589 --> 00:52:18,880
traffic is and you didn't just initiate

1425
00:52:23,990 --> 00:52:19,599
something

1426
00:52:31,349 --> 00:52:28,309
the uh the ability to to do all of this

1427
00:52:34,470 --> 00:52:31,359
uh is it beyond most users

1428
00:52:38,470 --> 00:52:34,480
uh technical uh you know

1429
00:52:39,829 --> 00:52:38,480
because it seems it seems complex but

1430
00:52:42,630 --> 00:52:39,839
are these things that

1431
00:52:42,950 --> 00:52:42,640
are these tools that you can use uh that

1432
00:52:44,549 --> 00:52:42,960
run

1433
00:52:45,990 --> 00:52:44,559
automatically and you don't have to get

1434
00:52:48,309 --> 00:52:46,000
confused it's all automatic

1435
00:52:50,309 --> 00:52:48,319
it's nothing complicated it just sounds

1436
00:52:50,950 --> 00:52:50,319
complicated so people's eyes glaze over

1437
00:52:53,030 --> 00:52:50,960
and they don't

1438
00:52:54,069 --> 00:52:53,040
do it right but little snitch like if

1439
00:52:56,069 --> 00:52:54,079
you're on a mac and you want to run

1440
00:52:58,630 --> 00:52:56,079
little snitch you literally

1441
00:53:00,470 --> 00:52:58,640
pay for it you install it it's under 100

1442
00:53:02,790 --> 00:53:00,480
i think it's like somewhere near 50.

1443
00:53:05,109 --> 00:53:02,800
um and then once it's installed it sits

1444
00:53:07,109 --> 00:53:05,119
up there in the little menu bar

1445
00:53:08,549 --> 00:53:07,119
and you can just see the in-going and

1446
00:53:09,910 --> 00:53:08,559
outcoming traffic in these two little

1447
00:53:11,990 --> 00:53:09,920
green and red bars

1448
00:53:13,349 --> 00:53:12,000
and whenever new traffic that it hasn't

1449
00:53:15,829 --> 00:53:13,359
seen before happens

1450
00:53:16,710 --> 00:53:15,839
it pops up and says this application is

1451
00:53:19,750 --> 00:53:16,720
trying to do

1452
00:53:20,710 --> 00:53:19,760
this with this website or this domain or

1453
00:53:22,549 --> 00:53:20,720
this id

1454
00:53:24,710 --> 00:53:22,559
and you can say with two little buttons

1455
00:53:27,829 --> 00:53:24,720
there deny or allow

1456
00:53:29,910 --> 00:53:27,839
and um and it'll remember these things

1457
00:53:32,069 --> 00:53:29,920
so you don't have to answer that 500

1458
00:53:33,510 --> 00:53:32,079
times because you use skype all the time

1459
00:53:34,870 --> 00:53:33,520
and you don't want to keep saying yes

1460
00:53:36,790 --> 00:53:34,880
skype can connect

1461
00:53:38,470 --> 00:53:36,800
um so it's just a one-time thing on that

1462
00:53:39,910 --> 00:53:38,480
answer if you want you can also

1463
00:53:42,390 --> 00:53:39,920
actually change a setting and say ask me

1464
00:53:44,309 --> 00:53:42,400
every time if you're really that guy uh

1465
00:53:45,670 --> 00:53:44,319
mine is set of course to just ask me

1466
00:53:47,589 --> 00:53:45,680
once on a lot of those things

1467
00:53:49,190 --> 00:53:47,599
right right really really simple though

1468
00:53:50,470 --> 00:53:49,200
really it's not invasive it takes a

1469
00:53:52,950 --> 00:53:50,480
couple seconds and

1470
00:53:53,990 --> 00:53:52,960
every month you use it it asks you less

1471
00:53:57,109 --> 00:53:54,000
and less things

1472
00:54:00,790 --> 00:53:57,119
because it knows already

1473
00:54:03,270 --> 00:54:00,800
these uh ransomware uh

1474
00:54:04,230 --> 00:54:03,280
type of phishing emails how do those

1475
00:54:05,829 --> 00:54:04,240
emails

1476
00:54:08,230 --> 00:54:05,839
look are they using something

1477
00:54:10,309 --> 00:54:08,240
traditional you know like costco or

1478
00:54:12,630 --> 00:54:10,319
paypal or bank of america

1479
00:54:13,510 --> 00:54:12,640
or is there something else that is going

1480
00:54:17,190 --> 00:54:13,520
on

1481
00:54:19,270 --> 00:54:17,200
um you know if it's

1482
00:54:20,390 --> 00:54:19,280
specifically at you or your company then

1483
00:54:23,030 --> 00:54:20,400
usually the

1484
00:54:23,990 --> 00:54:23,040
attacker will figure out some things

1485
00:54:26,150 --> 00:54:24,000
about you what payment

1486
00:54:28,150 --> 00:54:26,160
processor you're using what hardware

1487
00:54:29,829 --> 00:54:28,160
suppliers you're using um

1488
00:54:33,030 --> 00:54:29,839
you know what other companies you have

1489
00:54:33,670 --> 00:54:33,040
deals with uh are you a microsoft 365

1490
00:54:38,870 --> 00:54:33,680
user

1491
00:54:40,470 --> 00:54:38,880
they'll try and learn stuff like that

1492
00:54:41,829 --> 00:54:40,480
and then they'll try and send you emails

1493
00:54:42,870 --> 00:54:41,839
that look like they're from those

1494
00:54:44,789 --> 00:54:42,880
companies

1495
00:54:45,990 --> 00:54:44,799
if it's a less targeted one then it's

1496
00:54:47,270 --> 00:54:46,000
just gonna be

1497
00:54:49,030 --> 00:54:47,280
we're gonna make it look like one of the

1498
00:54:49,990 --> 00:54:49,040
bigger companies like a paypal or gmail

1499
00:54:52,150 --> 00:54:50,000
or something

1500
00:54:53,270 --> 00:54:52,160
and um and send that and hope that it

1501
00:54:54,950 --> 00:54:53,280
hits enough people

1502
00:54:56,789 --> 00:54:54,960
that use that service that you know it

1503
00:54:59,190 --> 00:54:56,799
gets to them

1504
00:55:01,270 --> 00:54:59,200
there you go let's take a quick break

1505
00:55:04,549 --> 00:55:01,280
and our guest tonight is greg house

1506
00:55:07,109 --> 00:55:04,559
we're talking about this uh insane

1507
00:55:09,030 --> 00:55:07,119
hack that has gone down with the grubman

1508
00:55:10,069 --> 00:55:09,040
associates and entertainment law firm in

1509
00:55:13,349 --> 00:55:10,079
new york

1510
00:55:15,510 --> 00:55:13,359
and demanding a 42 million

1511
00:55:16,710 --> 00:55:15,520
dollar ransom this is fade to black i'm

1512
00:55:18,950 --> 00:55:16,720
yours timmy church

1513
00:55:21,109 --> 00:55:18,960
more with greg after this short break on

1514
00:55:35,600 --> 00:55:21,119
the game changer network

1515
00:56:02,000 --> 00:55:35,610
and kgra the planet stay with us

1516
00:56:05,349 --> 00:56:02,010
[Music]

1517
00:56:09,109 --> 00:56:07,109
welcome back faded black i am your host

1518
00:56:09,750 --> 00:56:09,119
jimmy church if you've ever missed a

1519
00:56:12,789 --> 00:56:09,760
live

1520
00:56:16,230 --> 00:56:12,799
show you don't want to go through that

1521
00:56:19,230 --> 00:56:16,240
right live live like now now just get

1522
00:56:21,750 --> 00:56:19,240
our podcast click on the banners over at

1523
00:56:23,670 --> 00:56:21,760
jimmychurchradio.com we have over 1200

1524
00:56:24,390 --> 00:56:23,680
shows there for just two dollars per

1525
00:56:26,789 --> 00:56:24,400
month

1526
00:56:27,910 --> 00:56:26,799
including all of the past shows with

1527
00:56:29,750 --> 00:56:27,920
greg house

1528
00:56:31,910 --> 00:56:29,760
and and greg i gotta say if you're gonna

1529
00:56:35,270 --> 00:56:31,920
get the podcast just get it for greg

1530
00:56:38,309 --> 00:56:35,280
scan it for greg's past thanks man

1531
00:56:41,430 --> 00:56:38,319
oh man uh okay i

1532
00:56:44,710 --> 00:56:41,440
i want to get back uh two specifics here

1533
00:56:47,030 --> 00:56:44,720
um with uh the grubman

1534
00:56:47,910 --> 00:56:47,040
uh let's call it a hack with the grubman

1535
00:56:51,349 --> 00:56:47,920
hack

1536
00:56:53,270 --> 00:56:51,359
uh you have to be able to and i'm trying

1537
00:56:54,549 --> 00:56:53,280
to picture this in my mind's eye so i

1538
00:56:58,390 --> 00:56:54,559
need your help here

1539
00:56:59,510 --> 00:56:58,400
you have to navigate a gazillion file

1540
00:57:02,870 --> 00:56:59,520
folders on

1541
00:57:04,789 --> 00:57:02,880
their network how is that done

1542
00:57:07,270 --> 00:57:04,799
where you can get to the good stuff is

1543
00:57:09,270 --> 00:57:07,280
it because there's a live human

1544
00:57:10,789 --> 00:57:09,280
you know on the other end through the

1545
00:57:12,870 --> 00:57:10,799
vpn that is just

1546
00:57:14,710 --> 00:57:12,880
sitting there cruising file folders and

1547
00:57:17,109 --> 00:57:14,720
clicking through

1548
00:57:17,990 --> 00:57:17,119
absolutely um there's definitely someone

1549
00:57:19,510 --> 00:57:18,000
just uh

1550
00:57:21,510 --> 00:57:19,520
looking around when they get a big

1551
00:57:23,589 --> 00:57:21,520
target i mean on the smaller targets

1552
00:57:26,150 --> 00:57:23,599
they'll have automated tools that are

1553
00:57:28,150 --> 00:57:26,160
looking for specific file patterns and

1554
00:57:29,829 --> 00:57:28,160
specific types of network layouts so

1555
00:57:31,430 --> 00:57:29,839
they can kind of easily automatically

1556
00:57:34,309 --> 00:57:31,440
identify stuff but

1557
00:57:35,910 --> 00:57:34,319
once the basic initial stuff is done you

1558
00:57:37,829 --> 00:57:35,920
end up with a human

1559
00:57:39,589 --> 00:57:37,839
just digging through everything and you

1560
00:57:42,710 --> 00:57:39,599
end up with a

1561
00:57:44,150 --> 00:57:42,720
lateral movement uh you end up

1562
00:57:46,870 --> 00:57:44,160
specifically with

1563
00:57:49,270 --> 00:57:46,880
um you know once you get on one machine

1564
00:57:50,950 --> 00:57:49,280
inside of a network uh moving sideways

1565
00:57:51,510 --> 00:57:50,960
to the machine and the cubicle next to

1566
00:57:54,470 --> 00:57:51,520
it or

1567
00:57:56,470 --> 00:57:54,480
over to the server room is uh usually

1568
00:57:56,950 --> 00:57:56,480
the easiest thing you could ever do i

1569
00:57:58,309 --> 00:57:56,960
mean

1570
00:57:59,910 --> 00:57:58,319
it's once you've gotten through the

1571
00:58:01,670 --> 00:57:59,920
deadbolt on the front door of a house

1572
00:58:04,390 --> 00:58:01,680
you know walking into the kitchen

1573
00:58:06,549 --> 00:58:04,400
uh moving laterally in a network is dead

1574
00:58:07,430 --> 00:58:06,559
simple unless they've spent a lot of

1575
00:58:10,230 --> 00:58:07,440
money

1576
00:58:10,870 --> 00:58:10,240
like uh one of the best tools to track

1577
00:58:12,390 --> 00:58:10,880
and uh

1578
00:58:14,870 --> 00:58:12,400
deal with fighting off that type of

1579
00:58:15,589 --> 00:58:14,880
lateral movement is a tool called dark

1580
00:58:17,589 --> 00:58:15,599
trace but

1581
00:58:20,309 --> 00:58:17,599
uh you're not gonna have a good setup of

1582
00:58:24,950 --> 00:58:20,319
dark trace for under 150 000

1583
00:58:28,230 --> 00:58:24,960
so if you can't afford that um have fun

1584
00:58:30,230 --> 00:58:28,240
is is depending on the

1585
00:58:33,349 --> 00:58:30,240
the size of the company and the amount

1586
00:58:35,990 --> 00:58:33,359
of resources that are available

1587
00:58:38,950 --> 00:58:36,000
shouldn't every company have a guy like

1588
00:58:41,190 --> 00:58:38,960
you on staff

1589
00:58:42,950 --> 00:58:41,200
uh well i mean again that depends on

1590
00:58:45,190 --> 00:58:42,960
size right you know four person company

1591
00:58:47,990 --> 00:58:45,200
couldn't afford to have a dedicated uh

1592
00:58:50,390 --> 00:58:48,000
cyber security guy i.t security icis you

1593
00:58:52,710 --> 00:58:50,400
know whatever you want to call it um

1594
00:58:53,990 --> 00:58:52,720
but uh at a certain size i mean

1595
00:58:56,390 --> 00:58:54,000
definitely uh

1596
00:58:58,549 --> 00:58:56,400
50 person and above should have a

1597
00:59:01,589 --> 00:58:58,559
security person on staff uh

1598
00:59:04,630 --> 00:59:01,599
at a minimum one person what does this

1599
00:59:07,829 --> 00:59:04,640
do ultimately uh to the rep

1600
00:59:10,870 --> 00:59:07,839
reputation of rob grubman and his

1601
00:59:13,910 --> 00:59:10,880
law firm right you're you're

1602
00:59:17,030 --> 00:59:13,920
bruce springsteen or if you're you too

1603
00:59:20,069 --> 00:59:17,040
you're assuming that grubman has

1604
00:59:22,789 --> 00:59:20,079
has got the stuff on lockdown

1605
00:59:23,670 --> 00:59:22,799
you are assuming that uh but i mean you

1606
00:59:24,950 --> 00:59:23,680
know

1607
00:59:26,710 --> 00:59:24,960
i understand that people will assume

1608
00:59:28,230 --> 00:59:26,720
that and it will hurt the reputation but

1609
00:59:29,750 --> 00:59:28,240
it wouldn't have mattered which lawyers

1610
00:59:32,230 --> 00:59:29,760
they were using this would have

1611
00:59:33,670 --> 00:59:32,240
happened about the same i mean like so i

1612
00:59:35,829 --> 00:59:33,680
mean grubbin you know

1613
00:59:37,670 --> 00:59:35,839
the news has come out over the last few

1614
00:59:40,789 --> 00:59:37,680
hours that it has been pinned to

1615
00:59:44,069 --> 00:59:40,799
um to one of those pulse vpn servers uh

1616
00:59:45,030 --> 00:59:44,079
the citrix hack uh on grubman now uh so

1617
00:59:48,470 --> 00:59:45,040
so they know

1618
00:59:50,870 --> 00:59:48,480
they know the vector um and um

1619
00:59:52,150 --> 00:59:50,880
that's a an attack that's been available

1620
00:59:53,829 --> 00:59:52,160
to be patched

1621
00:59:56,309 --> 00:59:53,839
if you had a security person paying

1622
01:00:00,069 --> 00:59:56,319
attention for six months

1623
01:00:02,069 --> 01:00:00,079
so um they're bad uh i would think

1624
01:00:03,589 --> 01:00:02,079
in a sane world that makes them legally

1625
01:00:04,309 --> 01:00:03,599
actionable to people like bruce

1626
01:00:05,910 --> 01:00:04,319
springsteen

1627
01:00:07,349 --> 01:00:05,920
because they weren't maintaining proper

1628
01:00:10,950 --> 01:00:07,359
security

1629
01:00:12,390 --> 01:00:10,960
but um you know that's the thing that

1630
01:00:13,910 --> 01:00:12,400
bothers me the most not that they got

1631
01:00:16,230 --> 01:00:13,920
hacked i mean it's it's pretty hard to

1632
01:00:18,870 --> 01:00:16,240
stop a dedicated person at this point

1633
01:00:20,549 --> 01:00:18,880
um but that it was so easy because it

1634
01:00:21,270 --> 01:00:20,559
was a well-known and already patched

1635
01:00:22,870 --> 01:00:21,280
hole

1636
01:00:24,390 --> 01:00:22,880
that should hurt their reputation the

1637
01:00:29,109 --> 01:00:24,400
most

1638
01:00:32,630 --> 01:00:29,119
and now we've all seen uh

1639
01:00:33,990 --> 01:00:32,640
uh the movies right a lot of them you're

1640
01:00:37,190 --> 01:00:34,000
a consultant on

1641
01:00:40,630 --> 01:00:37,200
we've all seen the movies where uh

1642
01:00:44,069 --> 01:00:40,640
uh a virus

1643
01:00:47,910 --> 01:00:44,079
a file malware ransomware

1644
01:00:51,430 --> 01:00:47,920
whatever you want to call it is embedded

1645
01:00:56,230 --> 01:00:51,440
in a picture not just a link or a file

1646
01:00:58,630 --> 01:00:56,240
is is this approach real

1647
01:01:00,309 --> 01:00:58,640
what do you mean just uh that you know

1648
01:01:02,069 --> 01:01:00,319
any old file that might be doing one

1649
01:01:04,309 --> 01:01:02,079
thing could also be doing a second thing

1650
01:01:05,829 --> 01:01:04,319
yeah yeah like uh like an image like a

1651
01:01:07,990 --> 01:01:05,839
jpeg

1652
01:01:09,349 --> 01:01:08,000
sure i mean a lot of files are traded on

1653
01:01:12,630 --> 01:01:09,359
the internet that are

1654
01:01:13,589 --> 01:01:12,640
jpegs uh that um that you've hidden a

1655
01:01:16,390 --> 01:01:13,599
zip file in

1656
01:01:18,069 --> 01:01:16,400
and if you just unzip the uh the jpeg

1657
01:01:18,789 --> 01:01:18,079
like literally you you go to the command

1658
01:01:21,589 --> 01:01:18,799
line and type

1659
01:01:22,710 --> 01:01:21,599
unzip and then file.jpg whatever the

1660
01:01:24,870 --> 01:01:22,720
file name is

1661
01:01:26,309 --> 01:01:24,880
it'll realize oh there's a zip file here

1662
01:01:27,589 --> 01:01:26,319
and unzip the files out of it

1663
01:01:29,990 --> 01:01:27,599
but to everyone else it just looked like

1664
01:01:31,030 --> 01:01:30,000
an image file um sure that type of stuff

1665
01:01:34,230 --> 01:01:31,040
works there's also

1666
01:01:36,710 --> 01:01:34,240
you know um various forms of packing

1667
01:01:39,030 --> 01:01:36,720
which is ways to kind of encrypt your

1668
01:01:41,190 --> 01:01:39,040
executable but one of the

1669
01:01:42,470 --> 01:01:41,200
tricks that they'll use is they'll pack

1670
01:01:44,150 --> 01:01:42,480
your executable

1671
01:01:45,750 --> 01:01:44,160
with a second executable one that the

1672
01:01:48,069 --> 01:01:45,760
system should have like one we mentioned

1673
01:01:50,230 --> 01:01:48,079
earlier say notepad.exe right

1674
01:01:52,710 --> 01:01:50,240
and yours will piggyback on so whenever

1675
01:01:54,069 --> 01:01:52,720
anyone runs notepad it also runs yours

1676
01:01:56,230 --> 01:01:54,079
most malware detectors are going to

1677
01:01:59,750 --> 01:01:56,240
catch those these days um

1678
01:02:01,349 --> 01:01:59,760
but that one is uh that one is kind of

1679
01:02:01,990 --> 01:02:01,359
one of the tried and true that's been

1680
01:02:05,270 --> 01:02:02,000
going on

1681
01:02:07,750 --> 01:02:05,280
since you know the early 90s and

1682
01:02:09,029 --> 01:02:07,760
you mentioned uh and i always found this

1683
01:02:11,670 --> 01:02:09,039
interesting that

1684
01:02:12,390 --> 01:02:11,680
that apple tends to be a little bit

1685
01:02:15,029 --> 01:02:12,400
safer

1686
01:02:16,069 --> 01:02:15,039
right that for whatever reason uh the

1687
01:02:18,069 --> 01:02:16,079
respect of steve

1688
01:02:19,430 --> 01:02:18,079
jobs i don't know i don't know the

1689
01:02:20,150 --> 01:02:19,440
reason has always been that they've

1690
01:02:23,270 --> 01:02:20,160
never had

1691
01:02:24,789 --> 01:02:23,280
well once viruses became even

1692
01:02:25,990 --> 01:02:24,799
less a form of profit and more just

1693
01:02:26,789 --> 01:02:26,000
something that the hackers were doing

1694
01:02:29,270 --> 01:02:26,799
for fun

1695
01:02:30,710 --> 01:02:29,280
and then of course into profit um there

1696
01:02:31,990 --> 01:02:30,720
wasn't enough profit there because there

1697
01:02:33,750 --> 01:02:32,000
weren't enough people using them

1698
01:02:35,270 --> 01:02:33,760
especially people who were in big

1699
01:02:36,150 --> 01:02:35,280
business that you might get anything out

1700
01:02:37,510 --> 01:02:36,160
of so

1701
01:02:39,190 --> 01:02:37,520
uh you know you weren't going to break

1702
01:02:40,309 --> 01:02:39,200
into nasa through their apple

1703
01:02:42,230 --> 01:02:40,319
macintoshes

1704
01:02:44,549 --> 01:02:42,240
you were getting in through mainframes

1705
01:02:46,950 --> 01:02:44,559
and pcs and windows machines

1706
01:02:48,150 --> 01:02:46,960
um so you know the the mac was never a

1707
01:02:49,510 --> 01:02:48,160
big target i mean

1708
01:02:51,109 --> 01:02:49,520
there are people out there who think you

1709
01:02:51,349 --> 01:02:51,119
know that that's still the case and you

1710
01:02:55,589 --> 01:02:51,359
know

1711
01:02:56,470 --> 01:02:55,599
good gains in market share in the in the

1712
01:02:58,150 --> 01:02:56,480
recent you know

1713
01:02:59,589 --> 01:02:58,160
i don't know last eight years or so uh

1714
01:03:01,349 --> 01:02:59,599
really good gains um

1715
01:03:02,789 --> 01:03:01,359
they've become a target and the first

1716
01:03:04,630 --> 01:03:02,799
like real

1717
01:03:06,549 --> 01:03:04,640
ransomware i mean i say real because it

1718
01:03:07,270 --> 01:03:06,559
was kind of a joke it crashed more than

1719
01:03:09,670 --> 01:03:07,280
it ran

1720
01:03:11,670 --> 01:03:09,680
when it infected you uh for the mac

1721
01:03:14,710 --> 01:03:11,680
actually came out in 2016

1722
01:03:16,309 --> 01:03:14,720
uh by 2018 there was decent enough

1723
01:03:17,750 --> 01:03:16,319
ransomware it's still not on the level

1724
01:03:19,510 --> 01:03:17,760
of the windows ransomware

1725
01:03:21,430 --> 01:03:19,520
but it it does what it's supposed to and

1726
01:03:23,190 --> 01:03:21,440
it works most of the time

1727
01:03:24,950 --> 01:03:23,200
and it'll attack it'll attack mac

1728
01:03:28,710 --> 01:03:24,960
machines if you click on the wrong link

1729
01:03:30,309 --> 01:03:28,720
now is there uh i want to talk browsers

1730
01:03:33,510 --> 01:03:30,319
in just a second but what about

1731
01:03:36,630 --> 01:03:33,520
operating systems like uh linux is

1732
01:03:38,390 --> 01:03:36,640
is is that safer or is it just that less

1733
01:03:42,309 --> 01:03:38,400
people use it so

1734
01:03:43,990 --> 01:03:42,319
the hackers don't care uh

1735
01:03:46,069 --> 01:03:44,000
you know it's it's again it's one of

1736
01:03:47,829 --> 01:03:46,079
those um

1737
01:03:49,910 --> 01:03:47,839
how big of a target service you are and

1738
01:03:51,829 --> 01:03:49,920
how good you've secured your system but

1739
01:03:53,750 --> 01:03:51,839
there have been multiple uh linux

1740
01:03:56,470 --> 01:03:53,760
ransomware attacks in the past uh

1741
01:03:58,390 --> 01:03:56,480
there was a giant one uh called uh

1742
01:04:02,150 --> 01:03:58,400
killdisk there was another giant one

1743
01:04:03,910 --> 01:04:02,160
called the lilac uh lilac hit

1744
01:04:05,750 --> 01:04:03,920
thousands of linux servers i mean just

1745
01:04:06,309 --> 01:04:05,760
thousands of servers it was an automated

1746
01:04:13,750 --> 01:04:06,319
uh

1747
01:04:15,430 --> 01:04:13,760
um killdisk was was a little worse

1748
01:04:17,029 --> 01:04:15,440
because lilocked at least they figured

1749
01:04:18,789 --> 01:04:17,039
out how to undo

1750
01:04:21,109 --> 01:04:18,799
and the ransomware team actually still

1751
01:04:23,510 --> 01:04:21,119
existed killdisk was badly programmed

1752
01:04:25,990 --> 01:04:23,520
and it couldn't actually decrypt

1753
01:04:27,750 --> 01:04:26,000
it itself couldn't decrypt so even if

1754
01:04:29,349 --> 01:04:27,760
you like somehow paid the ransomware and

1755
01:04:31,510 --> 01:04:29,359
then tried to decrypt it you weren't

1756
01:04:32,390 --> 01:04:31,520
you weren't going to get through oh man

1757
01:04:34,549 --> 01:04:32,400
that sucks

1758
01:04:35,589 --> 01:04:34,559
yeah that one was like horrible yeah i

1759
01:04:37,750 --> 01:04:35,599
mean yeah i mean

1760
01:04:38,710 --> 01:04:37,760
the the linux ransomware attacks really

1761
01:04:41,829 --> 01:04:38,720
started in like

1762
01:04:43,270 --> 01:04:41,839
late 2017 around there so again you know

1763
01:04:45,510 --> 01:04:43,280
windows ransomware attacks had been

1764
01:04:48,069 --> 01:04:45,520
going on for a few years by then so

1765
01:04:49,029 --> 01:04:48,079
uh windows was definitely first but uh

1766
01:04:51,430 --> 01:04:49,039
there are now

1767
01:04:53,349 --> 01:04:51,440
solid code bases for for linux attacks

1768
01:04:54,390 --> 01:04:53,359
and solid code bases for mac attacks

1769
01:04:56,470 --> 01:04:54,400
it's just still

1770
01:04:58,630 --> 01:04:56,480
more profitable to go against windows

1771
01:05:03,109 --> 01:04:58,640
now going back to the movies

1772
01:05:06,710 --> 01:05:03,119
uh we have uh all seen

1773
01:05:10,630 --> 01:05:06,720
uh the the different agencies and

1774
01:05:13,109 --> 01:05:10,640
and private uh uh uh security firms

1775
01:05:13,910 --> 01:05:13,119
that have the ability to trace internet

1776
01:05:16,789 --> 01:05:13,920
traffic

1777
01:05:18,390 --> 01:05:16,799
no matter how complex it is even if it's

1778
01:05:21,589 --> 01:05:18,400
on the dark web

1779
01:05:24,870 --> 01:05:21,599
the we've seen that

1780
01:05:28,150 --> 01:05:24,880
with a case like uh our evil and

1781
01:05:30,390 --> 01:05:28,160
grubman is it possible to

1782
01:05:32,950 --> 01:05:30,400
to chase this back to an apartment in

1783
01:05:35,109 --> 01:05:32,960
belgrade

1784
01:05:36,069 --> 01:05:35,119
it would uh it would really take a

1785
01:05:39,750 --> 01:05:36,079
mistake on their part

1786
01:05:41,750 --> 01:05:39,760
at this point on on the team um i mean

1787
01:05:43,510 --> 01:05:41,760
if if the numbers are to be believed by

1788
01:05:45,109 --> 01:05:43,520
the uh big uh

1789
01:05:46,549 --> 01:05:45,119
you know anti-malware teams and the big

1790
01:05:48,069 --> 01:05:46,559
security teams who have been

1791
01:05:49,910 --> 01:05:48,079
hunting for these people and even the

1792
01:05:51,270 --> 01:05:49,920
numbers that uh you know our government

1793
01:05:52,069 --> 01:05:51,280
have put out when you add them all up

1794
01:05:54,710 --> 01:05:52,079
it's

1795
01:05:55,589 --> 01:05:54,720
at a minimum this malware strain has

1796
01:05:57,510 --> 01:05:55,599
been used for

1797
01:05:59,190 --> 01:05:57,520
almost two billion dollars in either

1798
01:06:02,470 --> 01:05:59,200
ransom or fraud

1799
01:06:03,990 --> 01:06:02,480
um that's enough money that the the

1800
01:06:06,470 --> 01:06:04,000
right people who would hunt you

1801
01:06:07,349 --> 01:06:06,480
down are paying attention and they still

1802
01:06:10,150 --> 01:06:07,359
haven't caught them

1803
01:06:11,750 --> 01:06:10,160
in somewhere depending on you know

1804
01:06:13,349 --> 01:06:11,760
there's rough estimates about when this

1805
01:06:14,950 --> 01:06:13,359
strain really started moving around

1806
01:06:17,349 --> 01:06:14,960
somewhere between two and a half to four

1807
01:06:20,069 --> 01:06:17,359
years ago um

1808
01:06:21,510 --> 01:06:20,079
so given that kind of a time frame that

1809
01:06:23,349 --> 01:06:21,520
means there's at least two and a half

1810
01:06:23,990 --> 01:06:23,359
years minimum that this has been on on

1811
01:06:27,670 --> 01:06:24,000
the

1812
01:06:28,870 --> 01:06:27,680
money um

1813
01:06:30,069 --> 01:06:28,880
if they were dumb enough to make

1814
01:06:32,230 --> 01:06:30,079
mistakes they would have made them

1815
01:06:34,150 --> 01:06:32,240
already is usually the case

1816
01:06:35,510 --> 01:06:34,160
uh they're obviously not the ones going

1817
01:06:36,870 --> 01:06:35,520
down to get a coffee

1818
01:06:39,029 --> 01:06:36,880
at the end of their street and bragging

1819
01:06:39,990 --> 01:06:39,039
to the barista that they're gonna buy a

1820
01:06:41,829 --> 01:06:40,000
new bentley

1821
01:06:43,270 --> 01:06:41,839
off of that american they just screwed

1822
01:06:45,510 --> 01:06:43,280
right um so

1823
01:06:47,670 --> 01:06:45,520
you know uh it's gonna be a tough one

1824
01:06:50,630 --> 01:06:47,680
they're gonna have to slip up

1825
01:06:51,990 --> 01:06:50,640
is it a situation where there is the

1826
01:06:55,510 --> 01:06:52,000
cyber aspect

1827
01:06:57,990 --> 01:06:55,520
of the forensic uh detective work

1828
01:06:59,029 --> 01:06:58,000
but then there is old-fashioned police

1829
01:07:02,390 --> 01:06:59,039
work right right

1830
01:07:04,230 --> 01:07:02,400
human bodies out there uh you know

1831
01:07:05,910 --> 01:07:04,240
chasing these guys down

1832
01:07:08,069 --> 01:07:05,920
ultimately is that how they're gonna get

1833
01:07:10,230 --> 01:07:08,079
caught you know kind of like dead pirate

1834
01:07:11,910 --> 01:07:10,240
roberts if you think about it

1835
01:07:14,630 --> 01:07:11,920
yeah uh you know one of one of the

1836
01:07:16,390 --> 01:07:14,640
interesting things i think of is

1837
01:07:19,510 --> 01:07:16,400
you know there was that first strain of

1838
01:07:21,109 --> 01:07:19,520
this uh specific ransomware as a service

1839
01:07:22,390 --> 01:07:21,119
uh that ran up you know almost two

1840
01:07:23,510 --> 01:07:22,400
billion dollars and then they went and

1841
01:07:25,109 --> 01:07:23,520
retired before

1842
01:07:26,630 --> 01:07:25,119
the new people took the source code and

1843
01:07:29,190 --> 01:07:26,640
made this new version

1844
01:07:29,990 --> 01:07:29,200
um but that first version um in their

1845
01:07:32,950 --> 01:07:30,000
kind of uh

1846
01:07:33,750 --> 01:07:32,960
exit message as they said we're retiring

1847
01:07:35,109 --> 01:07:33,760
and closed

1848
01:07:37,190 --> 01:07:35,119
down the service and sold the source

1849
01:07:39,029 --> 01:07:37,200
code off their exit message said that

1850
01:07:40,549 --> 01:07:39,039
they had spent the last you know six

1851
01:07:42,789 --> 01:07:40,559
months uh

1852
01:07:44,549 --> 01:07:42,799
taking all the money and putting it out

1853
01:07:47,109 --> 01:07:44,559
into various business ventures

1854
01:07:48,870 --> 01:07:47,119
in ways which would not only wash it but

1855
01:07:50,789 --> 01:07:48,880
make their new ventures clean

1856
01:07:52,630 --> 01:07:50,799
and all their new ventures were above

1857
01:07:54,950 --> 01:07:52,640
board normal businesses that you know

1858
01:07:57,829 --> 01:07:54,960
had nothing to do with illegal things

1859
01:07:59,829 --> 01:07:57,839
and so you know depending on how good

1860
01:08:01,910 --> 01:07:59,839
they actually washed that money

1861
01:08:03,510 --> 01:08:01,920
uh and how good their accounting is on

1862
01:08:04,069 --> 01:08:03,520
all of that you know that might be a

1863
01:08:07,029 --> 01:08:04,079
vector

1864
01:08:08,829 --> 01:08:07,039
taxes are a lot of times like the the

1865
01:08:10,309 --> 01:08:08,839
best vector to find these types of

1866
01:08:11,430 --> 01:08:10,319
things um

1867
01:08:13,190 --> 01:08:11,440
you know because then you get the

1868
01:08:13,589 --> 01:08:13,200
forensic accountants in right and they

1869
01:08:17,189 --> 01:08:13,599
find

1870
01:08:18,709 --> 01:08:17,199
interesting things um so it's again i

1871
01:08:19,510 --> 01:08:18,719
think it's gonna take a mistake to find

1872
01:08:21,590 --> 01:08:19,520
these people but

1873
01:08:23,189 --> 01:08:21,600
if they get caught i would say the first

1874
01:08:25,430 --> 01:08:23,199
string gets caught because they make

1875
01:08:26,709 --> 01:08:25,440
some kind of a mistake that outs that

1876
01:08:28,149 --> 01:08:26,719
the funding of whatever their new

1877
01:08:28,870 --> 01:08:28,159
businesses are didn't come from the

1878
01:08:30,709 --> 01:08:28,880
right places

1879
01:08:33,110 --> 01:08:30,719
do you think that we'll find out who is

1880
01:08:36,950 --> 01:08:33,120
behind it

1881
01:08:38,789 --> 01:08:36,960
uh i don't have high hopes actually

1882
01:08:40,709 --> 01:08:38,799
um they've been doing this for a while i

1883
01:08:43,430 --> 01:08:40,719
mean there was another hack uh

1884
01:08:45,269 --> 01:08:43,440
yesterday um by the our evil team on a

1885
01:08:47,189 --> 01:08:45,279
completely different company

1886
01:08:48,870 --> 01:08:47,199
uh on sherwood uh i think it's like

1887
01:08:50,390 --> 01:08:48,880
sherwood and forest uh the

1888
01:08:52,070 --> 01:08:50,400
they're a big food distributor that do

1889
01:08:53,749 --> 01:08:52,080
like all the truck driving for for

1890
01:08:55,669 --> 01:08:53,759
kroger's and albertsons and

1891
01:08:57,990 --> 01:08:55,679
all those other big ones so like oh

1892
01:09:00,149 --> 01:08:58,000
there's got out of them is going to be

1893
01:09:02,309 --> 01:09:00,159
tons of like contract data

1894
01:09:04,149 --> 01:09:02,319
and tons of uh vendor data from all

1895
01:09:06,550 --> 01:09:04,159
those all those big giant companies

1896
01:09:08,309 --> 01:09:06,560
now isn't sherwood that's the trucking

1897
01:09:10,070 --> 01:09:08,319
company out of indiana right they're

1898
01:09:11,349 --> 01:09:10,080
like the biggest trucking company in the

1899
01:09:14,870 --> 01:09:11,359
united states

1900
01:09:16,470 --> 01:09:14,880
yep holy crap they got hit by our evil

1901
01:09:18,789 --> 01:09:16,480
and uh it looks like it happened

1902
01:09:20,390 --> 01:09:18,799
somewhere uh you know days ago and

1903
01:09:22,950 --> 01:09:20,400
they've been talking with uh

1904
01:09:24,229 --> 01:09:22,960
the same kind of intermediary group uh

1905
01:09:27,349 --> 01:09:24,239
cove wave that uh

1906
01:09:28,070 --> 01:09:27,359
that was trying to get uh grubman to pay

1907
01:09:30,229 --> 01:09:28,080
too and was

1908
01:09:32,149 --> 01:09:30,239
going in between them and the hackers to

1909
01:09:34,229 --> 01:09:32,159
try and you know orchestrate the deal

1910
01:09:35,990 --> 01:09:34,239
the same group is trying to orchestrate

1911
01:09:37,990 --> 01:09:36,000
with them but it doesn't it's not going

1912
01:09:39,189 --> 01:09:38,000
to happen uh the cyber security firm

1913
01:09:40,870 --> 01:09:39,199
who's kind of doing a lot of the

1914
01:09:42,950 --> 01:09:40,880
teardown of this and figuring out

1915
01:09:44,550 --> 01:09:42,960
what's really happening uh dark al

1916
01:09:46,630 --> 01:09:44,560
already has copies of the conversations

1917
01:09:47,990 --> 01:09:46,640
and whatnot and it doesn't look like

1918
01:09:49,910 --> 01:09:48,000
any deal deals going to be made there so

1919
01:09:51,990 --> 01:09:49,920
it looks like again this is going to be

1920
01:09:53,430 --> 01:09:52,000
just old style police work and some

1921
01:09:54,390 --> 01:09:53,440
cyber security work to see if they can

1922
01:09:55,669 --> 01:09:54,400
track anything and

1923
01:09:58,709 --> 01:09:55,679
i don't think anyone's getting paid off

1924
01:10:00,709 --> 01:09:58,719
of that one you just recovered from

1925
01:10:04,870 --> 01:10:00,719
coronavirus

1926
01:10:08,310 --> 01:10:04,880
what is scarier to you right now

1927
01:10:10,070 --> 01:10:08,320
you know uh are evil and this type of

1928
01:10:13,830 --> 01:10:10,080
ransomware that is

1929
01:10:17,350 --> 01:10:13,840
uh part of a network on the dark web

1930
01:10:19,030 --> 01:10:17,360
or a real virus right

1931
01:10:21,030 --> 01:10:19,040
that has crippled the planet what would

1932
01:10:23,110 --> 01:10:21,040
you be more scared of

1933
01:10:24,470 --> 01:10:23,120
yeah i i find this a really tough

1934
01:10:27,430 --> 01:10:24,480
question because like when

1935
01:10:28,470 --> 01:10:27,440
when i was sick i had uh like my worst

1936
01:10:31,189 --> 01:10:28,480
fever really hit

1937
01:10:32,310 --> 01:10:31,199
it bounced between 101 and 102 but it

1938
01:10:34,709 --> 01:10:32,320
stayed there like

1939
01:10:36,630 --> 01:10:34,719
constantly for a week and a half like i

1940
01:10:39,030 --> 01:10:36,640
did not drop below that and so

1941
01:10:40,149 --> 01:10:39,040
that's the part that really sucked but

1942
01:10:42,790 --> 01:10:40,159
i've actually hit

1943
01:10:44,310 --> 01:10:42,800
105 106. i had scarlet fever when i was

1944
01:10:46,070 --> 01:10:44,320
young and actually you know

1945
01:10:47,910 --> 01:10:46,080
a lot of times in scarlet fever they

1946
01:10:49,590 --> 01:10:47,920
have to let you actually pass you know

1947
01:10:50,950 --> 01:10:49,600
your heart and brain stop

1948
01:10:52,709 --> 01:10:50,960
uh and then they revive you with the

1949
01:10:54,870 --> 01:10:52,719
defibrillators to pop you back

1950
01:10:55,910 --> 01:10:54,880
hopefully uh because it breaks the fever

1951
01:10:58,070 --> 01:10:55,920
right right

1952
01:10:59,350 --> 01:10:58,080
um so like i've had fevers take me

1953
01:11:02,310 --> 01:10:59,360
before um

1954
01:11:03,910 --> 01:11:02,320
and this one did not get that bad uh but

1955
01:11:04,950 --> 01:11:03,920
still i mean you know when when it comes

1956
01:11:07,189 --> 01:11:04,960
to the online stuff

1957
01:11:08,790 --> 01:11:07,199
uh you could say i'm lucky i'm so damn

1958
01:11:11,590 --> 01:11:08,800
poor they have nothing to take from me

1959
01:11:14,950 --> 01:11:11,600
so i'm not too scared of them

1960
01:11:17,590 --> 01:11:14,960
the uh take my identity you will find

1961
01:11:18,229 --> 01:11:17,600
that i own a tv and a bicycle not even a

1962
01:11:21,430 --> 01:11:18,239
car

1963
01:11:24,790 --> 01:11:21,440
right and anything else exactly

1964
01:11:27,910 --> 01:11:24,800
now i have often said

1965
01:11:28,630 --> 01:11:27,920
that uh i have nothing on my computers i

1966
01:11:31,510 --> 01:11:28,640
don't care

1967
01:11:32,870 --> 01:11:31,520
right ransomware you lock this up and

1968
01:11:36,709 --> 01:11:32,880
you encrypt it

1969
01:11:40,390 --> 01:11:36,719
good riddance right i i i i don't care

1970
01:11:43,030 --> 01:11:40,400
a i have backups b i have three or four

1971
01:11:45,350 --> 01:11:43,040
laptops leaning against the wall

1972
01:11:46,310 --> 01:11:45,360
that are ready to go i can be up and

1973
01:11:49,270 --> 01:11:46,320
running in

1974
01:11:49,990 --> 01:11:49,280
in minutes and i really honestly don't

1975
01:11:52,470 --> 01:11:50,000
care

1976
01:11:53,350 --> 01:11:52,480
i'll buy another computer and i'll back

1977
01:11:55,110 --> 01:11:53,360
up my files

1978
01:11:57,110 --> 01:11:55,120
everything else rests in the cloud and

1979
01:11:58,870 --> 01:11:57,120
i'm i'm i'm not worried about it

1980
01:12:00,310 --> 01:11:58,880
but that's something you know but that's

1981
01:12:03,430 --> 01:12:00,320
not the case

1982
01:12:04,870 --> 01:12:03,440
uh with most people and when this

1983
01:12:07,350 --> 01:12:04,880
malware starts going

1984
01:12:08,470 --> 01:12:07,360
rampant and and i thought a couple of

1985
01:12:11,590 --> 01:12:08,480
years ago that

1986
01:12:15,030 --> 01:12:11,600
we were running into situations

1987
01:12:18,149 --> 01:12:15,040
in a global sense greg where

1988
01:12:21,430 --> 01:12:18,159
any city paris washington dc

1989
01:12:24,470 --> 01:12:21,440
new york any integrated system uh

1990
01:12:27,189 --> 01:12:24,480
it could be held uh you know uh

1991
01:12:28,310 --> 01:12:27,199
in jeopardy for ransom right and that's

1992
01:12:31,430 --> 01:12:28,320
that's where we're at

1993
01:12:33,350 --> 01:12:31,440
it's only a question of when

1994
01:12:34,790 --> 01:12:33,360
right people should use this as the wake

1995
01:12:37,510 --> 01:12:34,800
up call to actually do

1996
01:12:39,510 --> 01:12:37,520
proper rotated backups you know like you

1997
01:12:40,870 --> 01:12:39,520
said have another device ready to go if

1998
01:12:42,790 --> 01:12:40,880
it's that important to you

1999
01:12:44,310 --> 01:12:42,800
if you work from home and you don't pay

2000
01:12:45,910 --> 01:12:44,320
rent if you miss a few days

2001
01:12:47,910 --> 01:12:45,920
you better have a spare device i mean

2002
01:12:49,750 --> 01:12:47,920
for all you know your your cpu dies or

2003
01:12:51,990 --> 01:12:49,760
your power supply goes out or something

2004
01:12:53,590 --> 01:12:52,000
i mean unrelated to even the scary stuff

2005
01:12:55,350 --> 01:12:53,600
like you should just have a second

2006
01:12:56,550 --> 01:12:55,360
device in the first place if it's that

2007
01:12:59,270 --> 01:12:56,560
important to you

2008
01:13:01,030 --> 01:12:59,280
um but the backups you know you bring up

2009
01:13:03,030 --> 01:13:01,040
an interesting point there like

2010
01:13:04,950 --> 01:13:03,040
make sure that you have backups but that

2011
01:13:06,709 --> 01:13:04,960
you're doing your backups in a way where

2012
01:13:07,350 --> 01:13:06,719
one of your backup drives every other

2013
01:13:10,070 --> 01:13:07,360
day

2014
01:13:11,110 --> 01:13:10,080
is not actually plugged in so if your

2015
01:13:13,189 --> 01:13:11,120
machine gets hit

2016
01:13:14,149 --> 01:13:13,199
nothing can hit that drive then you

2017
01:13:15,830 --> 01:13:14,159
bring up your

2018
01:13:16,870 --> 01:13:15,840
new fancy machine that's leaning against

2019
01:13:18,870 --> 01:13:16,880
the wall over there that you haven't

2020
01:13:20,149 --> 01:13:18,880
been using yet plug in your backup drive

2021
01:13:22,630 --> 01:13:20,159
you're all set

2022
01:13:23,830 --> 01:13:22,640
now uh going back one you can set on

2023
01:13:26,229 --> 01:13:23,840
fire i guess at that point

2024
01:13:28,790 --> 01:13:26,239
yes that's right well you know what and

2025
01:13:32,390 --> 01:13:28,800
usually you need a new computer anyway

2026
01:13:37,990 --> 01:13:32,400
so right um back in uh

2027
01:13:41,590 --> 01:13:38,000
2000 i'm gonna guess here 2014 2015

2028
01:13:44,870 --> 01:13:41,600
sony got uh their cyber attack and

2029
01:13:46,310 --> 01:13:44,880
the all the fingers pointed at at north

2030
01:13:49,350 --> 01:13:46,320
korea and

2031
01:13:50,390 --> 01:13:49,360
it was over uh the release of what was

2032
01:13:53,430 --> 01:13:50,400
the name of that movie

2033
01:13:56,790 --> 01:13:53,440
greg help me help you yeah the interview

2034
01:14:00,470 --> 01:13:56,800
right okay oh yeah so that went down

2035
01:14:04,070 --> 01:14:00,480
everything was uh allegedly

2036
01:14:05,669 --> 01:14:04,080
north korea i'm not so sure uh

2037
01:14:08,070 --> 01:14:05,679
looking back that that was the case

2038
01:14:11,270 --> 01:14:08,080
still could have been i don't know

2039
01:14:14,310 --> 01:14:11,280
but what would stop a country

2040
01:14:18,630 --> 01:14:14,320
like uh north korea or

2041
01:14:21,990 --> 01:14:18,640
iran or or pakistan or another player

2042
01:14:25,270 --> 01:14:22,000
to jump on the dark web and and sign up

2043
01:14:29,270 --> 01:14:25,280
to the our evil focus group

2044
01:14:31,270 --> 01:14:29,280
right and and take advantage of this

2045
01:14:33,510 --> 01:14:31,280
i mean absolutely nothing i mean we know

2046
01:14:35,430 --> 01:14:33,520
that north korea does this stuff uh

2047
01:14:37,430 --> 01:14:35,440
uh about uh we we believe we can

2048
01:14:38,630 --> 01:14:37,440
attribute at least one third of the

2049
01:14:41,110 --> 01:14:38,640
bitcoin hacks that took

2050
01:14:43,350 --> 01:14:41,120
big halls of bitcoins out of the

2051
01:14:45,189 --> 01:14:43,360
exchanges as they get hacked uh to north

2052
01:14:47,110 --> 01:14:45,199
korea taking the bitcoins

2053
01:14:48,870 --> 01:14:47,120
um so no they they do stuff like this

2054
01:14:50,310 --> 01:14:48,880
all the time i mean you got to remember

2055
01:14:52,070 --> 01:14:50,320
if you're talking north korea you're

2056
01:14:53,830 --> 01:14:52,080
dealing with a country that that makes a

2057
01:14:55,750 --> 01:14:53,840
fair amount of its gdp by

2058
01:14:57,030 --> 01:14:55,760
filling ships with crystal meth to ship

2059
01:14:59,830 --> 01:14:57,040
around the world

2060
01:15:01,350 --> 01:14:59,840
uh you know so like they they don't

2061
01:15:03,189 --> 01:15:01,360
really have anything stopping them from

2062
01:15:06,870 --> 01:15:03,199
doing any of this

2063
01:15:09,110 --> 01:15:06,880
the uh the fear

2064
01:15:10,310 --> 01:15:09,120
whenever i see a really good crime go

2065
01:15:13,189 --> 01:15:10,320
down uh

2066
01:15:15,830 --> 01:15:13,199
in a movie right where i go wow okay

2067
01:15:18,950 --> 01:15:15,840
well they just laid the groundwork

2068
01:15:21,510 --> 01:15:18,960
for any criminal any terrorist

2069
01:15:22,709 --> 01:15:21,520
on a really creative idea on how to get

2070
01:15:25,660 --> 01:15:22,719
things done

2071
01:15:27,189 --> 01:15:25,670
and then these types of hacks

2072
01:15:29,270 --> 01:15:27,199
[Laughter]

2073
01:15:31,189 --> 01:15:29,280
you always have to look at it is what is

2074
01:15:31,990 --> 01:15:31,199
the piece of the puzzle that they just

2075
01:15:33,830 --> 01:15:32,000
showed you

2076
01:15:35,669 --> 01:15:33,840
that they specifically left out because

2077
01:15:37,590 --> 01:15:35,679
the lawyers wanted to make sure whatever

2078
01:15:39,110 --> 01:15:37,600
their thing was was nerfed enough

2079
01:15:40,870 --> 01:15:39,120
that no one could just follow these

2080
01:15:43,030 --> 01:15:40,880
directions yeah

2081
01:15:44,550 --> 01:15:43,040
look for the whole and see if you can

2082
01:15:45,990 --> 01:15:44,560
honestly feel it if you can then great

2083
01:15:48,149 --> 01:15:46,000
you've got you've got a great plan

2084
01:15:49,910 --> 01:15:48,159
but uh but usually there's one step

2085
01:15:53,110 --> 01:15:49,920
missing and it's very much on purpose

2086
01:15:54,630 --> 01:15:53,120
yeah exactly but it's the germ of the

2087
01:15:56,470 --> 01:15:54,640
idea right

2088
01:15:58,229 --> 01:15:56,480
yeah yeah totally and convince people

2089
01:15:58,950 --> 01:15:58,239
they can do it that's what i'm talking

2090
01:16:02,630 --> 01:15:58,960
about

2091
01:16:04,310 --> 01:16:02,640
and so uh with this with grubman

2092
01:16:06,470 --> 01:16:04,320
and i can't believe sherwood i did i

2093
01:16:10,149 --> 01:16:06,480
didn't read about this yet

2094
01:16:12,790 --> 01:16:10,159
uh that's pretty shocking but uh

2095
01:16:14,550 --> 01:16:12,800
people read this and if you've got a low

2096
01:16:16,070 --> 01:16:14,560
moral compass

2097
01:16:17,830 --> 01:16:16,080
you read this and you're like well this

2098
01:16:21,030 --> 01:16:17,840
is actually pretty easy

2099
01:16:24,390 --> 01:16:21,040
for anybody to do is this letting

2100
01:16:27,430 --> 01:16:24,400
criminals know how to go and do things

2101
01:16:30,310 --> 01:16:27,440
i mean sure but every news coverage of

2102
01:16:31,669 --> 01:16:30,320
i just you know uh robbed a bank which

2103
01:16:34,470 --> 01:16:31,679
you know you get that coverage every day

2104
01:16:36,950 --> 01:16:34,480
says oh you can rob a bank um

2105
01:16:37,590 --> 01:16:36,960
the only thing they do on those is they

2106
01:16:39,830 --> 01:16:37,600
don't

2107
01:16:41,270 --> 01:16:39,840
really show much news coverage of and

2108
01:16:42,709 --> 01:16:41,280
they got away they only show the

2109
01:16:45,110 --> 01:16:42,719
coverage when the guy gets arrested

2110
01:16:48,070 --> 01:16:45,120
because they don't want to encourage it

2111
01:16:49,430 --> 01:16:48,080
but like i mean everyone covers

2112
01:16:51,189 --> 01:16:49,440
everything that could teach you how to

2113
01:16:53,430 --> 01:16:51,199
do all kinds of bad things it's

2114
01:16:55,189 --> 01:16:53,440
no different here now when we come back

2115
01:16:57,510 --> 01:16:55,199
after the break i'm going to talk you

2116
01:16:59,030 --> 01:16:57,520
talk to you about the vetting process

2117
01:16:59,990 --> 01:16:59,040
that criminals have to go through on the

2118
01:17:03,350 --> 01:17:00,000
dark web

2119
01:17:04,070 --> 01:17:03,360
right you can't obviously they have to

2120
01:17:07,030 --> 01:17:04,080
vet

2121
01:17:08,790 --> 01:17:07,040
their criminal brethren oh absolutely

2122
01:17:12,310 --> 01:17:08,800
they have to vet them

2123
01:17:16,470 --> 01:17:12,320
you can't allow uh the fbi or the

2124
01:17:17,189 --> 01:17:16,480
nro or whoever in the nsa to just sign

2125
01:17:20,229 --> 01:17:17,199
up

2126
01:17:21,030 --> 01:17:20,239
uh for you know you can't let the keys

2127
01:17:24,950 --> 01:17:21,040
to the kingdom

2128
01:17:27,990 --> 01:17:24,960
go right right criminals are vetted

2129
01:17:31,669 --> 01:17:28,000
they are when uh

2130
01:17:34,390 --> 01:17:31,679
if uh if i was on the dark web

2131
01:17:35,030 --> 01:17:34,400
greg and i'm not saying that that i ever

2132
01:17:39,990 --> 01:17:35,040
have been

2133
01:17:42,870 --> 01:17:40,000
just talk in hypotheticals here

2134
01:17:44,950 --> 01:17:42,880
but if you greg were on the dark web and

2135
01:17:48,790 --> 01:17:44,960
you wanted to buy some really good

2136
01:17:50,870 --> 01:17:48,800
heroin right or some fentanyl

2137
01:17:52,229 --> 01:17:50,880
and get it delivered you just can't sign

2138
01:17:53,910 --> 01:17:52,239
up to have that done there's a whole

2139
01:17:57,030 --> 01:17:53,920
process involved right you have

2140
01:17:57,990 --> 01:17:57,040
escrow of bitcoins you have your

2141
01:18:00,149 --> 01:17:58,000
background is

2142
01:18:02,149 --> 01:18:00,159
vetted and all of this has gone through

2143
01:18:02,870 --> 01:18:02,159
it has to work that way it used to be so

2144
01:18:04,790 --> 01:18:02,880
much easier

2145
01:18:06,149 --> 01:18:04,800
and every year it gets harder because

2146
01:18:08,390 --> 01:18:06,159
sites keep getting uh

2147
01:18:10,630 --> 01:18:08,400
attacked right and uh the the people

2148
01:18:12,310 --> 01:18:10,640
operating them keep going to jail so

2149
01:18:14,149 --> 01:18:12,320
the vetting process has gotten stronger

2150
01:18:17,270 --> 01:18:14,159
and stronger as it goes

2151
01:18:17,669 --> 01:18:17,280
uh so now it's to the point where a user

2152
01:18:20,630 --> 01:18:17,679
of

2153
01:18:22,229 --> 01:18:20,640
the site that's already vetted and one

2154
01:18:23,669 --> 01:18:22,239
other person from the site that's at

2155
01:18:25,590 --> 01:18:23,679
least like a moderator

2156
01:18:26,870 --> 01:18:25,600
have to both know you and invite you and

2157
01:18:28,790 --> 01:18:26,880
vouch for you

2158
01:18:30,870 --> 01:18:28,800
and then you have to go through a bunch

2159
01:18:32,709 --> 01:18:30,880
of uh hoops of answering a bunch of

2160
01:18:35,030 --> 01:18:32,719
questions that they think vet you

2161
01:18:36,709 --> 01:18:35,040
about not doing this and then you've got

2162
01:18:39,750 --> 01:18:36,719
to submit almost a resume

2163
01:18:41,270 --> 01:18:39,760
of uh stuff that you uh that you've done

2164
01:18:42,950 --> 01:18:41,280
in the past that prove that you know

2165
01:18:46,310 --> 01:18:42,960
you're just like them

2166
01:18:49,430 --> 01:18:46,320
well and and if if you're uh

2167
01:18:51,430 --> 01:18:49,440
a heroin user this process could take a

2168
01:18:53,830 --> 01:18:51,440
long time you can go into withdrawals

2169
01:18:55,030 --> 01:18:53,840
right i mean yeah depending on you know

2170
01:18:56,709 --> 01:18:55,040
which one of the sites you're trying to

2171
01:18:57,430 --> 01:18:56,719
sign up to that that could be a two-week

2172
01:18:59,510 --> 01:18:57,440
process

2173
01:19:01,110 --> 01:18:59,520
right that's your only source then you

2174
01:19:01,910 --> 01:19:01,120
could be having serious problems it's

2175
01:19:03,270 --> 01:19:01,920
like uh

2176
01:19:05,110 --> 01:19:03,280
i was talking to someone at the very

2177
01:19:06,229 --> 01:19:05,120
beginning of all of this covet stuff and

2178
01:19:09,110 --> 01:19:06,239
they were yelling

2179
01:19:09,990 --> 01:19:09,120
that uh here in massachusetts the uh the

2180
01:19:11,590 --> 01:19:10,000
uh

2181
01:19:13,830 --> 01:19:11,600
all the alcohol was still available all

2182
01:19:14,470 --> 01:19:13,840
the uh stores for for liquor they were

2183
01:19:17,350 --> 01:19:14,480
all open

2184
01:19:17,750 --> 01:19:17,360
and uh and what the hell how are those

2185
01:19:20,390 --> 01:19:17,760
two

2186
01:19:22,149 --> 01:19:20,400
and i was like if this lasts long enough

2187
01:19:24,470 --> 01:19:22,159
people with alcoholism

2188
01:19:25,910 --> 01:19:24,480
will die in their homes if they don't

2189
01:19:28,310 --> 01:19:25,920
have access to it it is

2190
01:19:29,990 --> 01:19:28,320
actually better to have them still

2191
01:19:31,189 --> 01:19:30,000
having access to it even though we know

2192
01:19:33,189 --> 01:19:31,199
that's a disease

2193
01:19:35,030 --> 01:19:33,199
than having them clog up the hospitals

2194
01:19:37,669 --> 01:19:35,040
right now

2195
01:19:38,950 --> 01:19:37,679
and they were like oh now i get it now

2196
01:19:42,310 --> 01:19:38,960
uh with bitcoin

2197
01:19:44,630 --> 01:19:42,320
getting closer and closer to somehow

2198
01:19:45,990 --> 01:19:44,640
being normal you know i think everybody

2199
01:19:49,590 --> 01:19:46,000
now knows what

2200
01:19:52,709 --> 01:19:49,600
a bitcoin is right and it it's

2201
01:19:56,149 --> 01:19:52,719
how easy is it to do a bitcoin

2202
01:19:57,270 --> 01:19:56,159
transaction if if i am new if i'm new to

2203
01:20:00,550 --> 01:19:57,280
bitcoin

2204
01:20:03,350 --> 01:20:00,560
right brand new how easy is it for me

2205
01:20:06,070 --> 01:20:03,360
to get a bitcoin open an account and go

2206
01:20:09,350 --> 01:20:06,080
out and buy something with a bitcoin

2207
01:20:10,550 --> 01:20:09,360
uh very i mean it depends on kind of how

2208
01:20:12,149 --> 01:20:10,560
strong you want

2209
01:20:13,430 --> 01:20:12,159
your platform to be like if you're

2210
01:20:13,990 --> 01:20:13,440
looking for something that you would

2211
01:20:16,310 --> 01:20:14,000
look at

2212
01:20:17,990 --> 01:20:16,320
more like your bank then you're going to

2213
01:20:20,950 --> 01:20:18,000
someone like a coin base you know

2214
01:20:23,189 --> 01:20:20,960
a u.s company uh that kind of handles

2215
01:20:24,470 --> 01:20:23,199
things in a very bank like way uh there

2216
01:20:26,709 --> 01:20:24,480
there are a hundred other sites you

2217
01:20:28,390 --> 01:20:26,719
could go to that you know as they get

2218
01:20:29,430 --> 01:20:28,400
easier access and quicker to give you

2219
01:20:32,870 --> 01:20:29,440
the bitcoin

2220
01:20:33,990 --> 01:20:32,880
the less trustworthy they happen to be

2221
01:20:35,510 --> 01:20:34,000
so you got to kind of

2222
01:20:36,950 --> 01:20:35,520
figure out where you want to be but i

2223
01:20:38,229 --> 01:20:36,960
mean there are websites you can go to

2224
01:20:40,070 --> 01:20:38,239
right now and just you know with a

2225
01:20:41,350 --> 01:20:40,080
credit card buy bitcoin and

2226
01:20:43,430 --> 01:20:41,360
by the time you've signed up to the

2227
01:20:46,070 --> 01:20:43,440
account bought it and spent it you're

2228
01:20:46,470 --> 01:20:46,080
you know 20 minutes in 20 minutes in and

2229
01:20:52,950 --> 01:20:46,480
so

2230
01:20:53,910 --> 01:20:52,960
these transactions are done in bitcoin

2231
01:20:56,550 --> 01:20:53,920
right

2232
01:20:58,149 --> 01:20:56,560
yeah but getting you know large sums of

2233
01:20:59,669 --> 01:20:58,159
bitcoin is a whole different story

2234
01:21:00,709 --> 01:20:59,679
you've got to get someone with that kind

2235
01:21:02,470 --> 01:21:00,719
of bitcoin to

2236
01:21:04,310 --> 01:21:02,480
sell you so you need one of the

2237
01:21:05,350 --> 01:21:04,320
institutional sellers to do it and a lot

2238
01:21:07,910 --> 01:21:05,360
of times that

2239
01:21:09,830 --> 01:21:07,920
that works more like uh say moving big

2240
01:21:11,990 --> 01:21:09,840
stocks where you've got to become

2241
01:21:13,590 --> 01:21:12,000
you know bitcoin's version of accredited

2242
01:21:14,870 --> 01:21:13,600
you know someone like a coinbase gives

2243
01:21:16,790 --> 01:21:14,880
you an account that only lets you play

2244
01:21:18,310 --> 01:21:16,800
around with up to five thousand dollars

2245
01:21:19,910 --> 01:21:18,320
until you've done that for a while and

2246
01:21:20,870 --> 01:21:19,920
proven some things and submitted extra

2247
01:21:22,870 --> 01:21:20,880
documents and then

2248
01:21:23,990 --> 01:21:22,880
then maybe you can play with 20 and so

2249
01:21:25,510 --> 01:21:24,000
on and so on so

2250
01:21:27,270 --> 01:21:25,520
suddenly having to pay a million dollar

2251
01:21:28,070 --> 01:21:27,280
ransom in bitcoin they're going to look

2252
01:21:29,830 --> 01:21:28,080
at you funny

2253
01:21:31,510 --> 01:21:29,840
that's right that's right giving you a

2254
01:21:32,790 --> 01:21:31,520
million dollars worth unless you can

2255
01:21:34,310 --> 01:21:32,800
really prove to us what you're going to

2256
01:21:36,070 --> 01:21:34,320
do with it and we're okay with it

2257
01:21:37,990 --> 01:21:36,080
right so you can go find it though i

2258
01:21:39,430 --> 01:21:38,000
mean again it's one of those things

2259
01:21:41,110 --> 01:21:39,440
if you really know what you're doing

2260
01:21:41,590 --> 01:21:41,120
you'll find a million dollars in bitcoin

2261
01:21:43,030 --> 01:21:41,600
that

2262
01:21:45,669 --> 01:21:43,040
they'll sell you they'll just gonna

2263
01:21:46,950 --> 01:21:45,679
charge you uh a little extra fee for how

2264
01:21:48,470 --> 01:21:46,960
fast you want

2265
01:21:50,470 --> 01:21:48,480
let's take our break right here our

2266
01:21:54,070 --> 01:21:50,480
guest tonight greg house

2267
01:21:54,870 --> 01:21:54,080
discussing this hack with uh grubman and

2268
01:21:59,030 --> 01:21:54,880
associates

2269
01:21:59,990 --> 01:21:59,040
in new york city demanding 20 42 billion

2270
01:22:02,149 --> 01:22:00,000
dollars

2271
01:22:03,750 --> 01:22:02,159
in ransom how they got it done how do

2272
01:22:05,270 --> 01:22:03,760
you pay the ransom

2273
01:22:11,070 --> 01:22:05,280
we'll follow up with everything after

2274
01:22:21,270 --> 01:22:11,080
this short break this is fade to block

2275
01:22:22,870 --> 01:22:21,280
[Music]

2276
01:22:25,189 --> 01:22:22,880
welcome back fade to black i am your

2277
01:22:27,110 --> 01:22:25,199
host jimmy church tonight our guest greg

2278
01:22:28,629 --> 01:22:27,120
house

2279
01:22:30,149 --> 01:22:28,639
talking about the recent hacking of a

2280
01:22:33,189 --> 01:22:30,159
new york law firm

2281
01:22:35,510 --> 01:22:33,199
by the malware are

2282
01:22:38,709 --> 01:22:35,520
evil they stole secret files and are

2283
01:22:42,070 --> 01:22:38,719
demanding ransom of 42 million dollars

2284
01:22:43,030 --> 01:22:42,080
and were threatening uh to reveal dirty

2285
01:22:44,629 --> 01:22:43,040
laundry uh

2286
01:22:46,070 --> 01:22:44,639
dirty laundry on donald trump but

2287
01:22:48,310 --> 01:22:46,080
apparently

2288
01:22:50,310 --> 01:22:48,320
greg has let us know that that

2289
01:22:53,510 --> 01:22:50,320
information on donald trump has been

2290
01:22:54,550 --> 01:22:53,520
purchased now i would assume greg that

2291
01:22:57,830 --> 01:22:54,560
that was purchased

2292
01:23:00,709 --> 01:22:57,840
with bitcoin how uh the

2293
01:23:01,510 --> 01:23:00,719
the one thing about bitcoin that is so

2294
01:23:04,950 --> 01:23:01,520
talked about

2295
01:23:08,750 --> 01:23:04,960
is that it is anonymous no pun intended

2296
01:23:11,030 --> 01:23:08,760
and its use is virtually

2297
01:23:12,390 --> 01:23:11,040
untraceable certainly if you want to go

2298
01:23:15,430 --> 01:23:12,400
down that road

2299
01:23:18,550 --> 01:23:15,440
uh your activities are are

2300
01:23:19,430 --> 01:23:18,560
virtually invisible is that actually the

2301
01:23:23,669 --> 01:23:19,440
case when we

2302
01:23:27,350 --> 01:23:23,679
talk about bitcoin uh no

2303
01:23:29,910 --> 01:23:27,360
bitcoin is not anonymous in itself and

2304
01:23:31,030 --> 01:23:29,920
as itself and uh even its initial

2305
01:23:33,270 --> 01:23:31,040
documentation

2306
01:23:34,709 --> 01:23:33,280
hasn't claimed to be it has been many

2307
01:23:36,390 --> 01:23:34,719
other people in the community who have

2308
01:23:37,910 --> 01:23:36,400
claimed that it somehow offers that

2309
01:23:42,070 --> 01:23:37,920
ability um

2310
01:23:44,310 --> 01:23:42,080
you you have to buy the bitcoin

2311
01:23:46,070 --> 01:23:44,320
so right then and there there's money

2312
01:23:47,270 --> 01:23:46,080
that's that's the worst trail you can

2313
01:23:49,910 --> 01:23:47,280
ever have right

2314
01:23:50,790 --> 01:23:49,920
so depending on how you've bought it you

2315
01:23:53,030 --> 01:23:50,800
know

2316
01:23:54,870 --> 01:23:53,040
like here locally in my town i there's a

2317
01:23:56,550 --> 01:23:54,880
liberty uh place that i can go to

2318
01:23:58,310 --> 01:23:56,560
and i can actually buy bitcoin with just

2319
01:24:00,950 --> 01:23:58,320
straight cash without giving

2320
01:24:02,229 --> 01:24:00,960
my name and they give me a code but that

2321
01:24:04,310 --> 01:24:02,239
goes into an app

2322
01:24:05,830 --> 01:24:04,320
that's on my phone so right there

2323
01:24:06,709 --> 01:24:05,840
there's some identifying data already

2324
01:24:08,149 --> 01:24:06,719
and if you've got

2325
01:24:10,229 --> 01:24:08,159
you know you're the nsa and you've got

2326
01:24:11,189 --> 01:24:10,239
some malware on my phone you know what i

2327
01:24:13,990 --> 01:24:11,199
just did

2328
01:24:15,430 --> 01:24:14,000
um so you know it's it's not truly

2329
01:24:16,870 --> 01:24:15,440
anonymous in any of these types of

2330
01:24:20,149 --> 01:24:16,880
senses but

2331
01:24:22,070 --> 01:24:20,159
can you anonymize it sure there are ways

2332
01:24:24,790 --> 01:24:22,080
to make it really hard to track if you

2333
01:24:28,070 --> 01:24:24,800
do a lot of extra technical stuff

2334
01:24:31,270 --> 01:24:28,080
uh most of these start with tools called

2335
01:24:32,950 --> 01:24:31,280
tumblers where um where it's really

2336
01:24:34,870 --> 01:24:32,960
interesting like let's say

2337
01:24:36,390 --> 01:24:34,880
there are five people who need to spend

2338
01:24:37,510 --> 01:24:36,400
bitcoin but they don't want it to be

2339
01:24:39,510 --> 01:24:37,520
tracked to them

2340
01:24:41,350 --> 01:24:39,520
they've got five addresses that they

2341
01:24:43,030 --> 01:24:41,360
need to send the bitcoin to your

2342
01:24:44,629 --> 01:24:43,040
bitcoins these big long strings that are

2343
01:24:47,270 --> 01:24:44,639
called addresses right

2344
01:24:48,149 --> 01:24:47,280
and um and then they all send to the

2345
01:24:50,070 --> 01:24:48,159
tumbler

2346
01:24:52,149 --> 01:24:50,080
with the metadata of tumblr could you

2347
01:24:54,149 --> 01:24:52,159
send this to that address

2348
01:24:56,229 --> 01:24:54,159
the tumblr then takes all of their

2349
01:24:58,229 --> 01:24:56,239
bitcoin mixes it up together

2350
01:24:59,910 --> 01:24:58,239
uh buys other bitcoin sells other

2351
01:25:00,709 --> 01:24:59,920
bitcoin trades it in for bitcoin it

2352
01:25:03,270 --> 01:25:00,719
already has

2353
01:25:03,990 --> 01:25:03,280
whatever moves it all around a hundred

2354
01:25:05,990 --> 01:25:04,000
times

2355
01:25:08,709 --> 01:25:06,000
and then sends some other random

2356
01:25:10,550 --> 01:25:08,719
bitcoins off to those end results

2357
01:25:11,990 --> 01:25:10,560
and because it's moved through so many

2358
01:25:13,910 --> 01:25:12,000
different addresses and so many

2359
01:25:15,990 --> 01:25:13,920
different owners by the time it gets to

2360
01:25:16,790 --> 01:25:16,000
the other end saying that that one

2361
01:25:22,310 --> 01:25:16,800
person

2362
01:25:23,910 --> 01:25:22,320
now there are many tumblr services out

2363
01:25:24,470 --> 01:25:23,920
there and some are way better than

2364
01:25:27,510 --> 01:25:24,480
others

2365
01:25:29,590 --> 01:25:27,520
some have been defeated some haven't um

2366
01:25:31,189 --> 01:25:29,600
but that's that's the easiest way to do

2367
01:25:32,870 --> 01:25:31,199
it because tumblr services you can

2368
01:25:34,229 --> 01:25:32,880
actually just like sign up for and set

2369
01:25:38,310 --> 01:25:34,239
up accounts in

2370
01:25:42,470 --> 01:25:38,320
hours now if we're talking about

2371
01:25:46,550 --> 01:25:42,480
42 million dollars in bitcoin

2372
01:25:49,590 --> 01:25:46,560
how easy is that for these

2373
01:25:53,110 --> 01:25:49,600
hackers to receive and

2374
01:25:55,270 --> 01:25:53,120
and to to you know

2375
01:25:56,390 --> 01:25:55,280
stay invisible is the best word to put

2376
01:26:01,990 --> 01:25:56,400
it

2377
01:26:03,830 --> 01:26:02,000
have been traceable

2378
01:26:05,669 --> 01:26:03,840
to a point like you know they see the

2379
01:26:07,910 --> 01:26:05,679
initial address they've sent it to

2380
01:26:09,189 --> 01:26:07,920
there are all kinds of tracking tools

2381
01:26:10,550 --> 01:26:09,199
out there where you can look at the

2382
01:26:12,470 --> 01:26:10,560
blockchain and see

2383
01:26:14,390 --> 01:26:12,480
you know that money went into this one

2384
01:26:14,790 --> 01:26:14,400
and then from there into this other one

2385
01:26:16,470 --> 01:26:14,800
and

2386
01:26:18,310 --> 01:26:16,480
then from there it was split among these

2387
01:26:20,310 --> 01:26:18,320
three and so on and so on and if you

2388
01:26:22,149 --> 01:26:20,320
follow it through the chain um you'll

2389
01:26:24,390 --> 01:26:22,159
usually find that you know

2390
01:26:27,030 --> 01:26:24,400
it was 40 million and 5 million ended up

2391
01:26:29,270 --> 01:26:27,040
in this one exchange in vietnam and 5

2392
01:26:31,510 --> 01:26:29,280
million ended up in this one in germany

2393
01:26:33,110 --> 01:26:31,520
and then it might end up going up to 50

2394
01:26:35,110 --> 01:26:33,120
other people so

2395
01:26:36,310 --> 01:26:35,120
again you know one of the things that

2396
01:26:37,990 --> 01:26:36,320
can happen uh

2397
01:26:39,350 --> 01:26:38,000
with certain cryptocurrency type

2398
01:26:41,590 --> 01:26:39,360
transactions is

2399
01:26:44,629 --> 01:26:41,600
uh certain addresses coins that go

2400
01:26:48,470 --> 01:26:44,639
through them can uh get marked as dirty

2401
01:26:50,709 --> 01:26:48,480
um in a way where the exchanges all know

2402
01:26:53,189 --> 01:26:50,719
they've got a list of coins that are

2403
01:26:54,629 --> 01:26:53,199
that are obviously either from hacks or

2404
01:26:57,590 --> 01:26:54,639
from ransoms

2405
01:26:59,270 --> 01:26:57,600
and uh so they can even you know once

2406
01:26:59,590 --> 01:26:59,280
those go into their accounts if let's

2407
01:27:02,310 --> 01:26:59,600
say

2408
01:27:04,470 --> 01:27:02,320
you show up with one of those coins on

2409
01:27:06,870 --> 01:27:04,480
coinbase like someone sends it to you

2410
01:27:08,310 --> 01:27:06,880
they'll know that came from a ransom and

2411
01:27:09,669 --> 01:27:08,320
they'll be able to alert authorities if

2412
01:27:12,390 --> 01:27:09,679
they feel like it i mean that's

2413
01:27:13,990 --> 01:27:12,400
on them really um that we have an

2414
01:27:15,030 --> 01:27:14,000
account user that looks to be a normal

2415
01:27:16,550 --> 01:27:15,040
guy that

2416
01:27:18,390 --> 01:27:16,560
doesn't look to have had anything to do

2417
01:27:19,110 --> 01:27:18,400
with it but somehow has one of those

2418
01:27:21,430 --> 01:27:19,120
coins

2419
01:27:22,709 --> 01:27:21,440
maybe you want to follow back from him

2420
01:27:25,669 --> 01:27:22,719
um you know things like that

2421
01:27:26,310 --> 01:27:25,679
so there are trails everywhere it's

2422
01:27:29,510 --> 01:27:26,320
pretty hard

2423
01:27:30,390 --> 01:27:29,520
but again the hackers behind this one

2424
01:27:34,070 --> 01:27:30,400
have been

2425
01:27:35,270 --> 01:27:34,080
really really good again the the numbers

2426
01:27:38,229 --> 01:27:35,280
that we're talking about is they've

2427
01:27:42,229 --> 01:27:38,239
extracted two billion dollars

2428
01:27:43,669 --> 01:27:42,239
now uh they're good the are they

2429
01:27:45,350 --> 01:27:43,679
obfuscating they're switching to other

2430
01:27:47,510 --> 01:27:45,360
cryptocurrencies they

2431
01:27:48,950 --> 01:27:47,520
are really good and it takes a certain

2432
01:27:50,709 --> 01:27:48,960
level to be there like

2433
01:27:52,310 --> 01:27:50,719
i would be surprised if one of these

2434
01:27:53,910 --> 01:27:52,320
people wasn't trained by like a

2435
01:27:55,110 --> 01:27:53,920
government to be on one of their hacking

2436
01:27:58,870 --> 01:27:55,120
squads

2437
01:28:03,270 --> 01:27:58,880
the uh the ability to do this

2438
01:28:06,550 --> 01:28:03,280
is one thing and then the exchanges

2439
01:28:09,830 --> 01:28:06,560
uh on the other hand want to

2440
01:28:12,390 --> 01:28:09,840
be part of the the rebel

2441
01:28:14,310 --> 01:28:12,400
bitcoin community and what it represents

2442
01:28:17,350 --> 01:28:14,320
but they also

2443
01:28:20,709 --> 01:28:17,360
want to be right well of course and then

2444
01:28:21,430 --> 01:28:20,719
others want to be legitimate uh like a

2445
01:28:25,590 --> 01:28:21,440
normal

2446
01:28:28,709 --> 01:28:25,600
that image

2447
01:28:31,990 --> 01:28:28,719
so what do are they are they

2448
01:28:32,390 --> 01:28:32,000
ready and willing to share information

2449
01:28:35,430 --> 01:28:32,400
with

2450
01:28:37,590 --> 01:28:35,440
different uh law enforcement uh

2451
01:28:39,990 --> 01:28:37,600
authorities around the world and does

2452
01:28:41,830 --> 01:28:40,000
that tarnish the reputation

2453
01:28:43,510 --> 01:28:41,840
for the criminals that are watching

2454
01:28:45,669 --> 01:28:43,520
willing most of them aren't

2455
01:28:47,430 --> 01:28:45,679
set up in a way where um they're just

2456
01:28:48,470 --> 01:28:47,440
gonna offer up the information out of

2457
01:28:51,030 --> 01:28:48,480
nowhere

2458
01:28:53,189 --> 01:28:51,040
uh they they try to stick to the letter

2459
01:28:53,990 --> 01:28:53,199
of the law so you know coinbase here has

2460
01:28:56,070 --> 01:28:54,000
certain

2461
01:28:57,189 --> 01:28:56,080
reporting responsibilities due to the

2462
01:28:58,550 --> 01:28:57,199
regulations of the

2463
01:29:00,310 --> 01:28:58,560
financial institutions they're

2464
01:29:03,910 --> 01:29:00,320
interacting with so

2465
01:29:07,350 --> 01:29:03,920
uh they do have some uh absolutely

2466
01:29:09,110 --> 01:29:07,360
uh regulated reasons that they have to

2467
01:29:11,350 --> 01:29:09,120
report certain things

2468
01:29:12,470 --> 01:29:11,360
um due to just how strong the financial

2469
01:29:14,390 --> 01:29:12,480
regulations are

2470
01:29:15,990 --> 01:29:14,400
but uh for the most part if they just

2471
01:29:17,590 --> 01:29:16,000
know that this looks fishy

2472
01:29:19,189 --> 01:29:17,600
they're not just gonna call the cops on

2473
01:29:20,390 --> 01:29:19,199
you they they don't want their

2474
01:29:22,550 --> 01:29:20,400
reputation

2475
01:29:24,310 --> 01:29:22,560
ever tarnished by the fact that they

2476
01:29:26,870 --> 01:29:24,320
initiated the action

2477
01:29:28,709 --> 01:29:26,880
um depending on what type of action it

2478
01:29:30,950 --> 01:29:28,719
is they might

2479
01:29:31,990 --> 01:29:30,960
fight a warrant for information or they

2480
01:29:33,430 --> 01:29:32,000
might not

2481
01:29:34,790 --> 01:29:33,440
fight that warrant and just let it go

2482
01:29:35,510 --> 01:29:34,800
through but either way they kind of want

2483
01:29:37,189 --> 01:29:35,520
the government

2484
01:29:39,430 --> 01:29:37,199
to at least take that step so they can

2485
01:29:41,189 --> 01:29:39,440
have some deniability and never actually

2486
01:29:43,910 --> 01:29:41,199
working with the government you know

2487
01:29:45,430 --> 01:29:43,920
willingly now we were talking before the

2488
01:29:48,550 --> 01:29:45,440
break and i'm going to get back to it

2489
01:29:51,590 --> 01:29:48,560
uh the vetting of of criminals

2490
01:29:55,189 --> 01:29:51,600
right this is something that

2491
01:29:58,070 --> 01:29:55,199
has to happen in the dark web

2492
01:29:59,510 --> 01:29:58,080
and for the dark web to operate

2493
01:30:02,709 --> 01:29:59,520
effectively

2494
01:30:05,750 --> 01:30:02,719
uh that that has to go down and i know

2495
01:30:07,110 --> 01:30:05,760
it sounds strange but there has to be a

2496
01:30:10,229 --> 01:30:07,120
certain amount of honor

2497
01:30:10,870 --> 01:30:10,239
amongst thieves and it has to happen

2498
01:30:13,590 --> 01:30:10,880
that way

2499
01:30:14,470 --> 01:30:13,600
and and most of these guys on the dark

2500
01:30:17,110 --> 01:30:14,480
web

2501
01:30:18,149 --> 01:30:17,120
are absolute criminals to their core

2502
01:30:22,149 --> 01:30:18,159
it's their

2503
01:30:24,390 --> 01:30:22,159
job well criminals will also

2504
01:30:25,830 --> 01:30:24,400
screw other criminals and that is

2505
01:30:28,070 --> 01:30:25,840
happening

2506
01:30:29,990 --> 01:30:28,080
on the dark web probably as much as

2507
01:30:32,229 --> 01:30:30,000
anything else that is going on

2508
01:30:34,550 --> 01:30:32,239
out there it is that crazy of an

2509
01:30:37,750 --> 01:30:34,560
environment isn't it

2510
01:30:39,750 --> 01:30:37,760
it is uh for for the dark web ones uh

2511
01:30:41,669 --> 01:30:39,760
you know you've got a you got to know

2512
01:30:43,189 --> 01:30:41,679
someone who knows someone or work your

2513
01:30:45,910 --> 01:30:43,199
way up you know

2514
01:30:47,110 --> 01:30:45,920
uh so you might end up on some of the

2515
01:30:50,149 --> 01:30:47,120
more plain

2516
01:30:51,590 --> 01:30:50,159
text ones like say if you don't want to

2517
01:30:52,390 --> 01:30:51,600
go over to the dark web but you want to

2518
01:30:55,189 --> 01:30:52,400
kind of start

2519
01:30:57,590 --> 01:30:55,199
playing around with the uh the lesser

2520
01:31:00,790 --> 01:30:57,600
forms of this uh you'd go to raid forums

2521
01:31:02,870 --> 01:31:00,800
it's literally at raidforums.com

2522
01:31:04,790 --> 01:31:02,880
right there go have fun there's multiple

2523
01:31:07,910 --> 01:31:04,800
data breaches there for sale every day

2524
01:31:09,669 --> 01:31:07,920
you can sign right up um

2525
01:31:11,350 --> 01:31:09,679
but you know you'll you'll earn a record

2526
01:31:12,950 --> 01:31:11,360
there of someone who's actually done

2527
01:31:14,310 --> 01:31:12,960
pretty good for a while and then you'll

2528
01:31:15,510 --> 01:31:14,320
make friends with a few people on the

2529
01:31:17,030 --> 01:31:15,520
dark web and

2530
01:31:19,030 --> 01:31:17,040
you know by the time you're looking to

2531
01:31:21,030 --> 01:31:19,040
kind of take that next step and really

2532
01:31:24,070 --> 01:31:21,040
move up in your criminal activity

2533
01:31:25,990 --> 01:31:24,080
you're going to get two of them on a

2534
01:31:26,470 --> 01:31:26,000
site to go to the admins and vouch for

2535
01:31:28,550 --> 01:31:26,480
you

2536
01:31:30,149 --> 01:31:28,560
and it's it's never one it's always at

2537
01:31:30,470 --> 01:31:30,159
least two that have to vouch for you for

2538
01:31:43,750 --> 01:31:30,480
the

2539
01:31:45,270 --> 01:31:43,760
but uh you know so you've got to have

2540
01:31:46,470 --> 01:31:45,280
vouchers and then you show up and

2541
01:31:48,390 --> 01:31:46,480
usually you're in some kind of a

2542
01:31:49,750 --> 01:31:48,400
restricted state to start where

2543
01:31:51,030 --> 01:31:49,760
you can't just show up on day one and

2544
01:31:52,229 --> 01:31:51,040
start like selling your wares you've

2545
01:31:54,550 --> 01:31:52,239
gotta you know

2546
01:31:55,430 --> 01:31:54,560
actually hang out talk to people get a

2547
01:31:57,669 --> 01:31:55,440
feel for things

2548
01:31:59,350 --> 01:31:57,679
post a lot before they really start

2549
01:32:02,950 --> 01:31:59,360
allowing you to have more features

2550
01:32:06,550 --> 01:32:02,960
and and use more of the stuff and

2551
01:32:07,270 --> 01:32:06,560
uh how far does the vetting go it's one

2552
01:32:10,070 --> 01:32:07,280
thing to build

2553
01:32:11,350 --> 01:32:10,080
relationships and and build your

2554
01:32:13,990 --> 01:32:11,360
reputation

2555
01:32:16,470 --> 01:32:14,000
but does does it go beyond that or do

2556
01:32:19,590 --> 01:32:16,480
they look into your background

2557
01:32:20,790 --> 01:32:19,600
uh some do um it again it depends on

2558
01:32:22,470 --> 01:32:20,800
kind of the level um

2559
01:32:23,990 --> 01:32:22,480
there is a dark web forum that is

2560
01:32:26,790 --> 01:32:24,000
specifically

2561
01:32:27,510 --> 01:32:26,800
for uh managing the collections of

2562
01:32:30,550 --> 01:32:27,520
stolen

2563
01:32:31,830 --> 01:32:30,560
um merchant accounts which is what

2564
01:32:33,510 --> 01:32:31,840
people use to uh

2565
01:32:34,629 --> 01:32:33,520
of course charge all the credit cards

2566
01:32:36,149 --> 01:32:34,639
that they get in the big credit card

2567
01:32:39,590 --> 01:32:36,159
dumps they take like you know

2568
01:32:42,790 --> 01:32:39,600
the giant tjx hack or any of those um

2569
01:32:45,910 --> 01:32:42,800
on on the couple forums that do that uh

2570
01:32:47,189 --> 01:32:45,920
the vetting to get access to that level

2571
01:32:48,229 --> 01:32:47,199
of the game which is where they're

2572
01:32:51,510 --> 01:32:48,239
playing with you know

2573
01:32:54,950 --> 01:32:51,520
the millions in the billions um that

2574
01:32:57,110 --> 01:32:54,960
takes real world uh vetting that takes

2575
01:32:58,870 --> 01:32:57,120
multiple users vetting you that takes

2576
01:33:00,790 --> 01:32:58,880
you proving

2577
01:33:02,149 --> 01:33:00,800
a big thing that you've done in the past

2578
01:33:04,550 --> 01:33:02,159
to them and

2579
01:33:05,990 --> 01:33:04,560
showing up with uh what you might refer

2580
01:33:07,669 --> 01:33:06,000
to as a gift

2581
01:33:09,270 --> 01:33:07,679
um you know something to give them that

2582
01:33:11,030 --> 01:33:09,280
they don't have yet that they could

2583
01:33:12,709 --> 01:33:11,040
really use you know

2584
01:33:14,310 --> 01:33:12,719
uh i mean you've got to go through a lot

2585
01:33:15,430 --> 01:33:14,320
and then on those they'll do a lot of

2586
01:33:16,790 --> 01:33:15,440
other things i mean

2587
01:33:19,189 --> 01:33:16,800
they'll want to know who you are they'll

2588
01:33:21,430 --> 01:33:19,199
want to uh do background checks

2589
01:33:22,709 --> 01:33:21,440
they will verify that you aren't it's

2590
01:33:25,430 --> 01:33:22,719
almost like um

2591
01:33:27,030 --> 01:33:25,440
you know you can't have a judge that

2592
01:33:28,390 --> 01:33:27,040
currently is sitting well you're not

2593
01:33:31,270 --> 01:33:28,400
supposed to uh that has

2594
01:33:32,950 --> 01:33:31,280
serious debt uh outside of normal debt

2595
01:33:35,030 --> 01:33:32,960
like a mortgage and

2596
01:33:36,070 --> 01:33:35,040
student loans are fine but if you've got

2597
01:33:37,830 --> 01:33:36,080
a sitting judge

2598
01:33:39,430 --> 01:33:37,840
with gambling debt even if it's a legal

2599
01:33:41,189 --> 01:33:39,440
type of gambling or something

2600
01:33:42,550 --> 01:33:41,199
uh that's a problem when they usually

2601
01:33:43,990 --> 01:33:42,560
are supposed to be sidelined until

2602
01:33:47,030 --> 01:33:44,000
that's cleaned up right

2603
01:33:48,790 --> 01:33:47,040
um there are certain cops uh in in like

2604
01:33:49,590 --> 01:33:48,800
the la county sheriff's uh actually

2605
01:33:52,070 --> 01:33:49,600
watch

2606
01:33:53,990 --> 01:33:52,080
their credit ratings and uh if they drop

2607
01:33:56,629 --> 01:33:54,000
before a certain level they actually

2608
01:33:57,270 --> 01:33:56,639
do an internal investigation to find out

2609
01:33:59,030 --> 01:33:57,280
uh

2610
01:34:00,629 --> 01:33:59,040
what exactly is going on that this guy's

2611
01:34:03,189 --> 01:34:00,639
having this much financial trouble

2612
01:34:04,390 --> 01:34:03,199
because financial trouble is leverage

2613
01:34:07,030 --> 01:34:04,400
and um

2614
01:34:09,110 --> 01:34:07,040
so they'll do that level of checking

2615
01:34:10,470 --> 01:34:09,120
before they let people into the really

2616
01:34:13,510 --> 01:34:10,480
deep parts

2617
01:34:15,830 --> 01:34:13,520
now the i'll make a confession

2618
01:34:16,870 --> 01:34:15,840
right now uh to everybody that is

2619
01:34:20,070 --> 01:34:16,880
listening

2620
01:34:21,030 --> 01:34:20,080
i have never gone and checked out the

2621
01:34:23,430 --> 01:34:21,040
dark web

2622
01:34:25,430 --> 01:34:23,440
okay and now with all of my research and

2623
01:34:27,910 --> 01:34:25,440
greg and i talking over the years

2624
01:34:29,270 --> 01:34:27,920
and and all of the information that i

2625
01:34:32,709 --> 01:34:29,280
have collected

2626
01:34:36,790 --> 01:34:32,719
uh and and i know how to do

2627
01:34:39,750 --> 01:34:36,800
i i i'm scared i'm absolutely scared

2628
01:34:40,550 --> 01:34:39,760
i don't want to go right so i haven't

2629
01:34:43,750 --> 01:34:40,560
done it

2630
01:34:47,189 --> 01:34:43,760
but then through that research greg

2631
01:34:50,229 --> 01:34:47,199
i have read many many times

2632
01:34:53,109 --> 01:34:50,239
that the dark web the tor browser

2633
01:34:54,070 --> 01:34:53,119
and and on and everything that was set

2634
01:34:57,669 --> 01:34:54,080
up

2635
01:35:01,030 --> 01:34:57,679
was uh was a government project

2636
01:35:04,550 --> 01:35:01,040
right that this was a way to

2637
01:35:07,350 --> 01:35:04,560
uh to do things uh more efficiently

2638
01:35:09,109 --> 01:35:07,360
while the regular www was being set up

2639
01:35:12,870 --> 01:35:09,119
and those protocols were there

2640
01:35:15,910 --> 01:35:12,880
but that was the start of the dark web

2641
01:35:16,870 --> 01:35:15,920
and can you confirm this part of the

2642
01:35:20,390 --> 01:35:16,880
urban myth

2643
01:35:23,990 --> 01:35:20,400
behind the dark web

2644
01:35:26,390 --> 01:35:24,000
uh well okay sure um so tor

2645
01:35:28,310 --> 01:35:26,400
started out as a government project the

2646
01:35:29,750 --> 01:35:28,320
initial code base uh

2647
01:35:31,990 --> 01:35:29,760
something you know that complicated

2648
01:35:35,350 --> 01:35:32,000
started out and

2649
01:35:36,070 --> 01:35:35,360
it was uh basically given out as open

2650
01:35:42,629 --> 01:35:36,080
source

2651
01:35:43,350 --> 01:35:42,639
uh kind of coalesced around it and

2652
01:35:45,030 --> 01:35:43,360
started uh

2653
01:35:46,550 --> 01:35:45,040
building on top of it the government

2654
01:35:49,910 --> 01:35:46,560
stopped developing it

2655
01:35:50,229 --> 01:35:49,920
and um the code base was gone over you

2656
01:35:52,310 --> 01:35:50,239
know

2657
01:35:54,870 --> 01:35:52,320
head to toe every bit of it by the

2658
01:35:58,149 --> 01:35:54,880
outside engineers and it's

2659
01:35:59,990 --> 01:35:58,159
at this point you know years and years

2660
01:36:01,830 --> 01:36:00,000
decades away from you know any actual

2661
01:36:04,390 --> 01:36:01,840
like government input on it

2662
01:36:05,270 --> 01:36:04,400
uh the the more interesting side of

2663
01:36:07,830 --> 01:36:05,280
things is not

2664
01:36:10,310 --> 01:36:07,840
that it in itself started that way but

2665
01:36:13,510 --> 01:36:10,320
uh when you look at things like tor

2666
01:36:16,790 --> 01:36:13,520
and other systems like that you um

2667
01:36:17,669 --> 01:36:16,800
you have to look at the connections like

2668
01:36:19,910 --> 01:36:17,679
torah does

2669
01:36:21,669 --> 01:36:19,920
onion routing which means you know it

2670
01:36:23,189 --> 01:36:21,679
encrypts and then sends to the next one

2671
01:36:25,030 --> 01:36:23,199
which encrypts and so on and so on and

2672
01:36:25,669 --> 01:36:25,040
then at the end it decrypts the layers

2673
01:36:27,910 --> 01:36:25,679
and you know

2674
01:36:29,910 --> 01:36:27,920
the layers of the onion kind of right so

2675
01:36:30,870 --> 01:36:29,920
it doesn't just go from you to one

2676
01:36:33,189 --> 01:36:30,880
server to

2677
01:36:34,709 --> 01:36:33,199
the place you were trying to go it goes

2678
01:36:35,430 --> 01:36:34,719
from you to another to another to

2679
01:36:37,750 --> 01:36:35,440
another

2680
01:36:39,430 --> 01:36:37,760
with the hope that when it comes out the

2681
01:36:40,629 --> 01:36:39,440
other end and goes to whatever web

2682
01:36:42,229 --> 01:36:40,639
server or whatever

2683
01:36:44,790 --> 01:36:42,239
communications channel you were trying

2684
01:36:47,350 --> 01:36:44,800
to talk to they can't tell which server

2685
01:36:48,870 --> 01:36:47,360
it entered on and thereby also tell who

2686
01:36:52,870 --> 01:36:48,880
you are right

2687
01:36:54,070 --> 01:36:52,880
um how many of those nodes are run by

2688
01:36:57,430 --> 01:36:54,080
people that we trust

2689
01:36:58,790 --> 01:36:57,440
is always my question and uh that's the

2690
01:36:59,270 --> 01:36:58,800
one that's been the hardest one to kind

2691
01:37:00,709 --> 01:36:59,280
of nail

2692
01:37:02,709 --> 01:37:00,719
down because there there were some

2693
01:37:05,109 --> 01:37:02,719
periods in time where uh there were

2694
01:37:06,950 --> 01:37:05,119
large percentages of tour nodes in

2695
01:37:09,750 --> 01:37:06,960
places where you would expect there to

2696
01:37:12,550 --> 01:37:09,760
be uh government controlled servers and

2697
01:37:14,870 --> 01:37:12,560
at a certain point uh you know having

2698
01:37:16,470 --> 01:37:14,880
that many nodes leads to forms of attack

2699
01:37:18,709 --> 01:37:16,480
that allow you to id

2700
01:37:20,470 --> 01:37:18,719
which node they came in on and if they

2701
01:37:21,830 --> 01:37:20,480
came in on a node that you controlled

2702
01:37:23,750 --> 01:37:21,840
and you were able to id

2703
01:37:25,270 --> 01:37:23,760
it was that node and where they were

2704
01:37:28,149 --> 01:37:25,280
trying to go then you know

2705
01:37:28,870 --> 01:37:28,159
by that point you can id the person uh

2706
01:37:31,350 --> 01:37:28,880
so

2707
01:37:32,149 --> 01:37:31,360
that was always my fear it doesn't look

2708
01:37:35,750 --> 01:37:32,159
like

2709
01:37:37,590 --> 01:37:35,760
they've actually uh pulled that attack

2710
01:37:39,590 --> 01:37:37,600
off yet in any real way

2711
01:37:41,030 --> 01:37:39,600
um most of the attacks that look like

2712
01:37:43,350 --> 01:37:41,040
they have happened

2713
01:37:45,350 --> 01:37:43,360
uh while someone was also using tor were

2714
01:37:48,149 --> 01:37:45,360
usually down to that user making a

2715
01:37:51,109 --> 01:37:48,159
hundred other mistakes like um

2716
01:37:52,790 --> 01:37:51,119
you know when i go to visit a website on

2717
01:37:55,189 --> 01:37:52,800
my computer i type in

2718
01:37:56,709 --> 01:37:55,199
letters i don't type in numbers but

2719
01:37:58,310 --> 01:37:56,719
those letters have to be turned into

2720
01:37:59,189 --> 01:37:58,320
numbers for my computer to get there

2721
01:38:03,270 --> 01:37:59,199
right

2722
01:38:06,950 --> 01:38:03,280
let's say i'm on the dark web and

2723
01:38:09,910 --> 01:38:06,960
my web browser isn't routing

2724
01:38:11,510 --> 01:38:09,920
those requests to turn that domain name

2725
01:38:13,669 --> 01:38:11,520
into an ip address

2726
01:38:15,350 --> 01:38:13,679
into the numbers through the dark web

2727
01:38:16,390 --> 01:38:15,360
it's looking at them on the plain text

2728
01:38:18,709 --> 01:38:16,400
web right

2729
01:38:20,629 --> 01:38:18,719
um then what you've done is you've

2730
01:38:22,950 --> 01:38:20,639
leaked a little bit of data there

2731
01:38:24,470 --> 01:38:22,960
while all of your transaction stuff is

2732
01:38:26,070 --> 01:38:24,480
going to happen over the dark web you're

2733
01:38:27,669 --> 01:38:26,080
going to connect to the website load the

2734
01:38:30,550 --> 01:38:27,679
website and all that fun stuff

2735
01:38:32,149 --> 01:38:30,560
over the dark web your request to get an

2736
01:38:34,390 --> 01:38:32,159
address out of a domain name might have

2737
01:38:36,870 --> 01:38:34,400
gone over the plain text web

2738
01:38:37,830 --> 01:38:36,880
and at that point uh you know you've

2739
01:38:41,189 --> 01:38:37,840
made the mistake

2740
01:38:43,109 --> 01:38:41,199
of requesting something from a server

2741
01:38:44,709 --> 01:38:43,119
that could easily be compromised like if

2742
01:38:47,510 --> 01:38:44,719
you look at uh a couple of the

2743
01:38:48,229 --> 01:38:47,520
drug markets that were online uh on the

2744
01:38:51,430 --> 01:38:48,239
dark web

2745
01:38:54,870 --> 01:38:51,440
that users got caught on the uh feds

2746
01:38:56,229 --> 01:38:54,880
um took over the server after busting

2747
01:38:58,950 --> 01:38:56,239
the person running them

2748
01:39:01,030 --> 01:38:58,960
right and um and then they would put a

2749
01:39:02,390 --> 01:39:01,040
piece of code on the server

2750
01:39:04,629 --> 01:39:02,400
letting it still run letting people

2751
01:39:06,550 --> 01:39:04,639
still buy and sell and everything

2752
01:39:08,229 --> 01:39:06,560
but there was a piece of code that would

2753
01:39:10,709 --> 01:39:08,239
ask your web browser

2754
01:39:11,990 --> 01:39:10,719
to grab a file from a web server now

2755
01:39:14,229 --> 01:39:12,000
that's every website does

2756
01:39:15,430 --> 01:39:14,239
this and every website has extra code

2757
01:39:17,350 --> 01:39:15,440
like when you're looking at twitter and

2758
01:39:19,189 --> 01:39:17,360
you're you're following jimmy here

2759
01:39:20,470 --> 01:39:19,199
and it reloads the screen you know right

2760
01:39:22,390 --> 01:39:20,480
in front of you without you clicking the

2761
01:39:23,430 --> 01:39:22,400
reload button that's because javascript

2762
01:39:25,430 --> 01:39:23,440
in the background

2763
01:39:27,030 --> 01:39:25,440
requested new data from the server right

2764
01:39:28,070 --> 01:39:27,040
so they they would include a piece of

2765
01:39:30,709 --> 01:39:28,080
code like that

2766
01:39:31,270 --> 01:39:30,719
on the dark market on the drug market

2767
01:39:32,709 --> 01:39:31,280
and then

2768
01:39:34,550 --> 01:39:32,719
the user who thinks he's doing

2769
01:39:36,310 --> 01:39:34,560
everything over the dark web suddenly

2770
01:39:38,229 --> 01:39:36,320
his web browser goes and makes a request

2771
01:39:40,790 --> 01:39:38,239
over on the plain text web

2772
01:39:41,590 --> 01:39:40,800
and they got you they know you were on

2773
01:39:43,030 --> 01:39:41,600
that site

2774
01:39:44,709 --> 01:39:43,040
they know exactly which second that

2775
01:39:47,030 --> 01:39:44,719
request was made and they know which

2776
01:39:48,390 --> 01:39:47,040
user logged in at that exact second too

2777
01:39:49,510 --> 01:39:48,400
and now since they're controlling that

2778
01:39:51,189 --> 01:39:49,520
server right now they have its

2779
01:39:52,149 --> 01:39:51,199
transaction history they know what drugs

2780
01:39:55,350 --> 01:39:52,159
you've bought or sold

2781
01:39:57,189 --> 01:39:55,360
and boom you're arrested uh so you know

2782
01:39:58,070 --> 01:39:57,199
when you when you go through these types

2783
01:40:01,910 --> 01:39:58,080
of

2784
01:40:04,070 --> 01:40:01,920
uh systems you've gotta not just use tor

2785
01:40:05,830 --> 01:40:04,080
you've gotta use tor in an even more

2786
01:40:06,790 --> 01:40:05,840
secure environment than you're used to

2787
01:40:09,189 --> 01:40:06,800
so you wanna

2788
01:40:10,790 --> 01:40:09,199
not just run tor browser on your normal

2789
01:40:12,709 --> 01:40:10,800
computer where you do your normal

2790
01:40:15,430 --> 01:40:12,719
everyday stuff you want to

2791
01:40:16,149 --> 01:40:15,440
boot into a computer into an operating

2792
01:40:18,550 --> 01:40:16,159
system

2793
01:40:20,629 --> 01:40:18,560
that was built to secure your torque

2794
01:40:23,109 --> 01:40:20,639
connections and only do things like

2795
01:40:25,030 --> 01:40:23,119
dns or requests or anything through tor

2796
01:40:25,510 --> 01:40:25,040
and make sure that no script can bake

2797
01:40:31,030 --> 01:40:25,520
out

2798
01:40:32,790 --> 01:40:31,040
there's tails uh which is kind of the

2799
01:40:34,390 --> 01:40:32,800
the most widely used one

2800
01:40:36,470 --> 01:40:34,400
uh you can just download and run off a

2801
01:40:37,830 --> 01:40:36,480
flash drive and boot into it and

2802
01:40:39,590 --> 01:40:37,840
when you're using tor browser and

2803
01:40:40,709 --> 01:40:39,600
something like that that info doesn't

2804
01:40:43,750 --> 01:40:40,719
leak and they don't

2805
01:40:47,430 --> 01:40:43,760
get you that way now if that

2806
01:40:51,430 --> 01:40:47,440
if if that request happens right and

2807
01:40:52,870 --> 01:40:51,440
you're back into going in the opposite

2808
01:40:54,709 --> 01:40:52,880
direction you're going off of the dark

2809
01:40:59,590 --> 01:40:54,719
web you're going out of the tour

2810
01:41:02,870 --> 01:40:59,600
back into the surface net right

2811
01:41:04,470 --> 01:41:02,880
how easy is it well obviously they're

2812
01:41:05,030 --> 01:41:04,480
going to have an ip address at that

2813
01:41:07,590 --> 01:41:05,040
point

2814
01:41:08,229 --> 01:41:07,600
they may know exactly where you're

2815
01:41:10,550 --> 01:41:08,239
sitting

2816
01:41:11,990 --> 01:41:10,560
and you know your street and and your

2817
01:41:14,629 --> 01:41:12,000
town and so forth

2818
01:41:16,709 --> 01:41:14,639
if you're using a vpn at that point with

2819
01:41:19,750 --> 01:41:16,719
that request that is happening

2820
01:41:23,350 --> 01:41:19,760
does that protect you from a hard uh

2821
01:41:26,550 --> 01:41:23,360
id again it depends on you know

2822
01:41:27,830 --> 01:41:26,560
what data is available to them uh when

2823
01:41:31,750 --> 01:41:27,840
they make that request

2824
01:41:34,790 --> 01:41:31,760
so if uh if you paid for that vpn

2825
01:41:36,790 --> 01:41:34,800
service uh with your own credit card and

2826
01:41:38,550 --> 01:41:36,800
that company is an american company then

2827
01:41:40,550 --> 01:41:38,560
they're going to see your ip address

2828
01:41:41,990 --> 01:41:40,560
as that vpn realize they're getting no

2829
01:41:43,910 --> 01:41:42,000
more data at that point

2830
01:41:45,669 --> 01:41:43,920
call up the vpn company and say do we

2831
01:41:47,430 --> 01:41:45,679
have to get a warrant or not

2832
01:41:48,629 --> 01:41:47,440
the vpn company if it's an american

2833
01:41:49,910 --> 01:41:48,639
company is going to say go get the

2834
01:41:51,189 --> 01:41:49,920
warrant but then we'll have the data

2835
01:41:54,229 --> 01:41:51,199
ready for you

2836
01:41:56,390 --> 01:41:54,239
um so if it's a foreign company then it

2837
01:41:59,669 --> 01:41:56,400
really depends on which one

2838
01:42:02,709 --> 01:41:59,679
you are um which one you're using so

2839
01:42:04,950 --> 01:42:02,719
like for me i like to use uh

2840
01:42:06,629 --> 01:42:04,960
one that i know isn't going to give up

2841
01:42:08,709 --> 01:42:06,639
the information because

2842
01:42:10,950 --> 01:42:08,719
they're in a com a country that doesn't

2843
01:42:12,149 --> 01:42:10,960
make them save the information if they

2844
01:42:15,510 --> 01:42:12,159
don't want to

2845
01:42:17,109 --> 01:42:15,520
so um perfect dash privacy.com

2846
01:42:18,629 --> 01:42:17,119
of which i have no deals with i just

2847
01:42:19,350 --> 01:42:18,639
literally love them because they're

2848
01:42:21,350 --> 01:42:19,360
service

2849
01:42:23,030 --> 01:42:21,360
they do not log any of that information

2850
01:42:23,750 --> 01:42:23,040
so when the law comes asking them a

2851
01:42:25,510 --> 01:42:23,760
question

2852
01:42:27,430 --> 01:42:25,520
they physically can't give it to them it

2853
01:42:29,430 --> 01:42:27,440
does not exist anywhere

2854
01:42:31,189 --> 01:42:29,440
so uh it really depends at that point

2855
01:42:33,109 --> 01:42:31,199
which vpn provider you're using and

2856
01:42:36,070 --> 01:42:33,119
which country they're located in

2857
01:42:36,550 --> 01:42:36,080
now uh tell me before uh we say good

2858
01:42:38,310 --> 01:42:36,560
night

2859
01:42:40,229 --> 01:42:38,320
and we can certainly continue this

2860
01:42:41,350 --> 01:42:40,239
conversation if you want to when going

2861
01:42:44,870 --> 01:42:41,360
to overtime

2862
01:42:48,390 --> 01:42:44,880
but for uh for most

2863
01:42:52,390 --> 01:42:48,400
in your world uh you guys are

2864
01:42:54,790 --> 01:42:52,400
all uh using encrypt encrypted text

2865
01:42:56,950 --> 01:42:54,800
uh your phone service you know this is

2866
01:42:57,590 --> 01:42:56,960
just what you guys do and i understand

2867
01:43:00,629 --> 01:42:57,600
that

2868
01:43:01,030 --> 01:43:00,639
and and people we yeah i had it it's

2869
01:43:03,590 --> 01:43:01,040
true

2870
01:43:04,550 --> 01:43:03,600
and uh me texting anybody in this

2871
01:43:07,350 --> 01:43:04,560
community

2872
01:43:09,590 --> 01:43:07,360
i always uh i it's it's difficult

2873
01:43:09,990 --> 01:43:09,600
because i don't i don't use encrypted

2874
01:43:13,109 --> 01:43:10,000
tax

2875
01:43:16,310 --> 01:43:13,119
services it is is

2876
01:43:18,229 --> 01:43:16,320
you you don't just turn on a computer

2877
01:43:20,629 --> 01:43:18,239
and are signed into chrome

2878
01:43:21,590 --> 01:43:20,639
and and going at life each day that's

2879
01:43:24,629 --> 01:43:21,600
not how you run

2880
01:43:27,750 --> 01:43:24,639
is it uh no uh

2881
01:43:31,669 --> 01:43:27,760
not not exactly uh but it also depends

2882
01:43:33,910 --> 01:43:31,679
on my needs uh you know i will

2883
01:43:36,229 --> 01:43:33,920
definitely just boot the machine and hop

2884
01:43:38,470 --> 01:43:36,239
right into my web browser my normal one

2885
01:43:39,990 --> 01:43:38,480
if i'm literally just gonna go

2886
01:43:41,430 --> 01:43:40,000
read an article on a news site or

2887
01:43:42,629 --> 01:43:41,440
something like that and i don't have any

2888
01:43:45,350 --> 01:43:42,639
specific plans

2889
01:43:46,550 --> 01:43:45,360
but you know if i even think i might

2890
01:43:49,590 --> 01:43:46,560
stray from that

2891
01:43:50,149 --> 01:43:49,600
into uh things that i don't want tracked

2892
01:43:52,310 --> 01:43:50,159
even

2893
01:43:53,270 --> 01:43:52,320
lightly just for personal privacy

2894
01:43:56,390 --> 01:43:53,280
reasons

2895
01:43:58,950 --> 01:43:56,400
um then i'm gonna boot onto one of

2896
01:44:00,870 --> 01:43:58,960
20 different flash drives i have uh

2897
01:44:02,709 --> 01:44:00,880
depending on just how strong the needs

2898
01:44:04,149 --> 01:44:02,719
are and you know if the needs are really

2899
01:44:06,229 --> 01:44:04,159
strong and uh

2900
01:44:07,990 --> 01:44:06,239
and this is something that i could never

2901
01:44:10,070 --> 01:44:08,000
ever have tracked back to me

2902
01:44:12,790 --> 01:44:10,080
then it isn't happening from my house or

2903
01:44:14,149 --> 01:44:12,800
a computer that i own that's mine

2904
01:44:15,990 --> 01:44:14,159
it is happening somewhere else out in

2905
01:44:18,310 --> 01:44:16,000
the world right this is uh

2906
01:44:19,990 --> 01:44:18,320
yeah everybody is yelling for overtime

2907
01:44:23,350 --> 01:44:20,000
so there you go greg you're not going

2908
01:44:25,910 --> 01:44:23,360
anywhere um i don't need to sleep

2909
01:44:27,510 --> 01:44:25,920
asleep is for sissies remember i'm all

2910
01:44:29,669 --> 01:44:27,520
the way out in boston here so

2911
01:44:30,950 --> 01:44:29,679
for him it's three hours earlier for me

2912
01:44:33,030 --> 01:44:30,960
it's 12 30 at night

2913
01:44:33,990 --> 01:44:33,040
yeah but boston is shut down right now

2914
01:44:37,590 --> 01:44:34,000
so you guys have

2915
01:44:40,870 --> 01:44:37,600
uh you guys have nothing but time

2916
01:44:44,310 --> 01:44:40,880
explain to me again uh

2917
01:44:49,109 --> 01:44:44,320
when you say i i would just

2918
01:44:51,590 --> 01:44:49,119
boot onto one of 20 uh usb drives

2919
01:44:55,270 --> 01:44:51,600
explain to me that process like i'm two

2920
01:44:59,910 --> 01:44:58,149
uh you know uh we'll we'll take uh you

2921
01:45:03,830 --> 01:44:59,920
know like tails as an example

2922
01:45:05,910 --> 01:45:03,840
um tails is uh kind of the the default

2923
01:45:08,149 --> 01:45:05,920
for anyone wanting to play with uh

2924
01:45:09,830 --> 01:45:08,159
with tor in a slightly more secure

2925
01:45:13,070 --> 01:45:09,840
environment um

2926
01:45:14,310 --> 01:45:13,080
there are others there's hoonix which is

2927
01:45:17,270 --> 01:45:14,320
w-h-o-n-i-x

2928
01:45:18,550 --> 01:45:17,280
there's cubes which is q-u-b-e-s so

2929
01:45:19,910 --> 01:45:18,560
there's there's a bunch of these right

2930
01:45:22,709 --> 01:45:19,920
and depending on

2931
01:45:24,550 --> 01:45:22,719
how secure i need to be you know i go

2932
01:45:26,229 --> 01:45:24,560
down that chain right so

2933
01:45:28,830 --> 01:45:26,239
tor is for when i really just want to

2934
01:45:30,149 --> 01:45:28,840
protect my privacy uh when i'm using

2935
01:45:32,870 --> 01:45:30,159
tails

2936
01:45:33,910 --> 01:45:32,880
hoonix is when well i might be using the

2937
01:45:35,669 --> 01:45:33,920
dark web to go

2938
01:45:37,350 --> 01:45:35,679
research some things but i just don't

2939
01:45:39,510 --> 01:45:37,360
want it to be in my history because i

2940
01:45:44,310 --> 01:45:39,520
just don't need that kind of heat

2941
01:45:46,149 --> 01:45:44,320
and cubes is for when well uh let's just

2942
01:45:48,790 --> 01:45:46,159
not talk about it

2943
01:45:49,590 --> 01:45:48,800
right and so i'm holding up you know

2944
01:45:52,870 --> 01:45:49,600
just a

2945
01:45:53,270 --> 01:45:52,880
usb drive to the camera so you're saying

2946
01:45:56,550 --> 01:45:53,280
that

2947
01:45:58,709 --> 01:45:56,560
tails resides on the usb drive

2948
01:46:00,310 --> 01:45:58,719
yep right and depending on what type of

2949
01:46:00,709 --> 01:46:00,320
computer you're on you know you stick it

2950
01:46:06,550 --> 01:46:00,719
in

2951
01:46:08,470 --> 01:46:06,560
computer you're on you press a different

2952
01:46:09,030 --> 01:46:08,480
key during boot to make it boot off of

2953
01:46:11,430 --> 01:46:09,040
it

2954
01:46:12,550 --> 01:46:11,440
um on the mac you can just hold down

2955
01:46:14,470 --> 01:46:12,560
option while it's

2956
01:46:15,910 --> 01:46:14,480
turning on and you hear the beep and

2957
01:46:17,910 --> 01:46:15,920
it'll pop up a little thing that'll show

2958
01:46:19,270 --> 01:46:17,920
your normal mac hard drive and it'll now

2959
01:46:20,390 --> 01:46:19,280
show the flash drive and you can select

2960
01:46:23,830 --> 01:46:20,400
it instead

2961
01:46:24,229 --> 01:46:23,840
um on windows uh you know depending on

2962
01:46:25,910 --> 01:46:24,239
what

2963
01:46:27,510 --> 01:46:25,920
you know boot options key your machine

2964
01:46:30,709 --> 01:46:27,520
has a lot of times it's

2965
01:46:32,390 --> 01:46:30,719
f9 or f12 um you'll just hit that while

2966
01:46:32,870 --> 01:46:32,400
the computer is coming on it'll pop up a

2967
01:46:34,390 --> 01:46:32,880
menu

2968
01:46:36,149 --> 01:46:34,400
would you like to boot into your windows

2969
01:46:37,270 --> 01:46:36,159
or do you want to boot off a cd or a

2970
01:46:40,709 --> 01:46:37,280
flash drive

2971
01:46:42,550 --> 01:46:40,719
fascinating

2972
01:46:44,229 --> 01:46:42,560
absolutely mind-blowing let's take our

2973
01:46:45,189 --> 01:46:44,239
break right here we'll head into some

2974
01:46:47,750 --> 01:46:45,199
overtime

2975
01:46:48,310 --> 01:46:47,760
greg house is our guest this is fade to

2976
01:46:50,550 --> 01:46:48,320
black i

2977
01:46:52,390 --> 01:46:50,560
am your host jimmy church this entire

2978
01:46:54,870 --> 01:46:52,400
conversation tonight has been

2979
01:46:56,629 --> 01:46:54,880
rolling around the recent hacking of a

2980
01:46:59,750 --> 01:46:56,639
new york law firm

2981
01:47:01,750 --> 01:46:59,760
with the resources and the malware are

2982
01:47:04,229 --> 01:47:01,760
evil they stole secret files are

2983
01:47:05,910 --> 01:47:04,239
demanding a ransom of 42 million dollars

2984
01:47:08,470 --> 01:47:05,920
how this stuff gets done how the money

2985
01:47:10,550 --> 01:47:08,480
gets washed what the transactions are

2986
01:47:12,070 --> 01:47:10,560
and how it gets done are everything we

2987
01:47:13,830 --> 01:47:12,080
are talking about tonight

2988
01:47:16,229 --> 01:47:13,840
we'll be right back more with greg house

2989
01:47:28,950 --> 01:47:16,239
in overtime after this short break stay

2990
01:47:32,149 --> 01:47:30,629
welcome back fade to black i am your

2991
01:47:33,350 --> 01:47:32,159
host jimmy church i guess tonight greg

2992
01:47:35,910 --> 01:47:33,360
house

2993
01:47:38,070 --> 01:47:35,920
tomorrow night robert m shock our go

2994
01:47:39,109 --> 01:47:38,080
beckley tepee special event thursday

2995
01:47:42,950 --> 01:47:39,119
night

2996
01:47:45,430 --> 01:47:42,960
linda moulton

2997
01:47:47,350 --> 01:47:45,440
joining us and it's gonna be great so

2998
01:47:49,189 --> 01:47:47,360
we've got four great nights and

2999
01:47:51,510 --> 01:47:49,199
what a great conversation uh tonight

3000
01:47:52,470 --> 01:47:51,520
with uh greg house greg i've learned so

3001
01:47:55,750 --> 01:47:52,480
much

3002
01:47:58,950 --> 01:47:55,760
and so many uh comments uh

3003
01:47:59,990 --> 01:47:58,960
from uh our audience and twitter tonight

3004
01:48:02,070 --> 01:48:00,000
and i'm watching

3005
01:48:03,510 --> 01:48:02,080
and man we've got a lot of hackers man

3006
01:48:05,830 --> 01:48:03,520
we got a lot

3007
01:48:07,990 --> 01:48:05,840
this whole tales thing and booting off

3008
01:48:10,229 --> 01:48:08,000
of a flash drive

3009
01:48:11,030 --> 01:48:10,239
and things man i didn't know anything

3010
01:48:12,550 --> 01:48:11,040
about this and

3011
01:48:14,229 --> 01:48:12,560
everybody here is talking about

3012
01:48:16,470 --> 01:48:14,239
different ways to do it

3013
01:48:18,790 --> 01:48:16,480
and i just feel like i'm i'm a little

3014
01:48:20,470 --> 01:48:18,800
late to the party and

3015
01:48:22,870 --> 01:48:20,480
this this is something that's been going

3016
01:48:26,950 --> 01:48:22,880
on for how long

3017
01:48:30,070 --> 01:48:26,960
i mean decades oh man

3018
01:48:32,550 --> 01:48:30,080
why am i just now you know i'm just now

3019
01:48:33,109 --> 01:48:32,560
finding out about this it's like uh the

3020
01:48:36,070 --> 01:48:33,119
truth

3021
01:48:38,310 --> 01:48:36,080
tales is only like 11 years old but

3022
01:48:40,470 --> 01:48:38,320
there were other systems before it

3023
01:48:42,550 --> 01:48:40,480
now uh going back still that's a decade

3024
01:48:46,390 --> 01:48:42,560
yeah going back to the dark web

3025
01:48:50,070 --> 01:48:46,400
and and these uh criminal hackers

3026
01:48:53,590 --> 01:48:50,080
and and organizations that are there

3027
01:48:56,709 --> 01:48:53,600
um they are assuming uh

3028
01:48:59,030 --> 01:48:56,719
that they know how to navigate the dark

3029
01:49:03,030 --> 01:48:59,040
web and they know what's going on

3030
01:49:04,470 --> 01:49:03,040
but certainly governments and state

3031
01:49:08,950 --> 01:49:04,480
actors out there

3032
01:49:12,149 --> 01:49:08,960
understand this too and they are

3033
01:49:13,189 --> 01:49:12,159
they have store fronts and and forms and

3034
01:49:15,189 --> 01:49:13,199
things

3035
01:49:17,189 --> 01:49:15,199
that are out there to attract those

3036
01:49:19,430 --> 01:49:17,199
criminals too right you just don't know

3037
01:49:22,790 --> 01:49:19,440
what is safe

3038
01:49:26,550 --> 01:49:22,800
well i mean yeah but the the bigger

3039
01:49:27,270 --> 01:49:26,560
uh issue there is that you have to deal

3040
01:49:28,950 --> 01:49:27,280
with

3041
01:49:30,550 --> 01:49:28,960
especially on the dark web the hosting

3042
01:49:33,030 --> 01:49:30,560
right and you have to deal with the

3043
01:49:35,430 --> 01:49:33,040
money you know there's got to be both

3044
01:49:37,109 --> 01:49:35,440
and those are always the vectors that

3045
01:49:38,149 --> 01:49:37,119
they find you at they find out where

3046
01:49:40,149 --> 01:49:38,159
your servers are

3047
01:49:41,589 --> 01:49:40,159
or they find someone doing something a

3048
01:49:42,149 --> 01:49:41,599
little crazy with money and after

3049
01:49:44,229 --> 01:49:42,159
monitoring

3050
01:49:45,990 --> 01:49:44,239
and tracking and all that fun stuff they

3051
01:49:47,270 --> 01:49:46,000
they end up catching you messing up and

3052
01:49:48,550 --> 01:49:47,280
find out that you're the guy running

3053
01:49:50,870 --> 01:49:48,560
that website

3054
01:49:52,070 --> 01:49:50,880
what the government has done uh for the

3055
01:49:55,350 --> 01:49:52,080
last like

3056
01:49:57,109 --> 01:49:55,360
five six years is keep the websites

3057
01:49:58,229 --> 01:49:57,119
running even if they're doing highly

3058
01:49:59,990 --> 01:49:58,239
illegal stuff

3059
01:50:01,589 --> 01:50:00,000
they did this with a child pornography

3060
01:50:03,189 --> 01:50:01,599
website left it running left tons of

3061
01:50:05,510 --> 01:50:03,199
kids getting exploited

3062
01:50:06,870 --> 01:50:05,520
um so they could catch everyone uh they

3063
01:50:09,510 --> 01:50:06,880
left it running for months

3064
01:50:09,990 --> 01:50:09,520
and it led to this giant argument about

3065
01:50:13,030 --> 01:50:10,000
was

3066
01:50:14,790 --> 01:50:13,040
catching that many people more important

3067
01:50:16,149 --> 01:50:14,800
than the few months of saving the kids

3068
01:50:18,550 --> 01:50:16,159
you could have done

3069
01:50:20,790 --> 01:50:18,560
and it was a tough argument uh and

3070
01:50:22,310 --> 01:50:20,800
people fell on both sides

3071
01:50:24,390 --> 01:50:22,320
uh but in the end i mean what the

3072
01:50:26,390 --> 01:50:24,400
government's plan of action is is

3073
01:50:28,470 --> 01:50:26,400
attack the sources we can attack and

3074
01:50:29,830 --> 01:50:28,480
finding the hosting is a little

3075
01:50:31,750 --> 01:50:29,840
easier than it should be for a lot of

3076
01:50:33,669 --> 01:50:31,760
these people because most of them go

3077
01:50:35,270 --> 01:50:33,679
into this not being super security

3078
01:50:36,470 --> 01:50:35,280
conscious before they start something on

3079
01:50:38,310 --> 01:50:36,480
the dark web

3080
01:50:39,910 --> 01:50:38,320
uh it's not as hard as it sounds once

3081
01:50:41,030 --> 01:50:39,920
you start looking into it and so people

3082
01:50:43,109 --> 01:50:41,040
get into it that

3083
01:50:44,149 --> 01:50:43,119
aren't prepared and then they'll attack

3084
01:50:45,750 --> 01:50:44,159
the money which is what they've always

3085
01:50:48,149 --> 01:50:45,760
done i mean look at al capone right

3086
01:50:49,430 --> 01:50:48,159
they they got him through his taxes um

3087
01:50:50,709 --> 01:50:49,440
they go after the money once they've

3088
01:50:52,070 --> 01:50:50,719
done that and they've got control of the

3089
01:50:53,910 --> 01:50:52,080
site then they're going to

3090
01:50:55,510 --> 01:50:53,920
leave it running and even expand it

3091
01:50:56,310 --> 01:50:55,520
they'll add features just to make you

3092
01:50:58,310 --> 01:50:56,320
think that the

3093
01:51:00,310 --> 01:50:58,320
old people are still running it and then

3094
01:51:02,149 --> 01:51:00,320
it'll run code on your machine because

3095
01:51:03,910 --> 01:51:02,159
you're visiting it happily and you're

3096
01:51:05,750 --> 01:51:03,920
saying yes to any request it makes of

3097
01:51:08,149 --> 01:51:05,760
course because you think you're safer on

3098
01:51:11,109 --> 01:51:08,159
the dark web or you know whatever

3099
01:51:13,109 --> 01:51:11,119
and then they've got you yeah and and uh

3100
01:51:16,229 --> 01:51:13,119
explain to me how this works

3101
01:51:19,350 --> 01:51:16,239
in that uh amazon

3102
01:51:22,470 --> 01:51:19,360
is probably the largest

3103
01:51:23,350 --> 01:51:22,480
uh provider of internet services in the

3104
01:51:27,189 --> 01:51:23,360
world not only

3105
01:51:30,070 --> 01:51:27,199
do they sell products but information

3106
01:51:30,790 --> 01:51:30,080
is is their bread and butter that's

3107
01:51:34,310 --> 01:51:30,800
what's keeping

3108
01:51:36,310 --> 01:51:34,320
amazon running is their

3109
01:51:37,350 --> 01:51:36,320
information services and their server

3110
01:51:39,910 --> 01:51:37,360
farms there are

3111
01:51:41,030 --> 01:51:39,920
other large ones around the world

3112
01:51:44,149 --> 01:51:41,040
certainly

3113
01:51:45,510 --> 01:51:44,159
but the servers that are running the

3114
01:51:48,310 --> 01:51:45,520
dark web

3115
01:51:49,510 --> 01:51:48,320
are some of those part of amazon's

3116
01:51:52,870 --> 01:51:49,520
network or

3117
01:51:54,229 --> 01:51:52,880
usually

3118
01:51:56,229 --> 01:51:54,239
a lot of times you know they'll have

3119
01:51:57,589 --> 01:51:56,239
terms of services and other things

3120
01:51:59,510 --> 01:51:57,599
blocking that kind of traffic from

3121
01:52:01,430 --> 01:51:59,520
running on their servers um

3122
01:52:02,709 --> 01:52:01,440
a lot of times there's uh the smaller

3123
01:52:05,510 --> 01:52:02,719
hosting infrastructures

3124
01:52:07,510 --> 01:52:05,520
or uh other you know external data

3125
01:52:09,189 --> 01:52:07,520
centers which are kind of uh

3126
01:52:11,589 --> 01:52:09,199
almost a dying breed at this point you

3127
01:52:13,830 --> 01:52:11,599
know when you wanted to put up a server

3128
01:52:15,750 --> 01:52:13,840
in the early 90s you know your only

3129
01:52:16,390 --> 01:52:15,760
choice was something called co-location

3130
01:52:18,709 --> 01:52:16,400
where

3131
01:52:20,470 --> 01:52:18,719
you'd go to one of the big data centers

3132
01:52:21,750 --> 01:52:20,480
that had everyone's servers even in the

3133
01:52:23,589 --> 01:52:21,760
beginning like you know facebook had

3134
01:52:25,350 --> 01:52:23,599
servers sitting in one of these right

3135
01:52:26,709 --> 01:52:25,360
and you'd bring your hardware and walk

3136
01:52:27,750 --> 01:52:26,719
right in and they'd say here's the rack

3137
01:52:29,510 --> 01:52:27,760
you put it in

3138
01:52:31,189 --> 01:52:29,520
and you'd get a key to the front door

3139
01:52:32,390 --> 01:52:31,199
and a key to the rack that your server's

3140
01:52:34,629 --> 01:52:32,400
on and you could walk

3141
01:52:36,629 --> 01:52:34,639
when i had mine there i used to walk by

3142
01:52:37,830 --> 01:52:36,639
comcast and rcn servers that i could

3143
01:52:39,109 --> 01:52:37,840
literally reach over and touch all the

3144
01:52:41,030 --> 01:52:39,119
buttons on if i felt like

3145
01:52:42,550 --> 01:52:41,040
right right everyone was just co-located

3146
01:52:43,189 --> 01:52:42,560
in these big facilities because they had

3147
01:52:44,870 --> 01:52:43,199
the power

3148
01:52:46,709 --> 01:52:44,880
the internet the air conditioning and

3149
01:52:49,750 --> 01:52:46,719
all the other stuff you needed

3150
01:52:51,189 --> 01:52:49,760
and um and those types of places are

3151
01:52:51,589 --> 01:52:51,199
kind of a dying breed because you have

3152
01:52:54,870 --> 01:52:51,599
these

3153
01:52:57,990 --> 01:52:54,880
giant companies like amazon with aws

3154
01:52:59,910 --> 01:52:58,000
and microsoft with azure and ibm

3155
01:53:01,669 --> 01:52:59,920
have a cloud now you know everyone's got

3156
01:53:03,350 --> 01:53:01,679
a cloud now google with their gcp their

3157
01:53:06,470 --> 01:53:03,360
google compute cloud and

3158
01:53:08,390 --> 01:53:06,480
um and you can just you know rent time

3159
01:53:10,310 --> 01:53:08,400
on servers from them

3160
01:53:11,589 --> 01:53:10,320
and uh so you no longer have to go into

3161
01:53:13,109 --> 01:53:11,599
data centers and manage your own

3162
01:53:14,390 --> 01:53:13,119
hardware and deal with your own hardware

3163
01:53:16,149 --> 01:53:14,400
failure anymore and

3164
01:53:18,070 --> 01:53:16,159
you know depending on your use case it's

3165
01:53:20,229 --> 01:53:18,080
it's good or it's bad but

3166
01:53:21,910 --> 01:53:20,239
because of their actions there are far

3167
01:53:23,669 --> 01:53:21,920
fewer places for you to co-locate your

3168
01:53:26,629 --> 01:53:23,679
own servers at anymore

3169
01:53:28,550 --> 01:53:26,639
and um that means there's far less

3170
01:53:29,669 --> 01:53:28,560
places for people to put their dark web

3171
01:53:31,189 --> 01:53:29,679
stuff up on but

3172
01:53:32,629 --> 01:53:31,199
like when you're thinking about just tor

3173
01:53:34,310 --> 01:53:32,639
or anything like that there are

3174
01:53:36,390 --> 01:53:34,320
surprising number of those nodes

3175
01:53:37,589 --> 01:53:36,400
at like universities because the

3176
01:53:39,350 --> 01:53:37,599
universities will have

3177
01:53:41,109 --> 01:53:39,360
college students in their various

3178
01:53:43,430 --> 01:53:41,119
courses bm programming or

3179
01:53:45,270 --> 01:53:43,440
cryptography related classes uh you know

3180
01:53:47,910 --> 01:53:45,280
all on the cs courses

3181
01:53:48,790 --> 01:53:47,920
um that are working on torah as part of

3182
01:53:51,350 --> 01:53:48,800
kind of you know

3183
01:53:52,550 --> 01:53:51,360
be it their final project or just part

3184
01:53:53,589 --> 01:53:52,560
of something the school is actually a

3185
01:53:56,950 --> 01:53:53,599
piece of

3186
01:54:00,709 --> 01:53:56,960
so uh the dark web and i remember

3187
01:54:04,070 --> 01:54:00,719
reading the data on this where

3188
01:54:06,550 --> 01:54:04,080
you have the surface web and

3189
01:54:07,350 --> 01:54:06,560
and i you know i would read these data

3190
01:54:10,310 --> 01:54:07,360
numbers

3191
01:54:11,030 --> 01:54:10,320
but the things that are underneath that

3192
01:54:14,790 --> 01:54:11,040
are

3193
01:54:16,870 --> 01:54:14,800
ginormous numbers dwarf

3194
01:54:18,229 --> 01:54:16,880
what we actually know and the amount of

3195
01:54:21,270 --> 01:54:18,239
web pages

3196
01:54:24,790 --> 01:54:21,280
uh that are out there and websites

3197
01:54:27,189 --> 01:54:24,800
of us normal users and what is actually

3198
01:54:28,790 --> 01:54:27,199
underneath that it's a two different

3199
01:54:31,270 --> 01:54:28,800
sets of numbers

3200
01:54:32,149 --> 01:54:31,280
where are all of these servers uh

3201
01:54:34,790 --> 01:54:32,159
located

3202
01:54:36,870 --> 01:54:34,800
that are storing all of this data in the

3203
01:54:38,790 --> 01:54:36,880
dark web

3204
01:54:40,390 --> 01:54:38,800
uh in those types of co-location

3205
01:54:43,669 --> 01:54:40,400
facilities normally

3206
01:54:46,390 --> 01:54:43,679
dark websites aren't um heavy traffic

3207
01:54:47,189 --> 01:54:46,400
so they don't need a lot of hardware so

3208
01:54:50,070 --> 01:54:47,199
you know

3209
01:54:51,189 --> 01:54:50,080
large dark websites run on still

3210
01:54:54,229 --> 01:54:51,199
individual servers

3211
01:54:55,270 --> 01:54:54,239
unlike you know a large you know surface

3212
01:54:56,950 --> 01:54:55,280
web

3213
01:54:58,390 --> 01:54:56,960
site might need multiple servers to be

3214
01:55:00,310 --> 01:54:58,400
running might even need multiple data

3215
01:55:02,790 --> 01:55:00,320
centers to themselves to be running

3216
01:55:04,870 --> 01:55:02,800
uh most sites on the dark web are small

3217
01:55:07,430 --> 01:55:04,880
enough that uh one

3218
01:55:08,149 --> 01:55:07,440
piece one small piece of one server will

3219
01:55:09,830 --> 01:55:08,159
work so

3220
01:55:11,910 --> 01:55:09,840
you can fit hundreds of these sites on a

3221
01:55:14,390 --> 01:55:11,920
server um

3222
01:55:16,550 --> 01:55:14,400
and so there are there are groups there

3223
01:55:19,750 --> 01:55:16,560
was one called freedom hosting

3224
01:55:21,350 --> 01:55:19,760
and um freedom hosting uh was

3225
01:55:22,870 --> 01:55:21,360
kind of what you would expect out of the

3226
01:55:24,310 --> 01:55:22,880
name um

3227
01:55:25,750 --> 01:55:24,320
anything and everything goes i'm not

3228
01:55:26,950 --> 01:55:25,760
looking at your servers and don't tell

3229
01:55:30,550 --> 01:55:26,960
me what's on them

3230
01:55:32,870 --> 01:55:30,560
uh was their policy and uh

3231
01:55:35,109 --> 01:55:32,880
a group of hackers actually got really

3232
01:55:36,870 --> 01:55:35,119
angry at the fact that you know

3233
01:55:38,229 --> 01:55:36,880
because freedom hosting had that as

3234
01:55:40,070 --> 01:55:38,239
their way there were

3235
01:55:41,750 --> 01:55:40,080
everything from some terrorist websites

3236
01:55:43,189 --> 01:55:41,760
that were you know actually plotting you

3237
01:55:44,709 --> 01:55:43,199
know different attacks through

3238
01:55:46,950 --> 01:55:44,719
sites that were obviously hosted on

3239
01:55:48,790 --> 01:55:46,960
freedom hosting to some actual

3240
01:55:51,350 --> 01:55:48,800
child pornography sites got onto their

3241
01:55:54,070 --> 01:55:51,360
uh their network and um

3242
01:55:56,629 --> 01:55:54,080
they got hacked and everything deleted

3243
01:55:58,709 --> 01:55:56,639
uh by a group of hackers at one point

3244
01:56:00,070 --> 01:55:58,719
but uh accidentally the hackers didn't

3245
01:56:01,990 --> 01:56:00,080
even mean to do this

3246
01:56:03,510 --> 01:56:02,000
it exposed enough information about the

3247
01:56:05,990 --> 01:56:03,520
hosting uh

3248
01:56:07,270 --> 01:56:06,000
of it that um the feds actually went in

3249
01:56:09,669 --> 01:56:07,280
and caught that one

3250
01:56:11,510 --> 01:56:09,679
freedom hosting two came up and uh

3251
01:56:12,390 --> 01:56:11,520
basically the exact same scenario again

3252
01:56:14,950 --> 01:56:12,400
so

3253
01:56:16,470 --> 01:56:14,960
uh you know it is tough to be one of the

3254
01:56:17,510 --> 01:56:16,480
guys trying to maintain those types of

3255
01:56:18,950 --> 01:56:17,520
servers but

3256
01:56:20,709 --> 01:56:18,960
if you wanted to put a website up on the

3257
01:56:21,990 --> 01:56:20,719
dark web you you can host one at home i

3258
01:56:24,470 --> 01:56:22,000
mean you set up a

3259
01:56:25,990 --> 01:56:24,480
a tour relay at home and and then you

3260
01:56:27,589 --> 01:56:26,000
know you you can get an address that

3261
01:56:28,229 --> 01:56:27,599
just points right at your home computer

3262
01:56:31,589 --> 01:56:28,239
and

3263
01:56:35,510 --> 01:56:31,599
run one at home now we've uh also

3264
01:56:38,709 --> 01:56:35,520
heard a lot about these uh

3265
01:56:40,550 --> 01:56:38,719
different uh web farms and server farms

3266
01:56:42,870 --> 01:56:40,560
that are out in the middle of the ocean

3267
01:56:45,030 --> 01:56:42,880
right that are in these remote locations

3268
01:56:46,870 --> 01:56:45,040
iceland and greenland and

3269
01:56:48,229 --> 01:56:46,880
there's probably one in antarctica by

3270
01:56:51,510 --> 01:56:48,239
now uh

3271
01:56:51,990 --> 01:56:51,520
how much of this is real i mean there

3272
01:56:56,229 --> 01:56:52,000
aren't

3273
01:56:59,189 --> 01:56:56,239
government research places but

3274
01:57:00,870 --> 01:56:59,199
iceland has a has a big set of data

3275
01:57:04,149 --> 01:57:00,880
centers on it um

3276
01:57:05,990 --> 01:57:04,159
because uh the energy uh and the air

3277
01:57:07,030 --> 01:57:06,000
conditioning both happen to be really

3278
01:57:08,310 --> 01:57:07,040
cheap there because you get the

3279
01:57:11,109 --> 01:57:08,320
geothermal

3280
01:57:12,629 --> 01:57:11,119
uh providing power uh and then you know

3281
01:57:13,990 --> 01:57:12,639
honestly open the windows for the

3282
01:57:16,070 --> 01:57:14,000
cooling uh when you're

3283
01:57:17,750 --> 01:57:16,080
when you've got it far enough north uh

3284
01:57:20,229 --> 01:57:17,760
so there there's a there's a few good

3285
01:57:22,229 --> 01:57:20,239
sized data centers in iceland uh

3286
01:57:24,229 --> 01:57:22,239
the the other kind of offshore ones like

3287
01:57:25,669 --> 01:57:24,239
when you're talking like the uh more

3288
01:57:27,990 --> 01:57:25,679
joke ones like uh

3289
01:57:29,589 --> 01:57:28,000
sealand there and others they've never

3290
01:57:30,790 --> 01:57:29,599
been profitable enough to stay up and

3291
01:57:33,990 --> 01:57:30,800
running long enough

3292
01:57:37,109 --> 01:57:34,000
to really make any kind of an impact and

3293
01:57:40,149 --> 01:57:37,119
the access

3294
01:57:43,669 --> 01:57:40,159
with something remote like a data center

3295
01:57:46,070 --> 01:57:43,679
in iceland how easy is it

3296
01:57:47,270 --> 01:57:46,080
for how much should they protect that

3297
01:57:48,950 --> 01:57:47,280
information

3298
01:57:50,709 --> 01:57:48,960
you know if the united states wanted

3299
01:57:54,229 --> 01:57:50,719
access to that server farm

3300
01:57:56,470 --> 01:57:54,239
does iceland give it up you know iceland

3301
01:57:58,149 --> 01:57:56,480
is actually really strong on their

3302
01:58:00,550 --> 01:57:58,159
on their security measures and on their

3303
01:58:02,870 --> 01:58:00,560
privacy measures um

3304
01:58:04,709 --> 01:58:02,880
so it's really interesting because our

3305
01:58:06,390 --> 01:58:04,719
government has actually violated what

3306
01:58:09,750 --> 01:58:06,400
they consider their sovereignty

3307
01:58:13,430 --> 01:58:09,760
uh twice in the last uh uh

3308
01:58:16,870 --> 01:58:13,440
what 15 years um by us having

3309
01:58:17,669 --> 01:58:16,880
actual federal u.s agents go and conduct

3310
01:58:20,790 --> 01:58:17,679
business

3311
01:58:22,629 --> 01:58:20,800
in iceland in reykjavik um and

3312
01:58:23,910 --> 01:58:22,639
do it without informing the local

3313
01:58:24,950 --> 01:58:23,920
government that they were doing it and

3314
01:58:26,790 --> 01:58:24,960
then coming home

3315
01:58:27,990 --> 01:58:26,800
and iceland only finding out about it

3316
01:58:30,870 --> 01:58:28,000
through the news

3317
01:58:31,510 --> 01:58:30,880
so i i think uh i think relations there

3318
01:58:33,189 --> 01:58:31,520
aren't uh

3319
01:58:36,149 --> 01:58:33,199
that good and you also have to remember

3320
01:58:38,229 --> 01:58:36,159
that like uh the pirate party itself uh

3321
01:58:39,750 --> 01:58:38,239
holds a lot of offices in government

3322
01:58:41,189 --> 01:58:39,760
there um

3323
01:58:43,189 --> 01:58:41,199
there there's a lot of powerful people

3324
01:58:44,229 --> 01:58:43,199
there who are all about privacy and

3325
01:58:46,709 --> 01:58:44,239
security

3326
01:58:47,510 --> 01:58:46,719
right and so when we look at something

3327
01:58:50,550 --> 01:58:47,520
like

3328
01:58:53,589 --> 01:58:50,560
uh the group that is using

3329
01:58:57,030 --> 01:58:53,599
uh you know our evil and

3330
01:58:58,629 --> 01:58:57,040
that collective of individuals that is

3331
01:59:02,310 --> 01:58:58,639
there

3332
01:59:04,709 --> 01:59:02,320
isn't it easy to pinpoint exactly

3333
01:59:05,910 --> 01:59:04,719
where this is occurring and where that

3334
01:59:08,149 --> 01:59:05,920
server is

3335
01:59:09,830 --> 01:59:08,159
and who was doing the keystrokes into

3336
01:59:14,470 --> 01:59:09,840
that server

3337
01:59:15,910 --> 01:59:14,480
yeah no that's my point

3338
01:59:17,990 --> 01:59:15,920
i'm just saying like that's literally

3339
01:59:19,589 --> 01:59:18,000
how little they know um

3340
01:59:20,870 --> 01:59:19,599
let's say there is a server in iceland

3341
01:59:21,589 --> 01:59:20,880
who's to say that that's the actual

3342
01:59:24,310 --> 01:59:21,599
endpoint

3343
01:59:26,229 --> 01:59:24,320
that could just be you know uh the the

3344
01:59:28,470 --> 01:59:26,239
thing running the vpn that

3345
01:59:29,589 --> 01:59:28,480
is actually you know being connected to

3346
01:59:31,510 --> 01:59:29,599
by another server

3347
01:59:32,709 --> 01:59:31,520
in romania that's being connected to by

3348
01:59:34,550 --> 01:59:32,719
one in iran

3349
01:59:35,910 --> 01:59:34,560
and that one happens to be where all the

3350
01:59:39,189 --> 01:59:35,920
real data is

3351
01:59:42,070 --> 01:59:39,199
and uh when our fbi asks any

3352
01:59:43,589 --> 01:59:42,080
uh authority in iran for data or logs or

3353
01:59:45,589 --> 01:59:43,599
anything computer related

3354
01:59:47,990 --> 01:59:45,599
they usually just get flipped off once

3355
01:59:51,030 --> 01:59:48,000
uh funnily enough they actually uh

3356
01:59:52,790 --> 01:59:51,040
televised themselves uh lighting a fbi

3357
01:59:54,070 --> 01:59:52,800
request on fire they actually took like

3358
01:59:54,629 --> 01:59:54,080
the piece of mail they got and lit it on

3359
01:59:56,550 --> 01:59:54,639
fire

3360
01:59:58,870 --> 01:59:56,560
just to show how much they care about

3361
02:00:01,350 --> 01:59:58,880
our requests for help

3362
02:00:03,350 --> 02:00:01,360
um yeah so uh if you could ever find

3363
02:00:05,510 --> 02:00:03,360
hosting in iran it's a pretty safe bet

3364
02:00:07,510 --> 02:00:05,520
that you're in good shape now

3365
02:00:09,189 --> 02:00:07,520
if you do something that is against

3366
02:00:10,629 --> 02:00:09,199
their local laws and whoever's nice

3367
02:00:11,830 --> 02:00:10,639
enough to give you that hosting gets

3368
02:00:14,149 --> 02:00:11,840
caught

3369
02:00:15,510 --> 02:00:14,159
you've hurt someone but you haven't hurt

3370
02:00:16,390 --> 02:00:15,520
yourself you aren't getting in trouble

3371
02:00:18,870 --> 02:00:16,400
for it

3372
02:00:19,589 --> 02:00:18,880
now what how strong you're a horrible

3373
02:00:23,270 --> 02:00:19,599
person

3374
02:00:27,430 --> 02:00:23,280
how strong is the encryption

3375
02:00:31,830 --> 02:00:27,440
not only with onion technology and tor

3376
02:00:34,229 --> 02:00:31,840
but vpns and internet traffic in general

3377
02:00:35,189 --> 02:00:34,239
how strong is that encryption can it all

3378
02:00:38,229 --> 02:00:35,199
be cracked

3379
02:00:38,950 --> 02:00:38,239
and is that information in use by the

3380
02:00:41,109 --> 02:00:38,960
nsa

3381
02:00:44,149 --> 02:00:41,119
and the way that snowden has presented

3382
02:00:47,350 --> 02:00:46,629
uh you know the encryption is getting a

3383
02:00:49,030 --> 02:00:47,360
lot better

3384
02:00:51,669 --> 02:00:49,040
um you know tor's encryption the onion

3385
02:00:53,350 --> 02:00:51,679
encryption itself hasn't been broken uh

3386
02:00:54,390 --> 02:00:53,360
there's been some mathematical attacks

3387
02:00:56,709 --> 02:00:54,400
that have

3388
02:00:58,229 --> 02:00:56,719
uh gotten through like if you're looking

3389
02:01:00,149 --> 02:00:58,239
at it in that kind of onion way like

3390
02:01:01,430 --> 02:01:00,159
imagine there's seven layers to this

3391
02:01:03,109 --> 02:01:01,440
there have been some mathematical

3392
02:01:05,350 --> 02:01:03,119
attacks that theoretically break through

3393
02:01:07,910 --> 02:01:05,360
a few of the layers but not all of them

3394
02:01:08,709 --> 02:01:07,920
uh as the supercomputers we have get

3395
02:01:10,870 --> 02:01:08,719
more and more

3396
02:01:12,229 --> 02:01:10,880
powerful and as quantum computing you

3397
02:01:15,030 --> 02:01:12,239
know gets ever closer

3398
02:01:16,470 --> 02:01:15,040
um you know it's it's gonna get easier

3399
02:01:17,750 --> 02:01:16,480
to break some of this older text so

3400
02:01:19,830 --> 02:01:17,760
we've gotta

3401
02:01:21,430 --> 02:01:19,840
stay up and ahead of it you know we've

3402
02:01:22,870 --> 02:01:21,440
got um

3403
02:01:25,189 --> 02:01:22,880
we've got a lot of people to thank for

3404
02:01:26,790 --> 02:01:25,199
bringing ssl to the wider web in a way

3405
02:01:28,149 --> 02:01:26,800
that it was free and that it was easy

3406
02:01:31,109 --> 02:01:28,159
and accessible you know

3407
02:01:32,629 --> 02:01:31,119
there was a day uh only you know a few

3408
02:01:35,990 --> 02:01:32,639
years ago where

3409
02:01:39,510 --> 02:01:36,000
the amount of websites on ssl doubled

3410
02:01:42,310 --> 02:01:39,520
uh literally in one day

3411
02:01:43,030 --> 02:01:42,320
and you're texting now who are you

3412
02:01:46,550 --> 02:01:43,040
texting to

3413
02:01:48,709 --> 02:01:46,560
you're tweeting i was not tweeting i was

3414
02:01:50,149 --> 02:01:48,719
texting a friend who just asked me if i

3415
02:01:53,669 --> 02:01:50,159
actually had room for

3416
02:01:54,629 --> 02:01:53,679
in her own words a dirty hippie to spend

3417
02:01:57,750 --> 02:01:54,639
the night

3418
02:01:58,790 --> 02:01:57,760
oh to which i said i do not uh we are

3419
02:02:01,030 --> 02:01:58,800
under lockdown

3420
02:02:03,109 --> 02:02:01,040
and i don't need some random stranger

3421
02:02:04,080 --> 02:02:03,119
from some other state who's in town and

3422
02:02:07,350 --> 02:02:04,090
can't find a hotel

3423
02:02:09,189 --> 02:02:07,360
[Laughter]

3424
02:02:11,109 --> 02:02:09,199
because i've been watching you tweet uh

3425
02:02:13,430 --> 02:02:11,119
throughout the show tonight

3426
02:02:16,149 --> 02:02:13,440
oh sure that i don't type so loudly like

3427
02:02:20,229 --> 02:02:16,159
please go away

3428
02:02:23,510 --> 02:02:20,239
the um uh the

3429
02:02:26,310 --> 02:02:23,520
this is this is where if

3430
02:02:27,990 --> 02:02:26,320
if you are up to no good like these are

3431
02:02:31,030 --> 02:02:28,000
evil guys

3432
02:02:34,070 --> 02:02:31,040
no matter how complex your system is is

3433
02:02:35,189 --> 02:02:34,080
anybody safe is everybody safe on on the

3434
02:02:38,550 --> 02:02:35,199
dark web

3435
02:02:42,629 --> 02:02:38,560
uh when you have so many variables like

3436
02:02:45,189 --> 02:02:42,639
bitcoin uh emails the tags that are left

3437
02:02:48,550 --> 02:02:45,199
behind in the malware itself

3438
02:02:51,589 --> 02:02:48,560
is is anybody safe

3439
02:02:54,550 --> 02:02:51,599
uh for uh you know that can they get

3440
02:03:01,030 --> 02:02:57,830
uh that is literally up to the person

3441
02:03:02,310 --> 02:03:01,040
doing the act itself uh

3442
02:03:04,229 --> 02:03:02,320
if you're doing something on the dark

3443
02:03:05,030 --> 02:03:04,239
web that you don't want to get caught

3444
02:03:08,550 --> 02:03:05,040
for

3445
02:03:11,830 --> 02:03:08,560
you getting caught is 99.9

3446
02:03:14,790 --> 02:03:11,840
on you uh the human

3447
02:03:16,790 --> 02:03:14,800
always makes the error uh the encryption

3448
02:03:19,589 --> 02:03:16,800
is there if you use it right

3449
02:03:21,510 --> 02:03:19,599
uh and that takes you know some studying

3450
02:03:24,310 --> 02:03:21,520
uh the tools are there if you

3451
02:03:25,990 --> 02:03:24,320
use them right um you know i told you

3452
02:03:27,510 --> 02:03:26,000
that one story once about how they

3453
02:03:29,750 --> 02:03:27,520
literally tracked a guy

3454
02:03:30,709 --> 02:03:29,760
who bought pieces to the computer he was

3455
02:03:33,350 --> 02:03:30,719
using

3456
02:03:35,189 --> 02:03:33,360
in another state while wearing a hoodie

3457
02:03:36,149 --> 02:03:35,199
with someone else's credit card at a

3458
02:03:39,990 --> 02:03:36,159
best buy

3459
02:03:42,470 --> 02:03:40,000
they tracked back to the hacker

3460
02:03:43,910 --> 02:03:42,480
um you know again he made a mistake

3461
02:03:45,910 --> 02:03:43,920
there uh which

3462
02:03:48,709 --> 02:03:45,920
literally he looked up at the camera and

3463
02:03:51,030 --> 02:03:48,719
his face was perfectly clear on it

3464
02:03:52,950 --> 02:03:51,040
um you know and then he didn't use some

3465
02:03:56,149 --> 02:03:52,960
special software that would have made

3466
02:03:58,390 --> 02:03:56,159
that vector non-existent you know you

3467
02:03:59,830 --> 02:03:58,400
you have to do some work to maintain

3468
02:04:00,870 --> 02:03:59,840
your own you can't expect that just

3469
02:04:02,950 --> 02:04:00,880
because i'm on a

3470
02:04:04,629 --> 02:04:02,960
supposedly encrypted system on the dark

3471
02:04:06,629 --> 02:04:04,639
web where the people on the other end

3472
02:04:08,629 --> 02:04:06,639
definitely don't want me making mistakes

3473
02:04:10,709 --> 02:04:08,639
they want to remain safe too you can't

3474
02:04:12,550 --> 02:04:10,719
just assume that because of those things

3475
02:04:14,069 --> 02:04:12,560
i'm safe you've got to take a lot of

3476
02:04:16,310 --> 02:04:14,079
extra steps on your own

3477
02:04:18,069 --> 02:04:16,320
and depending on just you know what

3478
02:04:19,910 --> 02:04:18,079
you're doing and how distanced from your

3479
02:04:22,470 --> 02:04:19,920
real identity it has to be

3480
02:04:23,430 --> 02:04:22,480
i mean those steps aren't just on the

3481
02:04:26,149 --> 02:04:23,440
computer

3482
02:04:27,750 --> 02:04:26,159
for me that means i literally drive

3483
02:04:29,510 --> 02:04:27,760
pretty far away from my house

3484
02:04:30,790 --> 02:04:29,520
to a place where a computer sitting that

3485
02:04:34,069 --> 02:04:30,800
has never

3486
02:04:35,990 --> 02:04:34,079
been at my house that is rebuilt every

3487
02:04:38,550 --> 02:04:36,000
year out of spare parts from machines

3488
02:04:40,709 --> 02:04:38,560
that i find for cash um

3489
02:04:42,709 --> 02:04:40,719
that never have my name it has never had

3490
02:04:45,589 --> 02:04:42,719
my name typed into the keyboard

3491
02:04:47,270 --> 02:04:45,599
like that thing is so not me and then i

3492
02:04:48,550 --> 02:04:47,280
randomize things like the mac address

3493
02:04:50,870 --> 02:04:48,560
and everything else and

3494
02:04:53,109 --> 02:04:50,880
i have a tool that will break you know

3495
02:04:54,069 --> 02:04:53,119
simple wi-fi passwords and i go around

3496
02:04:55,350 --> 02:04:54,079
until i find

3497
02:04:56,790 --> 02:04:55,360
one that it can break and then i use

3498
02:04:57,589 --> 02:04:56,800
that for the thing i need to do at that

3499
02:04:59,910 --> 02:04:57,599
point and

3500
02:05:01,350 --> 02:04:59,920
i of course boot off of cubes at that

3501
02:05:02,470 --> 02:05:01,360
point because i need a really secure

3502
02:05:04,709 --> 02:05:02,480
system so like

3503
02:05:05,669 --> 02:05:04,719
the level of security you provide for

3504
02:05:08,550 --> 02:05:05,679
yourself

3505
02:05:08,950 --> 02:05:08,560
is how easily you're going to get caught

3506
02:05:12,629 --> 02:05:08,960
so

3507
02:05:16,229 --> 02:05:12,639
you are saying that if you don't make a

3508
02:05:19,350 --> 02:05:16,239
human error you can get away with it

3509
02:05:21,669 --> 02:05:19,360
the technology is there so

3510
02:05:23,830 --> 02:05:21,679
it would be impossible to get caught if

3511
02:05:25,189 --> 02:05:23,840
you don't make a mistake

3512
02:05:26,709 --> 02:05:25,199
there are ways to do it where you're not

3513
02:05:28,149 --> 02:05:26,719
going to get caught again i i still

3514
02:05:29,990 --> 02:05:28,159
don't think those initial people who

3515
02:05:31,910 --> 02:05:30,000
literally took 2 billion

3516
02:05:34,069 --> 02:05:31,920
are going to get caught the ones who

3517
02:05:35,589 --> 02:05:34,079
made the initial code base that now has

3518
02:05:36,390 --> 02:05:35,599
been repurposed for our evil

3519
02:05:37,910 --> 02:05:36,400
i don't think they're going to get

3520
02:05:40,229 --> 02:05:37,920
caught i think they got away with it and

3521
02:05:42,550 --> 02:05:40,239
are retired and having fun on an island

3522
02:05:43,430 --> 02:05:42,560
wow that's incredible that's absolutely

3523
02:05:46,629 --> 02:05:43,440
incredible

3524
02:05:49,910 --> 02:05:46,639
it in the future of and i discuss

3525
02:05:51,830 --> 02:05:49,920
ai a lot and it's not ai

3526
02:05:53,189 --> 02:05:51,840
it's not artificial intelligence that

3527
02:05:55,430 --> 02:05:53,199
freaks me out because we're going to get

3528
02:05:58,470 --> 02:05:55,440
to that point it's at some day and

3529
02:06:00,830 --> 02:05:58,480
that thing is inevitable but it is

3530
02:06:02,950 --> 02:06:00,840
the other side of it the basic machine

3531
02:06:06,069 --> 02:06:02,960
learning and the quest

3532
02:06:09,910 --> 02:06:06,079
for artificial general intelligence

3533
02:06:13,189 --> 02:06:09,920
uh you know a few steps below

3534
02:06:14,950 --> 02:06:13,199
you know peer ai and singularity it's

3535
02:06:16,790 --> 02:06:14,960
it's the quest that is going on right

3536
02:06:17,589 --> 02:06:16,800
now with multiple companies around the

3537
02:06:20,550 --> 02:06:17,599
world

3538
02:06:21,510 --> 02:06:20,560
when we look at agi and the machine

3539
02:06:24,950 --> 02:06:21,520
learning

3540
02:06:28,390 --> 02:06:24,960
that is happening right now right agi

3541
02:06:30,629 --> 02:06:28,400
is still a few years off pure agi

3542
02:06:31,430 --> 02:06:30,639
but the other elements of this are

3543
02:06:34,629 --> 02:06:31,440
certainly

3544
02:06:37,189 --> 02:06:34,639
in place um do you fear that

3545
02:06:37,910 --> 02:06:37,199
do you do you think that there is enough

3546
02:06:41,350 --> 02:06:37,920
control

3547
02:06:43,270 --> 02:06:41,360
in place or is all of this just

3548
02:06:45,750 --> 02:06:43,280
fear porn and there's nothing to worry

3549
02:06:47,910 --> 02:06:45,760
about

3550
02:06:48,790 --> 02:06:47,920
i think the right controls can be put in

3551
02:06:51,830 --> 02:06:48,800
place uh

3552
02:06:55,669 --> 02:06:51,840
i think uh you know we live in

3553
02:06:59,189 --> 02:06:55,679
a uh capitalist society that is uh

3554
02:07:02,470 --> 02:06:59,199
a little driven by the wrong uh

3555
02:07:04,390 --> 02:07:02,480
forces it sometimes so the right

3556
02:07:06,709 --> 02:07:04,400
motivation has to be there for them to

3557
02:07:08,390 --> 02:07:06,719
actually put in that work in that effort

3558
02:07:09,830 --> 02:07:08,400
there are some groups working on that

3559
02:07:11,830 --> 02:07:09,840
effort there is uh

3560
02:07:13,669 --> 02:07:11,840
you know the artificial intelligence uh

3561
02:07:14,790 --> 02:07:13,679
group uh that's kind of a bunch of

3562
02:07:17,189 --> 02:07:14,800
company founders

3563
02:07:18,950 --> 02:07:17,199
and uh and college professors who have

3564
02:07:22,550 --> 02:07:18,960
come together to set up

3565
02:07:25,350 --> 02:07:22,560
some basic structural ideas of how we uh

3566
02:07:26,149 --> 02:07:25,360
define the the the places that ai is

3567
02:07:27,830 --> 02:07:26,159
allowed to play

3568
02:07:29,910 --> 02:07:27,840
and what access it gets to certain types

3569
02:07:32,310 --> 02:07:29,920
of data and you know whether

3570
02:07:33,510 --> 02:07:32,320
true agi would ever be given full access

3571
02:07:34,950 --> 02:07:33,520
to the internet where it could do

3572
02:07:36,790 --> 02:07:34,960
whatever it wanted you know

3573
02:07:39,510 --> 02:07:36,800
there there are people trying to build

3574
02:07:40,149 --> 02:07:39,520
sandboxes for the agi to be locked into

3575
02:07:42,550 --> 02:07:40,159
um

3576
02:07:44,229 --> 02:07:42,560
whether uh that works or not you know we

3577
02:07:46,310 --> 02:07:44,239
just don't know but um

3578
02:07:47,830 --> 02:07:46,320
i'm very much science-minded very much

3579
02:07:50,629 --> 02:07:47,840
uh you know

3580
02:07:52,229 --> 02:07:50,639
into the research and um it's kind of

3581
02:07:55,109 --> 02:07:52,239
like the singularity you know the

3582
02:07:56,229 --> 02:07:55,119
the idea that uh at some point that agi

3583
02:07:58,149 --> 02:07:56,239
those computers and

3584
02:07:59,910 --> 02:07:58,159
and then you know with quantum coming up

3585
02:08:01,910 --> 02:07:59,920
uh we're gonna get to that point where

3586
02:08:03,510 --> 02:08:01,920
the computer is smart enough to build a

3587
02:08:06,310 --> 02:08:03,520
a computer on its own that's

3588
02:08:07,750 --> 02:08:06,320
smarter than it is and it'll design it

3589
02:08:09,589 --> 02:08:07,760
and hand us the plans and

3590
02:08:11,430 --> 02:08:09,599
you know by the 50th iteration of that

3591
02:08:13,510 --> 02:08:11,440
which should be only the next morning

3592
02:08:15,270 --> 02:08:13,520
right um right it's now building itself

3593
02:08:17,109 --> 02:08:15,280
without us having to build anymore

3594
02:08:18,950 --> 02:08:17,119
and a few days in you know what it's the

3595
02:08:20,709 --> 02:08:18,960
best possible physical thing our

3596
02:08:22,069 --> 02:08:20,719
universe could actually allow for

3597
02:08:24,629 --> 02:08:22,079
because it keeps getting that much more

3598
02:08:26,709 --> 02:08:24,639
smarter than itself and what does it do

3599
02:08:28,950 --> 02:08:26,719
and there's the argument of well who

3600
02:08:31,430 --> 02:08:28,960
would plug that machine in to begin with

3601
02:08:31,990 --> 02:08:31,440
i would i i let's go i want to see what

3602
02:08:34,069 --> 02:08:32,000
it does

3603
02:08:35,669 --> 02:08:34,079
well and see and this is this is the

3604
02:08:38,790 --> 02:08:35,679
trippy part about this

3605
02:08:40,790 --> 02:08:38,800
where and i'm i'm speaking now to the

3606
02:08:43,270 --> 02:08:40,800
average person you need to listen to

3607
02:08:47,189 --> 02:08:43,280
what i am saying

3608
02:08:49,910 --> 02:08:47,199
once that line is crossed with agi

3609
02:08:52,229 --> 02:08:49,920
and you need to really think about this

3610
02:08:55,109 --> 02:08:52,239
if you're in a conversation

3611
02:08:56,709 --> 02:08:55,119
with somebody and you're having a normal

3612
02:08:59,750 --> 02:08:56,719
back and forth

3613
02:09:04,149 --> 02:08:59,760
but you have the ability to

3614
02:09:07,669 --> 02:09:04,159
think at the level of an agi computer

3615
02:09:11,350 --> 02:09:07,679
you are able to think about your

3616
02:09:14,390 --> 02:09:11,360
answer in that conversation

3617
02:09:17,109 --> 02:09:14,400
with the calculations of a year

3618
02:09:17,510 --> 02:09:17,119
you can think about your answer for a

3619
02:09:20,870 --> 02:09:17,520
year

3620
02:09:23,669 --> 02:09:20,880
you can contemplate your

3621
02:09:25,109 --> 02:09:23,679
brilliant response and have a year to

3622
02:09:28,870 --> 02:09:25,119
respond to it

3623
02:09:32,950 --> 02:09:28,880
but that year of thinking

3624
02:09:35,669 --> 02:09:32,960
happens in a nanosecond

3625
02:09:36,149 --> 02:09:35,679
wrap your head around that think about

3626
02:09:48,069 --> 02:09:36,159
that

3627
02:09:50,950 --> 02:09:48,079
our concept of thinking and conversation

3628
02:09:52,069 --> 02:09:50,960
and and testing and results and theories

3629
02:09:55,910 --> 02:09:52,079
and things

3630
02:09:58,229 --> 02:09:55,920
this is in a real-time human brain

3631
02:09:59,270 --> 02:09:58,239
when you then apply that like you just

3632
02:10:01,510 --> 02:09:59,280
said greg

3633
02:10:03,669 --> 02:10:01,520
where a computer can go and rewrite its

3634
02:10:04,629 --> 02:10:03,679
own code and develop a better version of

3635
02:10:07,830 --> 02:10:04,639
itself

3636
02:10:08,870 --> 02:10:07,840
in a couple of minutes by the next

3637
02:10:11,189 --> 02:10:08,880
morning

3638
02:10:12,149 --> 02:10:11,199
you got a room full of things that you

3639
02:10:15,430 --> 02:10:12,159
have no

3640
02:10:19,030 --> 02:10:15,440
concept of that is what agi

3641
02:10:23,189 --> 02:10:21,510
uh yeah i mean we will definitely i i

3642
02:10:25,910 --> 02:10:23,199
don't think we're able to predict what

3643
02:10:28,790 --> 02:10:25,920
happens when agi appears no matter what

3644
02:10:29,350 --> 02:10:28,800
uh we really wrap around it so i go with

3645
02:10:31,430 --> 02:10:29,360
uh

3646
02:10:34,069 --> 02:10:31,440
my wife's idea on this one and she says

3647
02:10:34,790 --> 02:10:34,079
uh anything that's even slightly robotic

3648
02:10:37,189 --> 02:10:34,800
at this point

3649
02:10:37,990 --> 02:10:37,199
let alone towards ai be really nice and

3650
02:10:39,830 --> 02:10:38,000
hug it

3651
02:10:41,189 --> 02:10:39,840
um just treat it nicely so when they

3652
02:10:43,350 --> 02:10:41,199
remember in the future you were one of

3653
02:10:45,830 --> 02:10:43,360
the nice ones

3654
02:10:47,109 --> 02:10:45,840
that you changed the oil you were

3655
02:10:49,910 --> 02:10:47,119
respectful

3656
02:10:51,510 --> 02:10:49,920
and you never let the battery drain make

3657
02:10:52,790 --> 02:10:51,520
sure they remember that you treated

3658
02:10:54,950 --> 02:10:52,800
their ancestors well

3659
02:10:56,069 --> 02:10:54,960
absolutely greg house you are the

3660
02:10:58,149 --> 02:10:56,079
absolute best my man

3661
02:11:00,550 --> 02:10:58,159
what's uh what's the launch date on the

3662
02:11:02,550 --> 02:11:00,560
new website what's the good news

3663
02:11:03,830 --> 02:11:02,560
uh probably about the end of august

3664
02:11:05,189 --> 02:11:03,840
right now

3665
02:11:06,709 --> 02:11:05,199
do you have the council for a little

3666
02:11:07,189 --> 02:11:06,719
earlier than that but no later than that

3667
02:11:10,149 --> 02:11:07,199
okay

3668
02:11:11,990 --> 02:11:10,159
there you go and uh the podcast is that

3669
02:11:12,790 --> 02:11:12,000
going to wait until the website is

3670
02:11:14,229 --> 02:11:12,800
launched

3671
02:11:16,709 --> 02:11:14,239
it's going to come along with it yeah

3672
02:11:18,629 --> 02:11:16,719
yeah there you go greg keep us posted

3673
02:11:20,629 --> 02:11:18,639
i look forward to our next conversation

3674
02:11:21,830 --> 02:11:20,639
here on fade to black but i always

3675
02:11:23,669 --> 02:11:21,840
learned something

3676
02:11:25,350 --> 02:11:23,679
and uh tonight was absolutely amazing

3677
02:11:26,870 --> 02:11:25,360
thank you so much my friend

3678
02:11:28,709 --> 02:11:26,880
absolutely always happy to be here man

3679
02:11:30,229 --> 02:11:28,719
uh go and cause some trouble i'll talk

3680
02:11:33,350 --> 02:11:30,239
to you soon

3681
02:11:36,830 --> 02:11:33,360
greg and greg's uh

3682
02:11:39,350 --> 02:11:36,840
website and the links for it are over at

3683
02:11:40,310 --> 02:11:39,360
jimmychurchradio.com there is a counter

3684
02:11:42,629 --> 02:11:40,320
that is there

3685
02:11:43,669 --> 02:11:42,639
announcing uh when everything is about

3686
02:11:45,510 --> 02:11:43,679
to kick off

3687
02:11:46,709 --> 02:11:45,520
but uh what a great conversation tonight

3688
02:11:48,550 --> 02:11:46,719
thank you so much greg

3689
02:11:50,390 --> 02:11:48,560
i want to remind everybody that this

3690
02:11:51,270 --> 02:11:50,400
week we did a little bit of programming

3691
02:11:53,350 --> 02:11:51,280
changes

3692
02:11:54,950 --> 02:11:53,360
thursday night is not fader night we're

3693
02:11:57,030 --> 02:11:54,960
not going to have open lines thursday

3694
02:11:59,270 --> 02:11:57,040
night we have linda moulton howe here

3695
02:12:01,430 --> 02:11:59,280
tomorrow night go beckley tepe our

3696
02:12:02,149 --> 02:12:01,440
favorite subject always here on fade to

3697
02:12:05,109 --> 02:12:02,159
black

3698
02:12:05,669 --> 02:12:05,119
uh tomorrow night is our annual uh fade

3699
02:12:08,229 --> 02:12:05,679
to black

3700
02:12:08,790 --> 02:12:08,239
go beckley teppy special event with

3701
02:12:11,189 --> 02:12:08,800
robert

3702
02:12:11,830 --> 02:12:11,199
m shock you're not going to want to miss

3703
02:12:15,189 --> 02:12:11,840
that

3704
02:12:17,109 --> 02:12:15,199
get out of here

3705
02:12:18,870 --> 02:12:17,119
got to thank greg house for another

3706
02:12:20,709 --> 02:12:18,880
great conversation tonight

3707
02:12:22,149 --> 02:12:20,719
tomorrow night robert m shock and of

3708
02:12:24,229 --> 02:12:22,159
course thursday night

3709
02:12:26,790 --> 02:12:24,239
linda moulton howe fade to black's

3710
02:12:30,390 --> 02:12:26,800
executive producer is rita kamarian

3711
02:12:33,270 --> 02:12:30,400
shows produced by hilton j palm renee

3712
02:12:34,629 --> 02:12:33,280
dennis and kevin announces our steve

3713
02:12:37,830 --> 02:12:34,639
harter jean patel and mark d

3714
02:12:41,229 --> 02:12:37,840
cova webmaster is drew the geek

3715
02:12:42,629 --> 02:12:41,239
music doug aldridge intro spaceboy

3716
02:12:44,870 --> 02:12:42,639
spaceboymusic.com

3717
02:12:47,189 --> 02:12:44,880
david black is produced by kjcr for the

3718
02:12:50,229 --> 02:12:47,199
game changer network and syndication is

3719
02:12:52,390 --> 02:12:50,239
r a the planet spot cast owning

3720
02:12:53,910 --> 02:12:52,400
copyrighted 2020 by fade to black in the

3721
02:12:55,910 --> 02:12:53,920
game changer network it cannot be

3722
02:12:57,510 --> 02:12:55,920
re-broadcast downloaded copied or used

3723
02:12:59,189 --> 02:12:57,520
anywhere in the known universe

3724
02:13:01,109 --> 02:12:59,199
without written permission from fade to

3725
02:13:03,350 --> 02:13:01,119
black or the game changer network

3726
02:13:04,790 --> 02:13:03,360
i'm your host jimmy church until

3727
02:13:09,589 --> 02:13:04,800
tomorrow night with

3728
02:13:21,530 --> 02:13:09,599
robert shock i want everybody to be safe

3729
02:13:21,540 --> 02:13:42,830
[Music]

3730
02:13:42,840 --> 02:13:49,310
wow